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I. INTRODUCTION
Education may be a cornerstone of our society, but the tax treatment
of higher education expenses does not appear to have resulted from an intel-
lectual exercise that would make our nation's educators' proud. The Inter-
nal Revenue Code' provides two separate, but equally unsatisfying, routes
that allow taxpayers to offset their income with the costs of higher educa-
tion.
Where an individual can reduce her tax liability while receiving an
education, the effect is to reduce significantly the cost of that education.
This "subsidization" is greatly needed as higher education costs have gener-
ally risen faster than the rate of inflation.2 Between 1976 and 2006, college
tuition and fees generally rose by more than twice the rate of inflation.' For
the 2009-2010 academic year, the average cost at public two-year institu-
tions was $2,544 per year, while the average cost at public and private four-
year institutions was $7,020 and $26,273 per year, respectively.'
1. Unless otherwise defined herein, the term "Code" refers to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended. References to a "Section" refer to a Section of the Internal Rev-
enue Code. References to the "Service" refer to the Internal Revenue Service.
2. Students' struggles to pay the costs of higher education are not new. See Note,
Federal Tax Incentives for Higher Education, 76 HARv. L. REV. 369 (1962) (explaining
students with the ability to do college work have been forced to forgo higher education be-
cause of an inability to pay the cost).
3. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, JCX-35-08, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS
RELATING TO TAx BENEFITS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 30 (Comm. Print 2008).
4. See COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2009 2, available at
http://advocacy.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2009 TrendsCollegePricingreport.pdf.
This represents increases of 7.3%, 6.5% and 4.4% respectively. Id. According to the U.S.
News & World Report 2010 rankings survey, the cost for graduate education is even greater.
The full-time tuition for the twenty-five top-ranked MBA programs in the country for the
2009-2010 academic year ranges from $20,525 to $51,321. Best Business Schools, US NEWS
& WORLD REPORT, http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-
schools/top-business-schools/mba-rankings (last visited Sept. 21, 2010) (on file with author).
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Increased costs have made the decision to pursue education beyond
high school resemble other investment decisions. It, however, is an invest-
ment that provides good returns.' In 2005, the median income for a full-
time year-round worker in the United States with a high school diploma was
$31,500.6 Workers with a four-year college degree had median earnings of
$50,900 (a sixty-two percent increase).' In 2008, median earnings for
workers with a bachelor's degree were almost sixty-five percent more
($33,800 v. $55,700) than those with solely a high school diploma.8 For
those with greater levels of education, the disparity was even greater. In
2005, median earnings for those with a master's degree were more than
eighty-one percent above high school graduates.' In 2008, these more edu-
cated workers had median earnings that were almost twice that of their
high-school counterparts.o In 2005, the median income of workers with
professional degrees ($100,000) was more than sixty percent higher than
those with a master's degree ($67,300), and more than three times greater
than that of high school graduates ($31,500)." In 2008, those with profes-
sional degrees earned almost fifty percent more than those with master's
5. One recent study notes this statement is a subject of controversy:
[Q]uestions have intensified about whether going to college is worthwhile and
whether it is appropriate to encourage young people who are on the fence about
continuing their education after high school to attend college. We believe it is crit-
ical that more people be in a position to examine for themselves the evidence of the
benefits of a college degree, rather than relying on the opinions of others-
opinions that are too frequently grounded in ideology and anecdotes rather than
evidence.
It is both reasonable and constructive to ask whether and for whom the expense of
postsecondary education is a good investment.
See SANDY BAUM ET AL., COLLEGE BOARD, EDUCATION PAYs 2010: THE BENEFITS OF HIGHER
EDUCATION FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY 6 (2010), available at http://trends.college
board.org/downloads/EducationPays-2010.pdf [hereinafter EDUCATION PAYS 2010]. From
a financial standpoint alone (i.e., not including other benefits of higher education), the au-
thors conclude the costs of education are outweighed by the benefits. "If the earnings of all
adults at each level of education are considered-instead of only those working full-time
year-round-the typical four-year college graduate makes up for time out of the labor force
and for paying tuition by age 30." Id. at 13.
6. See SANDY BAUM & JENNIFER MA, EDUCATION PAYS 2007: THE BENEFITS OF
HIGHER EDUCATION FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY (2007) 9, available at
http://www.collegeboard.com/prod-downloads/about/news-info/trends/ed-pays-2007.pdf
[hereinafter EDUCATION PAYS 20071.
7. Id.
8. EDUCATION PAYS 2010, supra note 5, at 11.
9. EDUCATION PAYS 2007, supra note 6, at 9. The median income of workers with
a master's degree was $61,300. Id.
10. EDUCATION PAYS 2010, supra note 5, at 11. Workers with a master's degree had
a median income of $67,300. Id.
11. EDUCATION PAYS 2007, supra note 6, at 9. The median income of workers with
a professional degree was $100,000. Id.
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degrees, and almost three times as much per year as high school graduates."
Studies of income data from both 2005 and 2008 show that median earnings
increased for each level of education attained."
Higher annual earnings translate into higher lifetime earnings for those
with advanced degrees. Based on median income data from 2005, an indi-
vidual with a bachelor's degree could expect to earn about sixty-one percent
more over a 40-year working life than the typical high school graduate.14
The lifetime earnings differential between those with a professional degree
and those with a bachelor's degree was almost eighty percent, with the dif-
ferential between those with a professional degree and a high school diplo-
ma being approximately 187 percent." Based on 2008 median earnings,
people with a bachelor's degree are expected to earn sixty-six percent more
over their lifetimes compared to high school graduates. 6 Those with pro-
fessional degrees are expected to earn 66 percent and 174 percent, respec-
tively, more than those with bachelor's degrees and high school diplomas
over their lifetimes." Although the income gap between those attaining
higher levels of education and those without had decreased slightly from
2005 to 2008, the earnings differential between higher-educated and less-
educated workers has been consistent (and has generally grown) over time."
12. EDUCATION PAYS 2010, supra note 5, at 11. Workers with a professional degree
had a median income of $100,000. Id.
13. See EDUCATION PAYS 2010, supra note 5, at 11; EDUCATION PAYS 2007, supra
note 6, at 9.
14. EDUCATION PAYS 2007, supra note 6, at 10.
15. Id.
16. EDUCATION PAYS 2010, supra note 5, at 12.
17. Id. For a clarification of how this disparity was calculated, see infra note 18.
18. A Census Bureau report noted:
[I]n 1975, full-time, year-round workers with a bachelor's degree had 1.5 times the
annual earnings of workers with only a high school diploma. By 1999, this ratio
had risen to 1.8. Workers with an advanced degree, who earned 1.8 times the earn-
ings of high school graduates in 1975, averaged 2.6 times the earnings of workers
with a high school diploma in 1999.
JENNIFER CHEESEMAN DAY & ERIC C. NEWBURGER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BIG PAYOFF:
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND SYNTHETIC ESTIMATES OF WORK-LIFE EARNINGs 3 (2002)
(footnote omitted), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-210.pdf. With
respect to the 2008 lifetime earnings figures, it should be noted that:
The calculations . . . are based on earnings of individuals working full-time year-
round. Because the proportion of adults working full-time year-round increases
with education level (for example, 67% of college graduates and 55% of high
school graduates between the ages of 45 and 54 worked full-time in 2008), the life-
time earnings differentials would be larger if all adults-or all adult workers-
were included in these calculations.
EDUCATION PAYS 2010, supra note 5, at 12. The rate of employment is also affected by
education level. As provided in one recent study:
In 2009, with an average annual unemployment rate of 7.9% for individuals ages
25 and older, unemployment had risen sharply for all levels of educational attain-
-1050 [Vol. 2010:1047
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Current law provides two ways for a taxpayer to offset her income
with expenses incurred while pursing higher education. First, where
amounts spent on education qualify as an "ordinary and necessary business
expense," a taxpayer will be entitled to deduct such expenses in computing
her taxable income ("Business Expense Deduction"). However, the Ser-
vice's current interpretation of the Business Expense Deduction is more
restrictive with respect to education expenses than with respect to other ex-
penditures.20
The second, and more limited, route to obtaining a tax subsidy arises
from certain tax incentives enacted for higher education expenses ("Tax
Incentive Provisions").2 These incentives include exclusions from gross
ment. The 4.6% unemployment rate for those with at least a four-year college de-
gree was 5.1 percentage points lower than the 9.7% unemployment rate for high
school graduates.
In 1999 and 2000, with low overall unemployment rates of 4.0% and 4.2%, respec-
tively, the gap between the unemployment rates for college graduates and high
school graduates was 1.7 percentage points.
From 1992 through 2009, the annual unemployment rate for individuals with some
college but less than a four-year degree was between 0.7 and 1.7 percentage points
lower than the unemployment rate for high school graduates.
Id. at 20.
19. See I.R.C. § 162 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (as amended in 1967). Treasury
Regulation § 1.162-5 sets forth the requirements for deducting education expenses, but never
defines "education" or "educational." The text of the regulations focuses on courses of for-
mal instruction such as "refresher courses or courses dealing with current developments as
well as academic or vocational courses." Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c)(1). The examples discuss
refresher courses, courses dealing with current events, courses within degree programs and
entire degree programs. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2)(iii), Exs. (1)-(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-
5(b)(3)(ii), Exs. (1)-(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(e)(2), Exs. (1)-(3). However, the courts have
held that education has a "broad commonsense meaning." See, e.g., Boser v. Comm'r, 77
T.C. 1124, 1130 (1981) (allowing an airline pilot to deduct some of the cost of flying his own
airplane to and from work as an educational expense); Voight v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 82 (1980),
nonacq. 1981-2 C.B. 3 (holding that a social worker could deduct the cost of her own psy-
choanalysis as an educational expense). In Lage v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 130, 134 (1969),
the court stated that "'[e]ducation' includes not merely instruction in a school, college, uni-
versity, or a formally conducted training program, but embraces the acquiring of information
and knowledge from a tutor. . . . It is clear that the deduction for educational expenses is not
limited to formal or institutional education." Id. (citations omitted).
20. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5; See also Marcus Schoenfeld, The Educational Ex-
pense Deduction: The Need For a Rational Approach, 27 VILL. L. REv. 237, 243-44 (1982);
Jay Katz, The Deductibility of Educational Costs: Why Does Congress Allow the IRS to Take
Your Education So Personally?, 17 VA. TAX REV. 1, 3-4 (1997); James L. Musselman, Fed-
eral Income Tax Deductibility of Higher Education Expenses: The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly, 35 CAP. U. L. REv. 923, 923-24 (2007).
21. The order in which this Article discusses these two differing routes is intention-
al. Many of the provisions of the Code categorized as Tax Incentive Provisions specifically
are inapplicable where the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction under another Code provision.
In other words, taxpayers entitled to a Business Expense Deduction are required to take such
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income for certain amounts used to pay for higher education expenses, as
well as a number of deductions or credits for taxpayers who make such ex-
penditures. While providing incentives for higher education is a worthy
goal, the Tax Incentive Provisions consist of a hodgepodge of confusing
statutes that fail to meet their stated objectives.22
The correlation between education and compensation-i.e., the more
education one has, the more one earns-should be properly reflected in the
tax code.23 More specifically, the Business Expense Deduction should be
revised to provide similar tax treatment for education expenses as is af-
forded other business expenses.
This Article will discuss the tax treatment of higher educational ex-
penses.24 Part II traces the history of the Business Expense Deduction with
respect to education expenses leading to the Service's current interpretation,
and provides criticism of the current law in this area. Part [H discusses the
myriad of Tax Incentive Provisions set forth in the Code, and it briefly dis-
cusses some of the concerns associated with those provisions. Part IV pro-
vides a framework for revising the Business Expense Deduction in connec-
tion with higher education expenses, providing guidelines for when such
expenses should be currently deductible and when capitalization and amor-
tization should be required. Part V concludes the Article.
At this point, I should note what this Article is not attempting to ac-
complish. This Article does not attempt to address generally whether the
government should subsidize such education. Elected officials have, for
deduction rather than utilizing a Tax Incentive Provision-regardless of which provides the
taxpayer with a greater benefit.
22. See infra Section III.D.
23. This belief is supported by the statistics referred to in this Article, as well as
those found in numerous other authorities. However, the author is cognizant of the words of
Mark Twain that "'[t]here are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics."' Mark
Twain, Chapters from My Autobiography-XX, 185 N. Am. REV. 465, 471 (1907). For a
different view of the correlation between higher education and income, see Joseph M.
Dodge, Taxing Human Capital Acquisition Costs-Or Why Costs of Higher Education
Should Not Be Deducted or Amortized, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 927 (1993).
24. In his article regarding the deductibility or amortization of higher education
costs, Professor Dodge excludes discussing the treatment of pre-college expenses stating that
"[b]ecause education is available free of charge up through the twelfth grade, the amortiza-
tion issue will be deemed to pertain only to college, graduate and professional school, and
postsecondary vocational education." See Dodge, supra note 23, at 928 n.1. This Article
similarly is limited to the tax consequences of post-secondary education expenditures. In
addition to Professor Dodge's rationale, the fact that all states require, with certain excep-
tions, that children attend school until at least the age of sixteen places education below the
college level in a different category than education that is purely voluntary and unavailable
free of charge. See Digest of Education Statistics: 2009 Tables & Figures, Table 166, NAT'L
CENTER FOR EDU. STATS., http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09_166.asp (see
figures in the 2008 compulsory attendance column) [hereinafter Education Statistics].
1052 [Vol. 2010:1047
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years, supported higher education in this country.' Nor is it an attempt to
end the debate on whether incentives for higher education should be pro-
vided through the tax code.26 Rather, this Article attempts to discuss the
current and historical tax treatment of higher education expenses and to
provide a system that more properly matches a taxpayer's income with the
associated educational expenses.
H. THE BUSINESS EXPENSE DEDUCTION
A. Introduction
Section 162(a) provides that "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business." 27 There is no specific statutory
provision governing the deductibility of education expenditures. Whether
25. See Thomas J. Kane, Beyond Tax Relief: Long-Term Challenges in Financing
Higher Education, 50 NAT'L TAx J. 335, 335 (1997) ("In his 1997 State of the Union ad-
dress, President Clinton declared educational reform the top priority of his second term.
Indeed the Administration's agenda for higher education [was] ... to '. . . make the 13th and
14th years of education-at least two years of college-just as universal in America by the
21st century as a high school education is today."'); see also William Jefferson Clinton, 1997
State of the Union Address, WASH. PosT, Feb. 4, 1997, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/special/states/docs/sou97.htm.
In his 2009 State of the Union address, President Obama made a similar pledge regarding
education stating:
It is our responsibility as lawmakers and educators to make this system work. But
it is the responsibility of every citizen to participate in it. And so tonight, I ask
every American to commit to at least one year or more of higher education or ca-
reer training. This can be community college or a four-year school; vocational
training or an apprenticeship. But whatever the training may be, every American
will need to get more than a high school diploma. And dropping out of high school
is no longer an option. It's not just quitting on yourself, it's quitting on your coun-
try-and this country needs and values the talents of every American. That is why
we will provide the support necessary for you to complete college and meet a new
goal: by 2020, America will once again have the highest proportion of college gra-
duates in the world.
See Remarks of President Barack Obama-As Prepared for Delivery Address to Joint Ses-
sion of Congress, WHITEHOUSE.GOv (Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov
/the-press-office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Address-to-Joint-Session-of-
Congress/ (last visited January 23, 2011).
26. Although, in Section HI.D., this author discusses eliminating or significantly
revising the Tax Incentive Provisions, the proposal set forth in Part IV can be effectuated in
conjunction with any tax incentive provisions that Congress wishes to retain. The author
approaches the Tax Incentive Provisions in a manner similar to Professor Schenk, who noted
that "Congress has elected to subsidize higher education through the tax system and in this
Article we do not question that judgment." Deborah H. Schenk & Andrew L. Grossman, The
Failure of Tax Incentives for Education, 61 TAx L. REv. 295, 298 (2008).
27. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006).
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such expenditures qualify for the Business Expense Deduction is a question
left for the regulations. 28 Notwithstanding the foregoing, education expendi-
tures will not qualify for the Business Expense Deduction unless they satis-
fy both the statutory language of Section 162 and the requirements of the
regulations.29 While a complete discussion of Section 162 is beyond the
scope of this Article, it is important to note that Section 162 requires that the
amounts paid or incurred30 during the taxable year must be "ordinary and
necessary expenses" paid or incurred in connection with "carrying on" a
"trade or business." 1
The seminal case discussing the ordinary and necessary requirement is
Welch v. Helvering.32 In that case, a grain commission agent, who had pre-
viously been an officer in a corporation engaged in the grain business, made
payments to the corporation's creditors following its emergence from bank-
ruptcy. The Court held that, because the payments were made for the pur-
pose of improving the taxpayer's credit and standing in the industry and re-
establishing business relations with the corporation's customers, the pay-
ments were not deductible as ordinary expenses. The Court bifurcated the
phrase "ordinary and necessary" into its two component parts.33  It con-
cluded that an expenditure was necessary if, in the judgment of the taxpay-
er, such expenditure was "appropriate and helpful" in the development of its
business.'
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (as amended in 1967); see also Weiszmann v. Comm'r, 52
T.C. 1106 (1969), affd. per curiam, 443 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1971); Carey v. Comm'r, 43
T.C.M. (CCH) 96 (1981); Bodley v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 1357 (1971).
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(9) (as amended in 1972); see also Weyts v. Comm'r,
85 T.C.M. (CCH) 999 (2003); Jorgensen v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1926 (2000); Kohen
v. Comm'r, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1518 (1982); Boser v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 1124, 1132 (1981).
30. The concept that an expense must be "paid or incurred" in order to be deductible
is a timing issue. A deduction only may be taken for the taxable year that is the proper taxa-
ble year under the method of accounting used by the taxpayer in computing its taxable in-
come. I.R.C. § 461(a). Under the cash method of accounting, expenses are generally de-
ducted in the tax year they are actually paid. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1) (as amended in
1999). Under the accrual method of accounting, expenses are generally deductible when "all
the events have occurred that establish the fact of the liability, the amount of the liability can
be determined with reasonable accuracy, and economic performance has occurred with re-
spect to the liability." Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2)(i).
31. I.R.C. § 162(a).
32. 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
33. Id. at 113-14.
34. Id. at 113. Courts often use the "necessary" component of Section 162 to distin-
guish personal expenses from business expenses. In Henry v. Commissioner, the court
stated:
In determining that which is 'necessary' to a taxpayer's trade or business, the tax-
payer is ordinarily the best judge on the matter, and we would hesitate to substitute
our own discretion for his with regard to whether an expenditure is 'appropriate
and helpful,' in those cases in which he has decided to make the expenditure solely
to serve the purposes of his business. . . . But where, as in this case, the expendi-
1054 [Vol. 2010:1047
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However, the Court was less clear on the definition of "ordinary,"
providing two separate meanings.35 First, the Court defined ordinary as
normal, expected, customary or typical. 6 The Court stated that:
Ordinary in this context does not mean that the payments must be habitual or nor-
mal in the sense that the same taxpayer will have to make them often. A lawsuit
affecting the safety of a business may happen once in a lifetime. The counsel fees
may be so heavy that repetition is unlikely. None the less, the expense is an ordi-
nary one because we know from experience that payments for such a purpose,
whether the amount is large or small, are the common and accepted means of de-
fense against attack.
Second, the Court distinguished those expenses that should be imme-
diately deductible from those that should be categorized as capital expendi-
tures. 38 The Court stated that:
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue resorted to that standard in assessing the
petitioner's income, and found that the payments in controversy came closer to
capital outlays than to ordinary and necessary expenses in the operation of a busi-
ness.... Reputation and learning are akin to capital assets, like the good will of an
old partnership. For many, they are the only tools with which to hew a pathway to
success. The money spent in acquiring them is well and wisely spent. It is not an
ordinary expense of the operation of a business.39
Capital expenditures are denied a current deduction.4 Distinguishing
currently deductible expenses from capital expenditures is often a difficult
task. However it is necessary to make such distinction since "[t]hrough
provisions such as these, the Code endeavors to match expenses with the
revenues of the taxable period to which they are properly attributable, the-
reby resulting in a more accurate calculation of net income for tax purpos-
es."4 1 The primary effect of characterizing a payment as either a business
expense or a capital expenditure is the period over which the taxpayer re-
tures may well have been made to further ends which are primarily personal, this
ordinary constraint does not prevail; petitioner must show affirmatively that his
expenses were 'necessary' to the conduct of his professions.
36 T.C. 879, 884 (1961) (citations omitted). Personal expenses are not deductible. See
I.R.C. § 262. The taxpayer has the burden of proving that an expense was incurred primarily
for business, rather than personal, purposes. See Walliser v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 433, 437
(1979); see also Boehm v. Comm'r, 35 B.T.A. 1106, 1109 (1937).
35. Welch, 290 U.S. at 113-16.
36. Id. at 113-14.
37. Id. at 114 (citation omitted); see also Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 495-96
(1940) (holding that "[o]rdinary has the connotation of normal, usual, or customary. To be
sure, an expense may be ordinary though it happen [sic] but once in the taxpayer's lifetime.
Yet the transaction which gives rise to it must be of common or frequent occurrence in the
type of business involved.")
38. Welch, 290 U.S. at 115-116.
39. Id. (citations omitted).
40. See I.R.C. § 263 (2006).
41. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (citations omitted).
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covers its cost.4 2 Business expenses are deductible (in full) when paid or
incurred, while capital expenditures are either amortized or depreciated over
their useful life or (if no useful life can be ascertained) recovered upon dis-
position of the asset or upon dissolution of the enterprise.
The distinction between a business expense and a capital expenditure
is one "'of degree and not of kind."'43 The INDOPCO Court noted that
"[a]lthough the mere presence of an incidental future benefit . . . may not
warrant capitalization, a taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond the year
in which the expenditure is incurred is undeniably important in determining
whether the appropriate tax treatment is immediate deduction or capitaliza-
tion."" The Court also stated that
courts more frequently have characterized an expenditure as capital in nature be-
cause "the purpose for which the expenditure is made has to do with the corpora-
tion's operations and betterment, sometimes with a continuing capital asset, for the
duration of its existence or for the indefinite future or for a time somewhat longer
than the current taxable year."4 5
In U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner," the Seventh Circuit noted that
Treasury Regulations promulgated under Section 263 provided that "ex-
penditures producing nothing more than an 'incidental' future benefit are
eligible for current year deductions, while expenditures whose benefits ex-
tend 'substantially' beyond the tax year must be capitalized."47
The Business Expense Deduction requires that ordinary and necessary
expenses be incurred "in carrying on any trade or business."48 Neither the
Code nor the regulations define the terms trade or business. Rather, defini-
tions have evolved from case law. In Commissioner v. Groetzinger,49 the
Court set forth a two-part test that is temporal and subjective. First, the
taxpayer must be involved in the activity with continuity and regularity.so In
addition, the taxpayer's primary purpose for engaging in the activity must
be for income or profit.'
With respect to "carrying on" a trade or business, the taxpayer must be
engaged in a trade or business to which the expenses relate at the time they
are paid or incurred.52 This focuses, in part, on whether the taxpayer's ex-
penses are business or personal. The taxpayer actually "carrying on" the
42. Id. at 84-85.
43. Id. at 86 (citation omitted).
44. Id. at 87.
45. Id. at 90 (citations omitted).
46. 270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001).
47. Id. at 1141 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2 (as amended in 1993)).
48. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006).
49. 480 U.S. 23 (1987).
50. Id. at 35.
51. Id.
52. See Frank v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 511, 513 (1953).
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business appears to move some expenditures from non-deductible personal
amounts to deductible business expenses. With other expenses, the fact that
those expenses were incurred prior to the taxpayer carrying on a trade or
business makes them capital in nature. The Service explains:
Expenses incurred in the course of a general search for or preliminary investigation
of a business or investment include those expenses related to the decisions whether
to enter a transaction and which transaction to enter. Such expenses are personal
and are not deductible.... Once the taxpayer has focused on the acquisition of a
specific business or investment, expenses that are related to an attempt to acquire
such business or investment are capital in nature and, to the extent that the ex-
penses are allocable to an asset the cost of which is amortizable or depreciable,
may be amortized as part of the asset's cost if the attempted acquisition is success-
ful. 53
The analysis should be similar for education expenses. The courts and
the Service should look to see whether the expenditures in question are de-
ductible business expenses, nondeductible personal expenses, or capital
expenditures (which may, in certain cases, be depreciated or amortized over
their useful life). 54 History shows, however, that the Service and the courts
generally have taken a more restrictive approach in applying Section 162 to
these expenses.ss
B. Historical Perspective
The question of whether education expenses qualify for the Business
Expense Deduction has a long history, proceeding through four distinct
stages. The first stage, beginning in 1921, was the most restrictive. In
1950, beginning with Hill v. Commissioner," courts began to relax the re-
quirements for deductibility by allowing deductions for formal courses of
instruction." In 1958, the Treasury Department issued the first regulations
providing standards specific to education expenditures. 9 These regulations
were last revised in 1967.'
1. The Early Years
The Service's initial position with respect to educational expenses was
one that significantly limited their deductibility. In O.D. 892, the Service
53. Rev. Rul. 77-254, 1977-2 C.B. 63 (emphasis omitted).
54. See infra Section II.C.
55. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
56. See infra Section II.B.1.
57. 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
58. See infra Section II.B.2.
59. See infra Section 1I.B.3.
60. See infra Section I1.B.4.
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announced that "expenses incurred by school-teachers in attending summer
school are in the nature of personal expenses . . . and are not deductible in
computing net income."' In O.D. 984, the Service stated that doctors' ex-
penses in taking postgraduate courses were nondeductible personal ex-
penses.62
In I.T. 1520, the Service concluded that research expenses incurred by
a college professor who was urged, but not required, to engage in research
were nondeductible personal expenses.63 The research was characterized as
necessary to the professor's professional recognition and standing, but it did
not affect his salary. However, in G.C.M. 11654, the Service recommended
that I.T. 1520 be revoked insofar as it held that the research expenses were
of a personal nature.' The Service concluded that such research expendi-
tures were deductible if they were ordinary and necessary and did not con-
stitute capital expenditures.6 ' The Service acknowledged that I.T. 1520 was
inconsistent with I.T. 2602," in which the Service concluded that a member
of a professional association could deduct the cost of sending a representa-
tive to the annual association convention.67
In early decisions, courts also sided with the Service in holding that
education expenses were personal expenditures. For example, in Appeal of
Driscoll, the Board of Tax Appeals held that a taxpayer's deductions for
voice lessons taken in preparation for a professional singing career were
personal expenditures.68 In Darling v. Commissioner, the Board held that a
cartoonist's expenses incurred in studying and practicing sculpture were not
61. O.D. 892, 1921-4 C.B. 209 (1921), obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 69-31, 1969-1 C.B.
307.
62. O.D. 984, 1921-5 C.B. 171 (1921), obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 69-31, 1969-1 C.B.
307.
63. I.T. 1520, 1-2 C.B. 145 (1922), revoked by I.T. 2688, XH-1 C.B. 250 (1933).
64. G.C.M. 11654, XII-1 C.B. 250 (1933), obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 69-31, 1969-1
C.B. 307.
65. Id.
66. I.T. 2602, X-2 C.B. 130 (1931).
67. The Service cited to a number of cases, inconsistent with I.T. 1520, where ex-
penses incurred by a physician in attending medical conventions were found to be deductible
as business expenses. See, e.g., Jack v. Comm'r, 13 B.T.A. 726 (1928), X-2 C.B. 35 (1931);
Squier v. Comm'r, 13 B.T.A. 1223 (1928), X-2 C.B. 66 (1931); Coffey v. Comm'r, 21
B.T.A. 1242 (1931), X-2 C.B. 14 (1931). The Service also cited to Shutter v Commissioner,
2 B.T.A. 23 (1925), acq., IV-2 C.B. 4, where the court allowed a minister to deduct the cost
of attending a church convention essential to his standing and position, and Silverman v.
Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1328 (1927), acq., VI-2 C.B. 6, holding that a college professor
could deduct the cost of attending a professional convention as an ordinary and necessary
business expense because the professor was "expected ... to keep abreast in his particular
field of work," and attendance at meetings was "expected and necessary [for this purpose
and] . . . to advance the interests of the university, though his contract of employment [did]
not specifically make mention of any such activities."
68. 4 B.T.A. 1008, 1009 (1926).
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deductible because his "work was purely educational and was not carried on
for profit."'
In Welch, the Supreme Court discussed, in dicta, the rationale for not
allowing a Business Expense Deduction for education expenses.o While
the Court concluded that such expenditures could be business rather than
personal expenses, even in those cases, such expenses were nondeductible
capital expenditures." Justice Cardozo stated that:
Reputation and learning are akin to capital assets, like the good will of an old part-
nership. For many, they are the only tools with which to hew a pathway to suc-
cess. The money spent in acquiring them is well and wisely spent. It is not an or-
dinary expense of the operation of a business. 72
After Welch, the Service and the courts had two distinct grounds for
denying a deduction for amounts spent on education; such amounts were
either personal expenses or nondeductible capital expenditures. In Osborne
v. Commissioner, the court relied on Welch in holding that a Yale research
professor could not deduct expenses for services related to the preparation
and publication of scholarly and literary matter.73 The taxpayer did not ex-
pect to derive a direct or immediate profit from this work, but he hoped and
expected that it would lead to advancement (possibly as a college presi-
dent).74 The court stated:
Apparently his entire interest was not in current gain or present livelihood from his
efforts, but in laying a foundation for the future. His position was similar to that of
any student preparing and training himself for a profession or lifework; he builds a
foundation of learning upon which his future living and earnings are to be based.
The expenses incurred in preparing himself are in essence the cost of the capital
structure from which his future income is to be derived. They are not ordinary and
necessary expenses of carrying on a trade or business.75
In 1942, the Service issued the first regulations that appeared to spe-
cifically deny a deduction for education expenses. Treasury Regulation
111, Section 19.23(a)-15(b) provided, in part, that "[a]mong expenditures
not allowable ... are the following . .. expenses of taking special courses or
training.""
69. 4 B.T.A. 499, 503 (1926), acq., VI-I C.B. 2.
70. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
71. Id. at 115-16.
72. Id. (internal citations omitted).
73. 3 T.C. 603 (1944).
74. Id. at 604.
75. Id. at 605; see also Weiszmann v. Comm'r, 52 T.C. 1106, 1112 (1969), af'd per
curiam, 443 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1971) (discussing analysis of educational expenses in Welch v.
Helvering in light of the 1967 Treasury Regulations).
76. See Treas. Reg. 111, § 19.23(a)-15(b), T.D. 5196, 1942-2 C.B. 96.
77. Id.
Winter] 1059
Michigan State Law Review
2. Between Hill and Regulatory Guidance
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Hill v. Commissioner was the first to
allow a Business Expense Deduction for the costs of formal instruction."
The court concluded that, where a public school teacher was required under
state law to either attend summer school or take an examination on five se-
lected books as prerequisite for renewal of her teacher's certificate, the costs
of attending summer school were deductible as ordinary and necessary
business expenses."
The taxpayer argued that these expenses were ordinary and necessary
expenses incurred to sharpen her skills, were required by state law, and
maintained-but did not improve-the status of her trade or business." The
Tax Court denied the taxpayer's deduction on three grounds. First, notwith-
standing state regulations that permitted the summer school alternative as
one permissible method of renewing the taxpayer's teaching certificate, the
court concluded that such expenses were not ordinary since the taxpayer had
not shown that "the course pursued by petitioner was the usual method fol-
lowed by teachers in obtaining renewals of their certificates or that it was
necessary so to do."' Second, the Tax Court determined that the education
expenses were being undertaken to obtain new employment because there
was no proof that the taxpayer was employed to continue in her position at
the time she attended summer school.82 Finally, the court relied on the Ser-
vice's conclusion in O.D. 892 that such expenses were "personal expenses
incurred in advancing [her] education and . . . not deductible in computing
net income."83
The Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision. In rejecting the
Tax Court's conclusion that such expenses were not "ordinary," the Fourth
Circuit declined to support the Tax Court's implicit requirement for a statis-
tical showing of which teachers chose one option for renewal of their teach-
ing certificates over the other.' Rather, the Fourth Circuit was satisfied that
the taxpayer's decision to attend summer school was "a response that a rea-
sonable person would normally and naturally make under the specific cir-
cumstances."" The Fourth Circuit also disagreed with the Tax Court's
second conclusion-that the taxpayer failed to affirmatively prove that she
was employed to continue in her position as teacher when she incurred the
78. 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950), rev'g, 13 T.C. 291 (1949).
79. Id.
80. Hill v. Comm'r, 13 T.C. 291, 293 (1949).
81. Id. at 294.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 294-95.
84. See Hill, 181 F.2d at 908.
85. Id.
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summer school expenses." Instead, the circuit court found that "[s]he did
prove to the Tax Court that she had been continuously so engaged for con-
secutive decades."" Finally, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the lower
court's reliance on O.D. 892. However, rather than invalidating the prior
precedent, the court distinguished the Service's prior ruling by stating that
such ruling was not controlling "when, as in the instant case, the attendance
at summer school was undertaken essentially to enable a teacher to continue
her (or his) career in her (or his) existing position.""
Following Hill, the Service issued I.T. 4044.89 The Service stated that
it was modifying O.D. 892 to conform to the Hill decision.' In I.T. 4044,
the Service concluded that a teacher's expenses for the purpose of maintain-
ing his or her position were deductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses." However, "expenses incurred for the purpose of obtaining a
teaching position, or qualifying for permanent status, a higher position, an
advance in the salary schedule, or to fulfill the general cultural aspirations
of the teacher, are deemed to be personal expenses which are not deductible
in determining taxable net income."92
Although the court in Hill appeared to treat educational expenses in
the same manner as other trade or business expenses, many courts continued
to treat such expenses differently. This was especially true in connection
with the requirement that such expenses be "necessary." For example, in
Welch, the Court stated that the term "necessary" should be construed to
mean appropriate and helpful.93 However, with respect to education ex-
penses, courts construed the term to have a more standard definition of be-
ing required.
For example, in Cardozo v. Commissioner, a professor undertook a
European trip for study and research.' The trip was made voluntarily, at his
expense, for the purpose of increasing his prestige, to improve his reputation
for scholarship and learning, and to better fit him for his current employ-
ment. The taxpayer claimed a Business Expense Deduction. The court
rejected this position, concluding that such expenditures were nondeductible
personal expenses.95 The Tax Court stated that, even assuming such ex-
penses qualified as ordinary, they were not necessary since the taxpayer's
employer neither required nor authorized the expenditures to retain his posi-
86. Id.
87. Id. at 908-09.
88. Id. at 909.




93. 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933); see supra note 34.
94. 17 T.C. 3 (1951).
95. Id. at 7.
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tion." The court both distinguished Hill, and cited to the Service's position
in I.T. 4044, in reaching its conclusion.'
In Coughlin v. Commissioner, the taxpayer was an attorney in general
practice as a member of a firm of lawyers." The firm did considerable work
that required at least one member to keep current on federal tax matters.
The taxpayer maintained his tax proficiency, in part, by attending a continu-
ing legal education tax institute.' Relying on Hill, the taxpayer claimed a
Business Tax Deduction." The Service argued that such expenses were
nondeductible personal expenses."o' The Tax Court, relying on O.D. 894
and Welch, concluded that such expenditures were personal expenses, akin
to capital assets, and not an ordinary expense." The Tax Court distin-
guished the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hill by comparing the necessity of
the expenses in the two cases. The Tax Court concluded that, whereas the
taxpayer in Hill was required by state law to incur the expense, the expenses
in the present case were "not deductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses because of the educational and personal nature of the object pur-
sued by the petitioner.""'
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court's finding that
the only difference between the case at issue and Hill was "the degree of
necessity which prompted the incurrence of the expenses."" While the
taxpayer in Hill was required to take such courses to retain her position, the
taxpayer in Coughlin was "morally bound" to do so.' The Second Circuit
also considered, and rejected, the applicability of the dicta found in Welch,
stating:
The general reference to the cost of education as a personal expense [in Welch]
was made by way of illustrating the point then under decision, and it related to that
knowledge which is obtained for its own sake as an addition to one's cultural
background or for possible use in some work which might be started in the future.
There is no indication that an exception is not to be made where the information
acquired was needed for use in a lawyer's established practice.'0
96. Id. at 6.
97. Id.; see also Lampkin v. Comm'r, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 576 (1952) (holding that a
college professor's expenses in connection with his doctoral dissertation were not necessary
since his program of study was not was not required to maintain his position. The court
declined to decide whether such costs were nondeductible personal expenses or capital ex-
penditures).
98. 18 T.C. 528 (1952).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 529.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 529-30.
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However, even after Coughlin, the Service continued to interpret the
"necessary" requirement of the Business Expense Deduction differently for
educational expenditures. In Revenue Ruling 55-412, the Service con-
cluded that expenses incurred for travel and study by a teacher on sabbatical
leave constituted personal expenses where such travel and study were not
required in order for the teacher to maintain the teaching position.'" Distin-
guishing two of its prior pronouncements'as in which it concluded that simi-
lar (albeit required) expenses were deductible, the Service stated that where
"the expenses of travel and study were voluntarily assumed by a teacher for
the purpose of increasing his prestige, to improve his reputation for scholar-
ship and learning, and to better fit him for the duties he was employed to
perform, such expenses were considered to be personal expenses." " Ac-
cordingly, Revenue Ruling 55-412 appears to show that, at least with re-
spect to educational expenses, the Service continued to interpret the "neces-
sary" requirement to mean "required as a condition of employment" rather
than "appropriate and helpful" as applied in other contexts."o
3. The 1958 Regulations
On July 10, 1956, the Treasury Department issued its first set of com-
prehensive proposed regulations dealing exclusively with the deductibility
of educational expenses."' These regulations continued to reflect the Ser-
vice's prior position that, "[i]n general, a taxpayer's expenditures for his
education are personal and are not deductible."" 2
However, the proposed regulations contained an exception to the gen-
eral rule for expenses that satisfied a two-part test."3 First, the expenditures
needed to be "ordinary and necessary for ... the taxpayer's employment or
other trade or business or specialty therein" and "directly and immediately
related thereto."''4 Second, the degree of business necessity and relation-
ship of the expenditures were required to clearly outweigh any personal
107. Rev. Rul. 55-412, 1955-1 C.B. 318.
108. I.T. 4044, 1951-1 C.B. 16; I.T. 3380, 1940-1 C.B. 29.
109. Rev. Rul. 55-412, 1955-1 C.B. 318 (citing Cardozo v. Comm'r, 17 T.C. 3 (1951)
and I.T. 4044, 195 1-1 C.B. 16).
110. See H. Helmut Loring, IRS Denying Educational Expense That Would Be Ordi-
nary and Necessary for Business, 9 J. TAX'N 280 (1958).
111. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, 21 Fed. Reg. 5091 (July 10, 1956). Treas. Reg.
111, § 19.23(a)-15, T.D. 5196, 1942-2 C.B. 96, dealt more generally with nontrade or busi-
ness expenses and only mentioned "special courses or training" in a laundry list of nonde-
ductible expenditures. See text accompanying notes 76-77.
112. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(1).
113. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b).
114. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(1).
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aspects of the expenses."' However, any expenses that satisfied this two-
part test remained nondeductible personal expenditures if they were:
[M]ade primarily for the purpose of, or ... [had] the result of, obtaining a position
for the taxpayer; qualifying him to enter an employment or otherwise become es-
tablished in a trade or business or a specialty therein; establishing or enhancing
substantially his reputation in his trade or business; substantially advancing him in
earning capacity, salary, status, or position; or primarily fulfilling the general cul-
tural aspirations or other personal purposes of the taxpayer." 6
No cases were ever decided based on the proposed regulations. On
April 5, 1958, the Service finalized Treasury Regulation 1.162-5."' The
regulations "constituted the first systematic analysis of many of the prob-
lems inherent in the area of educational expenditures and, in general, greatly
liberalized deductibility.""' These regulations, which contained both an
115. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2).
116. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-5(a)(2), (b). The proposed regulations provided that
refresher courses were likely to qualify as deductible expenses. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.162-5(c). Similarly, expenditures for education that was expressly required by an employ-
er for the employee's "continued retention of his salary, status, or employment" were likely
to qualify as a deductible expense. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(d). However, where
required education
in more than an incidental and relatively minor manner, . . . [had] the result of ob-
taining a different position for the taxpayer; qualifying him to enter an employment
or otherwise become established in a trade or business or a specialty therein; estab-
lishing or enhancing substantially his reputation in his trade or business; or sub-
stantially advancing him in earning capacity, salary, status, or position[,] the ex-
penses for such education was not deductible.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(d).
117. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, T.D. 6291, 23 Fed. Reg. 2244, 2246, 1958-1 C.B. 63, 67
(Apr. 5, 1958). According to the Service, "Regulations (section 1.162-5) were promulgated
under section 162 of the Code in order to differentiate between expenditures for education
which constitute ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on a business
activity and those which are personal in nature." Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 C.B. 69. The new
regulations were a significant change from the Service's prior policy. As such, Congress
extended the time for filing amended tax returns for tax years beginning January 1, 1954 to
allow taxpayers to claim educational expense deductions under the new regulations. See
Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 96, 72 Stat. 1672 (1958).
118. See Schoenfeld, supra note 20, at 255 (citations omitted). The Senate Report to
the Technical Amendments Act of 1958 noted that:
The Internal Revenue Service long held that relatively few educational expenses
were deductible as business expenses, or as expenses incurred in the production of
income. Generally, the Service had held that for such expenses to be deductible
they must be required as a condition to the retention, by the taxpayer, of his present
employment. On April 4, 1958, however, the Treasury Department in a news re-
lease announced that it was issuing final regulations which were more liberal than
the regulations previously in force. ...
S. REP. No. 85-1983, at 110 (1958); see also Devereaux v. Comm'r, 292 F.2d 637 (3d Cir.
1961), rev'g and rem'g, 19 T.C.M. 453 (1960) (citing Comment, Deductibility of Education-
al Expenses, 6 STAN. L. REv. 547 (1954); Note, New Treasury Regulation Defines Deducti-
bility of Education Costs as Trade or Business Expense, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1097 (1958));
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affirmative and a negative component, focused on the taxpayer's primary
purpose for pursuing the education when determining whether the expenses
qualified for a Business Expense Deduction.l 9
The affirmative component provided that education expenditures
would be deductible if the education was undertaken primarily to either (i)
maintain or improve skills required by the taxpayer in his employment or
other trade or business,'20 or (ii) meet the express requirement of a taxpay-
er's employer, or the requirements of applicable law or regulations, imposed
as a condition to the retention by the taxpayer of his salary, status or em-
ployment.'21 The negative component prohibited a deduction for education-
al expenses undertaken primarily to either (i) obtain a new position or sub-
stantial advancement in position,12 or (ii) fulfill the general educational
aspirations or other personal purposes of the taxpayer.'23 Education meeting
the minimum requirements for qualifying or establishing a taxpayer in her
intended trade or business (or specialty therein) constituted a nondeductible
personal expenditure."
The primary purpose approach of the 1958 regulations proved un-
workable for two reasons.' First, because different courts could reach dif-
ferent conclusions, "essentially identical situations could and did produce
contrary results and these fact findings often turned on vague statements
made by the taxpayer years before."'26 Second, because the holdings in
these cases revolved around factual rather than legal issues, "little or no
Loring, supra note 110 at 280 (stating that "the changes reflected in the final Regulations
have been hailed by many observers as a substantial liberalization of the Treasury's position
in favor of a group of deserving taxpayers").
119. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5.
120. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(1). The regulations provided that this was a fact-based
analysis. Treas. Reg. § § 1.162-5(a). This portion of the regulations appears to have been
based on Coughlin v. Commissioner, in which the Second Circuit allowed a deduction for
education to "keep sharp the tools [the taxpayer] actually used in his going trade or busi-
ness." 203 F.2d 307, 309 (2d. Cir. 1953); see supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(2). This portion of the regulations appears to have
been based on the holding in Hill v. Commissioner, in which the Fourth Circuit allowed a
deduction for the cost of education incurred by the taxpayer "to maintain her present posi-
tion, not to attain a new position; to preserve, not to expand or increase; to carry on, not to
commence." 181 F.2d 906, 909 (4th Cir. 1950); see supra notes 78-932 and accompanying
text.
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b). In determining whether the taxpayer pursued educa-
tion primarily for "the purpose of obtaining a new position or substantial advancement," the
regulations considered the fact that the education actually met the express requirements for a
new position or substantial advancement as an important factor. Id. However, the regula-
tions further provided that such fact was not important if the education was "required as a
condition to the retention by the taxpayer of his present employment." Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Schoenfeld supra note 20, at 259.
126. Id. at 260.
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appellate review was possible; thus the coherence normally supplied by
appellate review was missing."127
4. The Current Regulations
The regulations were amended in 1967 in order to provide more spe-
cific rules with respect to the tax treatment of education expenses.' 28 These
regulations remain unaltered in effect today and have been upheld consis-
tently by the courts.129 The amended regulations have a format similar to
the regulations previously finalized in 1958 by providing for an affirmative
component, which must be satisfied, and a negative component, which the
taxpayer cannot run afoul of. The most substantial change was the elimina-
tion of the subjective "primary purpose" test and its replacement by a more
objective test.'30
The negative component of the regulations is considered first."' Ex-
penditures that are determined to be "personal expenditures or [to] consti-
tute an inseparable aggregate of personal and capital expenditures" are not
deductible even if such expenditures satisfy the affirmative component of
the regulations. 32
The first category of nondeductible educational expenses consists of
expenses that are required by an individual "in order to meet the minimum
educational requirements for qualification in his employment or other trade
127. Id.
128. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, 31 Fed. Reg. 12843 (Oct. 1, 1966).
129. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1967), T.D. 6918, 32 Fed. Reg. 6679, 1967-1 C.B. 36
(May 2, 1967). These regulations became effective for taxable years beginning on or after
January 1, 1968, but for prior years taxpayers could rely on either the 1958 or the 1967 regu-
lations. See Rev. Rul. 68-191, 1968-1 C.B. 67; Schoenfeld supra note 20, at 272; see also
Weiszmann v. Comm'r, 52 T.C. 1106, 1107 (1969) (in which the court concludes that both
the 1958 Regulations and the 1967 Regulations are "consistent with the law and not arbi-
trary"); Melnik v. U.S., 73-2 T.C. 9520, 9521 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 521 F.2d 1065 (9th
Cir. 1975); Anderson v. U.S., 75-2 T.C. 9578, 9578 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Taubman v.
Comm'r, 60 T.C. 814, 814 (1973); Bodley v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 1357, 1361 (1971); Weiler v.
Comm'r, 54 T. C. 398, 402 (1970); Fleischer v. Comm'r, 403 F.2d 403, 407-408, (2d Cir.
1968), affg 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 422 (1967).
130. In Marlin v. Commissioner, the court stated that "[s]ection 1.162-5(d), Income
Tax Regs. (1967), removes the subjective requirement of primary purpose, which was often
difficult to establish, and, consequently, is more favorable to taxpayers ... than the old regu-
lations." 54 T.C. 560, 565 (1970); see also Gates v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 970, 971
(1977) ("it is precisely this subjective standard which the present regulation was designed to
eliminate[,]" referring to the notice of proposed rule making published in the Federal Regis-
ter on October 1, 1966); Bouchard v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1098, 1099 (1977); Dins-
more v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1008, 1009 (1977); Weiler v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 398
(1970); Fleischer v. Comm'r, 403 F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 1968), affg 26 T.C.M. 422 (1967).
131. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-5(a), (b)(1); see Schoenfeld, supra note 20, at 273.
132. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(1).
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or business" (the "minimum educational requirement").'33 This is a question
of fact that relies on a number of factors such as "the requirements of the
employer, the applicable law and regulations, and the standards of the pro-
fession, trade, or business involved."'" The fact that an individual is al-
ready employed in a trade or business does not establish that he has satisfied
the minimum educational requirement.'35 However, once such requirement
is satisfied (as when the taxpayer enters the trade or business), an individual
will be treated in effect as meeting the minimum educational requirement
for his trade or business even if such requirement later changes.'
The second category of nondeductible educational expenses consists
of expenses that are part of a program of study that will qualify an individu-
al for a new trade or business (the "new trade or business test").'37 This test
is applied objectively, rather than subjectively. "If the education leads to
qualifying the taxpayer for a new trade or business, evidence that the tax-
payer never intended to enter such trade or business is irrelevant under the
1967 regulation."' Where the taxpayer is an employee, "a change of duties
does not constitute a new trade or business if the new duties involve the
same general type of work as is involved in the individual's present em-
ployment."'"9
Educational expenditures that do not run afoul of either the minimum
educational requirement or the new trade or business test will qualify for the
Business Expense Deduction if they satisfy one of the two prongs of the
133. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2)(i).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2)(iii), ex. (1) (situation 4).
137. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3).
138. See Vincent G. Kalafat, Rethinking Treasury Regulation § 1.162-5 and Slaying
the Monster in the Education Tax Maze, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1985, 2000-01 (2005)
(citing Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3), ex. 2). According to Kalafat, this represents the most
significant change from the prior regulations. Id. (citations omitted).
139. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3), exs. (1)-(4).
The 1967 Regulation significantly liberalize the rules for deducting educational expenses
with respect to education that qualifies an individual for a specialty in a particular trade or
business. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3) (1967) (disallowing a deduction where such
expenditures will qualify an individual for a new trade or business) with Treas. Reg. § 1.162-
5(b) (1958) (disallowing a deduction where such expenditures are required to meet the min-
imum requirements for qualification or establishment in an intended trade or business or
specialty therein). Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(e), ex. (2) (1958) (general practitioner of
medicine could not deduct courses in pediatrics because the course of study qualified him for
a specialty within his trade or business) with Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(ii), ex. (4) (1967)
(allowing a psychiatrist to deduct the cost of a program of study and training in psychoanaly-
sis because the study and training simply maintains or improves skills required in his trade or
business and does not qualify him for a new trade or business).
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affirmative component of the regulations.14 Such expenses must either (i)
maintain or improve skills required by the individual in his employment or
other trade or business, or (ii) meet the express requirements of the individ-
ual's employer, or of applicable law or regulations, imposed as a condition
to such individual retaining "an established employment relationship, status
or rate of compensation."'41 With respect to the affirmative component, the
wording of the current regulations mirrors that of the 1958 Regulations.
Education that maintains or improves a taxpayer's skills includes "re-
fresher courses or courses dealing with current developments as well as
academic or vocational courses" as long as such education does not also
satisfy the minimum education requirement or fail the new trade or business
test.'42 Education imposed by an employer qualifies only if "such require-
ments are imposed for a bona fide business purpose of the individual's em-
ployer."'43 However, only the minimum education necessary to retain an
employment relationship, status, or rate of compensation may be consi-
dered.'" Additional education is only deductible if it maintains or improves
the taxpayer's skills.14 5
C. Critiquing the Current Regulations
The tax system classifies all expenditures to determine their proper tax
treatment. The first question is whether an expenditure was made for busi-
ness or personal purposes.
Business expenses-the costs incurred by the taxpayer in earning gross income-
are nondiscretionary in the sense that the income is conditioned on the outlay. Per-
sonal expenditures reflect the disposition which the taxpayer elects to make out of
the wealth that she has earned. Business expenses must necessarily be deductible
if the income tax is to be imposed on "income"; for the same reason, personal ex-
penditures should be disallowed.'4
140. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-5(a)(1)-(2) (2011). Expenses are deductible if they satisfy
the affirmative provisions of Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(1) and do not run afoul of the negative
provisions of Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b) even if such education may lead to a degree. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a).
141. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-5(a)(1)-(2).
142. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c)(1).
143. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c)(2).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX 103 (l1 h ed. 2009). Professor
Chirelstein notes that "[wihile the line between business and personal expense is of the es-
sence in all this, the fact is that Congress itself has chosen to cross that line fairly freely by
allowing deductions for a variety of items which are plainly personal in nature" Id. at 104.
Professor Oliver notes "[tihe difficulty with this assumption arises in drawing a line that is
meaningful, equitable, and administrable." Amy J. Oliver, Improving the Tax Code to Pro-
vide Meaningful and Effective Tax Incentives for Higher Education, 12 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
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Section 162 provides the Business Expense Deduction.'47 Section 262
disallows a deduction-except as otherwise provided-for any "personal,
living, or family expenses.""' Amounts not spent "directly connected with
or pertaining to" the taxpayer's trade or business are nondeductible personal
expenditures."' The taxpayer has the burden of proving that an expense
was incurred primarily for business, rather than personal, purposes.'
There is, however, a second line-drawing exercise for business ex-
penditures-whether such amount is a current expense or a capital expendi-
ture. Such line drawing attempts to "match expenses with the revenues of
the taxable period to which they are properly attributable, thereby resulting
in a more accurate calculation of net income for tax purposes." 5' Only cur-
rent expenses, generally those that do not create a benefit having a useful
life of more than one year, are deductible in full when paid or incurred.'52
Capital expenditures are depreciable or amortizable over their useful life,
provided that a useful life can be estimated with reasonable accuracy."
Accordingly, the Code sets up three categories of expenditures: (i) nonde-
ductible personal expenditures; (ii) deductible business expenses; and (iii)
capitalized business expenditures."
At first blush, the regulations applicable to education expenses appear
to apply the same standard. The affirmative component of the regulations
seems to be geared towards determining whether the expenses in question
are business or personal expenses (i.e., whether an expense is "directly con-
nected with or pertaining to the taxpayer's trade or business").' The nega-
tive component of the regulations, on the other hand, appears to be geared
PoL'Y 91, 94 (2000). The Tax Incentive Provisions, discussed infra in Section IH, cross that
line by allowing for a deduction (or credit) for educational expenses even in situations where
the education is undertaken solely for personal purposes.
147. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006). Section 212 allows a similar deduction for ordinary and
necessary expenses incurred in connection with certain profit-seeking activities that do not
rise to the level of a trade of business. See I.R.C. § 212(a). Section 212 is beyond the scope
of this Article.
148. I.R.C. § 262.
149. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a).
150. Henry v. Comm'r, 36 T.C. 879, 884 (1961).
151. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79,84 (1992).
152. I.R.C. §§ 162(a), 263(a); see Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (in the case of certain
tangible equipment, those assets not "having a useful life substantially beyond the taxable
year"); Treas. Reg. Section 1.263(a)-4(f) (in the case of intangibles, any right or benefit that
does not extend beyond the earlier of 12 months after the first date that "the taxpayer realizes
the right or benefit or [t]he end of the taxable year following the taxable year in which the
payment is made."); see also discussion supra notes 40-47.
153. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 167, 168, 195, 197. Where a useful life cannot reasonably be
determined, the cost of such capital expenditure may be recovered when the purchased asset
is later sold.
154. I.R.C. §§ 162(a), 262(a), 263(a).
155. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a); see Schoenfeld, supra note 20, at 314.
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towards the current expense/capital expenditure distinction (i.e., whether the
expenses relate to a current or future trade or business).1 6 However, Trea-
sury Regulation 1.162-5 imposes a different standard for education ex-
penses.17 Such expenses either qualify for the Business Expense Deduction
or are "personal expenditures or constitute an inseparable aggregate of per-
sonal and capital expenditures.""' No deduction is allowed for expenses in
that second category under Section 262 or Section 263. There is no such
thing as a business, capital expenditure for education. There is no justifica-
tion for a different standard for educational expenses.'59
Application of different standards causes the regulations to be both
under-inclusive and over-inclusive in the types of expenditures for which a
deduction is allowed.'" Some taxpayers are denied deductions for business
expenses that would have been deductible or amortizable but for the fact
that such expenses relate to education. Other taxpayers are afforded a de-
duction, in full, for the entire cost of education even though such expendi-
tures provide significant future benefits.
The regulations are under-inclusive in two respects-both relating to
the regulation's negative component. First, there is no basis in the law for
the proposition that, where education expenditures satisfy the affirmative
component of the regulations (i.e., such expenses are directly related or per-
taining to the taxpayer's current trade or business), such expenditures will
be nondeductible if they also qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or busi-
ness."' In other words, a taxpayer that pursues education to maintain or
improve her skills in connection with her current trade or business will be
denied a deduction because she has improved herself in a manner that al-
lows her to enter a new trade or business (even though she has no intent to
do so). The regulations and case law are clear that this is an objective test,
and the taxpayer's intent is irrelevant.'62 Here, the regulations treat educa-
156. Schoenfeld, supra note 20, at 315.
157. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
158. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(1).
159. See Schoenfeld supra note 20, at 315 (stating "[t]here is no reason to treat a
business-related educational expenditure differently than any other business-related expendi-
ture"); Katz, supra note 20, at 3 (stating "[t]here is no language in the Code, with the excep-
tion of one section [i.e., Section 274(m)(2), which disallows a deduction from expenses
incurred in connection with travel as a form of education], to justify the treatment of the
deductability of educational costs by a different standard"); Kalafat supra note 138, at 2002-
2003.
160. The regulations have been criticized for other reasons as well. For example, one
commentator concludes that the regulations are bad tax policy for failing to satisfy the prin-
ciple of certainty and simplicity. Kalafat, supra note 138, at 2003-04.
161. See Schoenfeld, supra note 20, at 315.
162. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3), exs. (2)-(3); see also O'Donnell v. Comm'r, 62
T.C. 781, 783 (1974), affd, 519 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1975); Glenn v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 270,
274 (1974).
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tional expenses differently than other expenses, and exclude amounts that
would be deductible in other contexts, solely because they are education
expenditures.'63
The regulations are also under-inclusive because expenditures that are
directly related or pertain to a new trade or business, and which meet the
minimum educational requirement or otherwise qualify the taxpayer for
such trade or business, should be treated as capital expenditures of such a
new trade or business. These expenditures should be eligible for amortiza-
tion, assuming that they have a reasonably determinable useful life. How-
ever, the regulations state that such amounts are "personal expenditures or
constitute an inseparable aggregate of personal and capital expenditures.""
The regulations make this blanket statement without explaining "when or
how or why educational expenditures are 'personal' or 'capital,' or when or
how or why they may be 'an inseparable aggregate of personal and capital
expenditures.""" This statement has only one purpose: to disallow those
education expenses that relate to a new trade or business-whether or not
such expenses also relate to an existing trade or business-from being
amortized over their useful life as a result of the interplay between Section
262 and Section 162. In effect, it provides an implicit approval to the idea
espoused by the Supreme Court in Welch that an education expense can be a
business expense, while limiting the scope of such holding by denying capi-
talization of these business expenses because they are also personal ex-
penses. There is no other purpose for classifying education as a capital ex-
163. Professor Schoenfeld's criticism that the "new trade or business" standard is not
defined, and, accordingly, "any regulation based on such a vague standard is invalid" is
relevant to this point. See Schoenfeld, supra note 20, at 311. Schoenfeld concludes that any
education expenses that lead to a degree will be nondeductible (notwithstanding the fact that
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) allows a Business Expense Deduction for expenses that qualify
under the regulations "even though the education may lead to a degree") "because that de-
gree will almost certainly make some other position theoretically available to the taxpayer."
Id. at 316. The new trade or business test is bad policy. According to one commentator:
When performing this seemingly speculative search to identify some new trade or
business, courts generally require the education to serve only a minor role as one
"helpful" step, make unlikely assumptions, and ignore important factual evidence,
such as economic practicability, employer requirements, and the taxpayer's intent.
As a result, this speculative search is a confusing and problematic approach for de-
termining tax incentives for higher education.
Kalafat, supra note 138, at 2019. The effect of not having set standards for deductibility, and
allowing each case to be decided on its facts, is that certain education only becomes deducti-
ble in certain situations, rather than being treated consistently across all taxpayers. Nowhere
is this inconsistency more pronounced than in determining whether an M.B.A. degree is
deductible. See, e.g., Jill Kutzbach Sanchez, The Deductibility of MBA Degree Expenses
Under Treasury Regulation 1.162-5: Are You One of the Lucky Few Who Qualify?, 32 J.
CORP. L. 659, 666-67 (2007).
164. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(1).
165. Schoenfeld, supra note 20, at 314 (citations omitted).
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penditure because all nondeductible education expenses are, in part, person-
al expenses.'"
The rationale for the presumption that all education is a "personal re-
sponsibility" providing "extensive personal rewards" stems from the earliest
pronouncements by the Service" and from cases such as Carroll v. Com-
missioner." Carroll should be limited to its facts and to undergraduate
education. Whereas there might be common consensus that there is no di-
rect and proximate relationship between a college education and the profes-
sion of being a policeman (as the court in Carroll concluded), the same does
not hold true for most professional or vocational education. The rationale of
the court in Carroll seems significantly weaker when one attempts to argue
that a lawyer attended law school primarily for personal purposes."
Once a direct and proximate relationship between the education at is-
sue and the taxpayer's trade or business is shown, the expenses associated
with such education should not be treated as personal expenses.7 o Such
amounts may be deductible if they are related to the taxpayer's current trade
or business, or amortizable when related to a future trade or business. There
is no reason to treat costs incurred for education differently than other costs.
The same regulations that are, at times, under-inclusive also fail, at
times, by being over-inclusive. Over-inclusivity results when the regula-
166. See Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(9) (as amended in 1972) (treating Section 162 and
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 as the exclusive means for deducting education expenses). In addition,
the statutory prohibition of deducting personal expenses found in Section 262 takes prece-
dence over the Business Expense Deduction of Section 162. See Sharon v. Comm'r, 66 T.C.
515, 522-25 (1976), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir.1978); see also .R.C. § 261 (no deduction
is allowed for any item specified in that part, including Section 262).
167. See Section II.B.1.
168. 51 T.C. 213, 215 (1968), affd, 418 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1969).
169. See Daniel I. Halperin, Business Deductions for Personal Living Expenses: A
Uniform Approach to an Unresolved Problem, 122 U. PENN. L. REV. 859, 904 (1974) (where
it is noted that "[t]he personal benefits at least through college seem fairly strong." Howev-
er, "[i]t is hard to find any personal satisfaction in a bar review course or in a course for
preparation for the CPA exam"). But see Rev. Rul. 69-292, 1969-1 C.B. 84 (expenses for a
preparatory course for the CPA exam were found to be nondeductible under the current
regulations).
170. See Betz v. Comm'r, 30 T.C.M. 119, 121 (1971). In Betz, the court states:
Where a direct relationship between the expenditures and the trade or business of
the taxpayer can be demonstrated, educational expenses are deductible. On the
other hand, if the business connection is too tenuous to support a business expense
deduction, or if the expenses are considered inherently personal due to the presence
of overriding personal considerations, a deduction must be disallowed. Since an
educational undertaking may involve a combination of business and personal mo-
tives, a determination as to the proper characterization of educational expenses, in-
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tions allow for the current deductibility of certain education expenses that
would, in other contexts, constitute capital expenditures.
For example, in Hill, the court allowed a deduction for university
courses taken to allow the taxpayer to renew his teaching license for ten
years."' However, the general rule for deductibility of licenses is stated as
follows:
If an intangible asset is known from experience or other factors to be of use in the
business or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length of
which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may be
the subject of a depreciation allowance. . . . An intangible asset, the useful life of
which is not limited, is not subject to the allowance for depreciation.172
In Sharon v. Commissioner, the court held that an attorney could deduct the
cost of fees paid to gain admission to the California bar over his life expec-
tancy. 73
In other cases, courts have allowed current deductions for graduate
degrees. For example, in Damm v. Commissioner, the court permitted a
university lecturer to deduct the costs incurred in obtaining a Ph.D. de-
gree.'74 The court found that the education maintained or improved his
skills as a teacher without violating the minimum educational test or the
new trade or business test."' Noting that such expenses may provide the
taxpayer with a future benefit, the court stated "Damm's education clearly
may be expected to be useful in his career as [a] teacher for many years
after the expenses were made. Nevertheless, neither side disputes the now-
or-never status of the educational expenses deduction.""'
Damm is not the only situation in which the courts and the Service
have allowed taxpayers a Business Expense Deduction for graduate degrees.
Taxpayers have been allowed similar current deductions for Ph.D., 77
171. Hill v. Comm'r, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
172. Richmond Hill Television Corp. v. U.S., 354 F.2d 410, 411-12 (4th Cir. 1965)
(emphasis omitted) (holding that a radio station license was not amortizable because of its
indeterminable useful life).
173. 66 T.C. 515 (1976), affd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978); see also U.S.
Freightways Corp. v. Comm'r, 270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001) (trucking company could de-
duct the costs of its license fees, permit fees, and insurance premiums as ordinary, necessary,
and recurring expenses).
174. 41 T.C.M. (P-H) 1359 (1981).
175. Id.
176. Id. at n.9 (citations omitted).
177. See Furner v. Comm'r, 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968) (taxpayer, a junior high
school teacher, was entitled to deduct the costs of full-time graduate study in the year such
costs were incurred); Ford v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 1300 (1971), affd, 487 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir.
1973) (per curiam) (taxpayer who received a Ph.D. in linguistics and anthropology was en-
titled to deduct the costs of such education in full in the year of payment).
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LL.M.,' 78 M.B.A.,'7 and advanced medical degrees.'" While over-inclusion
under the current regulations is taxpayer-friendly, it violates the matching
principle set forth in INDOPCO.
To the extent that the current regulations are both under-inclusive and
over-inclusive, such regulations violate fundamental principles of fairness.
Some taxpayers are receiving too little benefit for their expenditures, while
other taxpayers are receiving a benefit far in excess of what should be al-
lowed. The proposal for reform, set forth in Section IV, provides a solution
that attempts to properly reflect income for all taxpayers.
III. TAx INCENTIVES FOR HIGHER EDUCATION EXPENSES FOR
INDIVIDUALS
In those situations where an individual's education expenses fail to
qualify for the Business Expense Deduction, such expenses may qualify for
one of the Tax Incentive Provisions. As discussed in this Section, while
there may be good reasons to provide incentives for higher education, the
incentives currently available have not been shown to be effective tax poli-
cy, are highly complex, and may be inequitable.''
Prior to 1997, the Code provided individuals with only a few Tax In-
centive Provisions for higher education expenses.'82 However, education
was one of President Clinton's top priorities."' The Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997 represented "a significant expansion in the use of tax policy to encour-
age enrollment and to help families and communities pay for schools."'" A
178. See Ruehmann v. Comm'r, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 675 (1971) (finding a practicing
lawyer was entitled to deduct the expenses incurred in obtaining an LL.M. degree); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-12-003 (Mar. 22, 1991) (same with respect to an LL.M. in taxation). But
see Kohen v. Comm'r, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1518 (1982) (finding a taxpayer was not able to
deduct an LL.M. in taxation where the taxpayer had never practiced law and was therefore
not carrying on a trade or business).
179. See Robinson v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 550 (1982); Glenn v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 270
(1974); Weiler v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 398 (1970); Allemeier v. Comm'r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 197
(2005); Blair Holding Co. v. Comm'r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1255 (1980); Sherman v. Comm'r,
36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1191 (1977); Singleton-Clarke v. Comm'r, T.C. Summary Op. 2009-182;
see also Sanchez supra note 163, at 667.
180. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-78, 1974-1 C.B. 44 (concluding that education that al-
lowed a doctor to advance from general practice to a specialization in orthotics was a change
in duty rather than a new trade or business).
181. See infra Section III.D.
182. These provisions included the exclusions from income for qualified scholar-
ships, employer-provided educational assistance, student loan forgiveness, and distributions
from qualified tuition plans. See infra Section III.A-C.
183. See Kane, supra note 25, at 335.
184. BOB LYKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., 97-915 EPW, TAX BENEFITS FOR
EDUCATION IN THE TAXPAYER REUEF ACT OF 1997 1 (1997), available at
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrsl245/.
[Vol. 2010:10471074
Tax Treatment of Higher Education Expenses
further significant expansion of these provisions occurred during the admin-
istration of President George W. Bush with the passage of the Economic
Growth and Reconciliation Reform Act of 2001. The American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009, enacted during President Obama's first year
in office, provided an expansion of previously enacted tax incentives.'"
Finally, The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job
Creation Act of 2010, enacted into law in December 2010, provided an ex-
tension of many portions of the Tax Incentive Provisions.'
The Tax Incentive Provisions can be best categorized by the temporal
periods to which such incentives relate. The Code provides some tax bene-
fits for current higher education expenses, incentives to save for future edu-
cation expenditures, and relief for certain higher education expenses pre-
viously incurred.'
A. Tax Incentives for Current Expenses-The Ghost of Christmas Present
1. Hope Scholarship Credit and Lifetime Learning Credit
Code Provision: Section 25A
Estimated Revenue Loss (Hope Scholarship Credit): 2009 - $6.7
billion, 2010 - $9.5 billion, 2011 - $4.7 billion, 2012 - $2.9 billion,
2013 - $2.9 billion'88
Estimated Revenue Loss (Lifetime Learning Credit): 2009 - $1.9
billion, 2010 - $2.2 billion, 2011 - $3.0 billion, 2012 - $3.2 billion,
2013 - $3.2 billion'89
Section 25A provides a tax credit for taxpayers who incur higher edu-
cation expenses equal to the sum of the Hope Scholarship Credit plus the
185. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
186. See infra note 193.
187. This Article limits its discussion to those Code provisions that specifically focus
on providing tax incentives to individuals that incur higher education expenses, and it does
not attempt to discuss the myriad of tax provisions providing benefits to providers of higher
education, including the tax exemptions for educational institutions found in Section
501(c)(3), the charitable contribution deduction found in Section 170, and the ability of high-
er educational institutions to finance their facilities and activities through the issuance of tax-
exempt bonds under Section 103.
188. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 111th CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAx
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013 39 (Comm. Print 2010). These estimates do
not take into account the changes made to the Tax Incentive Provisions as a result of the Tax
Relief Act of 2010. See infra notes 193,437.
189. ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013, at 39.
Winter] 1075
Michigan State Law Review
Lifetime Learning Credit (hereafter, collectively, the "Education Tax Cre-
dits").'"
With respect to a particular student, these two credits are mutually ex-
clusive-i.e., a taxpayer may not claim both for the same student for the
same taxable year.'91 A taxpayer may, however, claim the Hope Scholar-
ship Credit for one student and the Lifetime Learning Credit for another
student on the same tax return. 9 2 Additional rules prevent a taxpayer from
claiming either credit for any expense for which a deduction is allowed un-
der the Code.'
As initially drafted, individuals could claim a nonrefundable Hope
Scholarship Credit equal to one-hundred percent of the first $1,000 of quali-
fied tuition and related expenses and fifty percent of the next $1,000 of
qualified tuition and related expenses (i.e., a maximum credit of $1,500)
190. I.R.C. § 25A(a) (2006), enacted as part of The 1997 Taxpayer Relief Act (TRA),
Pub. L. No. 105-34 (1997). The HOPE Tax credit is modeled after the Georgia State Univer-
sity Merit Scholarship program of the same name. HOPE is an acronym for "Helping Out-
standing Pupils Educationally." Other than the name, however, there is no relationship be-
tween the Georgia State scholarship and the federal tax credit. In fact, the state scholarship is
merit-based, while the federal tax credit is income based. See THE FINANCE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION: THEORY, RESEARCH, POLICY & PRACTICE 351-52 (Michael B. Paulsen & John C.
Smart, eds.) (2001).
191. I.R.C. § 25A(c)(2)(A).
192. Treas. Reg. § 1.25A-1(b)(1) (2011).
193. I.R.C. § 25A(g)(5). Double benefit limitations prevent a taxpayer from claiming
multiple tax incentives for the same expenses. Such limitations apply by excluding from the
definition of qualifying expenses for one Tax Incentive Provision those expenses that qualify
for a benefit under either another Tax Incentive Provision or provide some other benefit
under the Code (i.e., a "Double Benefit"). The majority of the Tax Incentive Provisions
contain some Double Benefit limitation.
For tax years prior to 2002 and after 2012, a taxpayer is required to elect to claim
the Section 25A education credits. However, during that period, no education credit is al-
lowed for a taxable year for the qualified tuition and related expenses of a student if, during
the taxable year, a distribution is made to, or on behalf of, the student from an education
individual retirement account described in Section 530(b) if any portion of the distribution is
excluded from gross income under Section 530(d)(2). See I.R.C. § 25A(e), prior to amend-
ment by the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), Pub.
L. No. 107-16, § 401(g)(2)(A), 115 Stat. 38 (2001). For tax years beginning after December
31, 2001 and prior to January 1, 2013, taxpayers may elect not to have the provisions of
Section 25A apply with respect to the qualified tuition and other related expenses of an indi-
vidual for any taxable years. See I.R.C. § 25A(e). The changes made to Section 25A(e) were
designed to allow taxpayers to claim both a Hope Scholarship Credit and/or a Lifetime
Learning Credit, on the one hand, and to exclude from income distributions made from an
Coverdell ESA, on the other hand, provided that the distribution is not used for the same
expenses as which the credit is claimed. The changes made pursuant to the EGTRRA were
set to expire with respect to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2010. See
EGTRRA, § 901. However, in December 2010, such provisions were extended for an addi-
tional two years. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Crea-
tion Act of 2010 (Tax Relief Act of 2010), Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 101(a), 124 Stat. 3296
(2010).
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paid for the first two years of an eligible student's post-secondary education
in a degree or certificate program.'" These dollar amounts were indexed for
inflation beginning in 2001.' In 2008, the maximum credit was $1,800
(i.e., one-hundred percent of the first $1,200 of such expenses and fifty per-
cent of the next $1,200 of such expenses).'" The credit has been modified
temporarily for tax years 2009 through 2012'" (and renamed the American
Opportunity Tax Credit) to allow for a refundable credit 98 of up to $2,500
per student per year for qualified tuition and related expenses at a rate of
one-hundred percent for the first $2,000 of qualified tuition and related ex-
194. I.R.C. § 25A(b).
195. I.R.C. § 25A(h)(1).
196. I.R.S. Rev. Proc. 2007-66, 200745 I.R.B. 970.
197. See I.R.C. § 25A(i) (added by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009 (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111-5, Div. B., Tit. I, § 1004(a), 123 Stat. 115, 313 (2009). Al-
though as initially enacted, the American Opportunity Tax Credit was set to expire after
December 31, 2010, such provision has been extended for an additional two years. See Tax
Relief Act of 2010, § 103(a).
In his budget for the 2011 fiscal year, President Obama proposed making the
American Opportunity Tax Credit permanent. Such change is expected to increase the defi-
cit by approximately $75 billion over the 10-year period from 2011-2020. See OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2011 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy20 1/assets/budget.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). In addi-
tion, as part of his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama pressed Congress to
make such credit permanent, stating:
Of course, the education race doesn't end with a high school diploma. To com-
pete, higher education must be within the reach of every American. That's why
we've ended the unwarranted taxpayer subsidies that went to banks, and used the
savings to make college affordable for millions of students. And this year, I ask
Congress to go further, and make permanent our tuition tax credit-worth $10,000
for four years of college. It's the right thing to do.
See Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Ad-
dress (Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/
remarks-president-state-union-address/ (last visited January 28, 2011).
The "enhanced" Hope Scholarship Credit provides that, for tax years 2008 and
2009, students attending an eligible education institution located in the Midwestern disaster
area may elect a Hope Scholarship Credit equal to one hundred percent of the first $2,400 of
qualified tuition and related expenses paid and fifty percent of the next $2,400 of qualified
tuition and related expenses paid. In other words, the Hope Scholarship Credit for such
students has been increased for such years to a maximum of $3,600. See Emergency Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 702, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008); see also
I.R.S. Pub. 970, 20 (2009).
198. Forty percent of the otherwise allowable American Opportunity Credit is re-
fundable. However, none of the credit is refundable if the taxpayer claiming the credit is (1)
under age 18, or (2) under age 24 and a student providing less than one half his/her own
support who has one living parent and does not file a joint return. Special rules apply to
residents of U.S. possessions. See I.R.C. § 25A(i)(6).
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penses, and twenty-five percent on the next $2,000 of qualified tuition and
related expenses.'
The Lifetime Learning Credit provides individuals with a nonrefunda-
ble credit equal to twenty percent of an eligible student's qualified tuition
and related expenses paid during the taxable year. 2 1 Unlike the Hope Scho-
larship Credit, which is calculated on a per-student basis, the maximum
allowable Lifetime Learning Credit per year is $2,000 per taxpayer regard-
less of the number of students reported on the taxpayer's return.201' Addi-
tionally, the amount of the credit is not adjusted for inflation.
For purposes of Section 25A, the term "qualified tuition and related
expenses" means tuition and fees required for the enrollment or attendance
of the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, or any dependent of the taxpayer at
an eligible educational institution for courses of instruction of such individ-
ual at such institution.2" From 2009 through 2012, solely with respect to
the American Opportunity Tax Credit, course materials (e.g., books) are
199. I.R.C. § 25A(i).
200. I.R.C. § 25A(c)(1). Solely for 2005 and 2006, for individuals attending an eligi-
ble educational institution in the Gulf Opportunity Zone, the credit amount was forty percent
of the first $10,000 of qualified tuition and related expenses paid by the taxpayer and in-
curred for the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse or any dependent. See I.R.C. § 14000(3)
(2006) (added by The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-135, § 102(a), 119
Stat. 2577, 2594 (2005)). This provision was also applied to individuals who attended eligi-
ble educational institutions in Midwestern disaster areas for 2008 and 2009. See Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, §§ 702(a)(1)(B), (d)(8).
201. I.R.C. § 25A(c)(1). For taxable years beginning prior to 2003, the maximum
credit was limited to $1,000. I.R.C. § 25A(c)(1). Professor Oliver notes that computing the
Lifetime Learning Credit on a per-return basis rather than on a per-student basis (as is the
case with the Hope Scholarship Credit) results an inequity when the Hope Scholarship Credit
is not also available in situations where a taxpayer wishes to claim tax credits for two differ-
ent qualifying students. Because the Hope Scholarship Credit is available on a per-student
basis, a taxpayer claiming two students eligible for the Hope Scholarship Credit can utilize
the credit twice. Even where only one student is eligible for the Hope Scholarship Credit, the
taxpayer could claim the Hope Scholarship Credit for one student and the Lifetime Learning
Credit for the other student. However, because the Lifetime Learning Credit is available
only once on a taxpayer's return, a taxpayer claiming two students not eligible for the Hope
Scholarship Credit can only take advantage of a single Lifetime Learning Credit. In addition,
because the Lifetime Learning Credit is not available to married couples that file separate
returns, a married couple with both spouses incurring higher education expenses receives less
benefit from the credit than two single individuals. See Oliver, supra note 146, at 110-11.
202. See I.R.C. § 25A(f)(1)(A). The committee reports provide that the cost of books
is not included in determining the amount of the Education Tax Credits. See H.R. REP. No.
105-220, at 346 (1997) (Conf. Rep.). For these purposes, an "eligible educational institu-
tion" is defined as an institution which is defined in section 481 of the Higher Education Act
of 1965, and which is eligible to participate in a program under title IV of such Act. See
I.R.C. § 25A(f)(2). Amounts paid by the taxpayer during a taxable year for an academic
period that begins during the first three months of the next year will be included in the taxa-
ble year in which the payment was made. See I.R.C. § 25A(g)(4).
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included as related expenses.203 However, in neither case does the term
"qualified tuition and related expenses" include (i) either student activity
fees, athletic fees, insurance expenses; or other expenses unrelated to an
individual's academic course of instruction; or (ii) expenses with respect to
any course or other education involving sports, games or hobbies, unless
such course or other education is part of the individual's degree program.2 "
In order to prevent taxpayers from claiming a Double Benefit for the same
expenses, a taxpayer must reduce her qualified tuition and related expenses
by the following amounts paid for the benefit of the student: (i) qualified
scholarships; (ii) educational assistance provided to present or past members
of the armed forces; and (iii) any other non-taxable payment for the stu-
dent's education expenses (other than gifts, bequests, devises or inherit-
ances).205
If a student is claimed as a dependent by a parent or other taxpayer,
the parent (or other taxpayer) claims the credit regardless of who pays the
qualified tuition and related expenses.2 06 In addition, married couples must
file a joint return for the taxable year to claim the credits.2
For purposes of the Hope Scholarship Credit (including the American
Opportunity Tax Credit), an "eligible student" must carry at least one-half
the normal full-time load for the course of study the student is pursuing.20
Additionally, the credit is not allowable in any tax year for an individual
unless such individual is an eligible student for at least one academic period
that begins during the taxable year.2" Furthermore, such credit is available
only for eligible students who have not been convicted of a felony offense
for possession or distribution of a controlled substance.210 The Lifetime
Learning Credit is available with respect to any course of instruction at an
eligible educational institution-regardless of whether the student is
enrolled full-time or part-time-to acquire or improve job skills of the stu-
dent.211 The Lifetime Learning Credit provides no disqualification for those
with drug convictions.
For tax years beginning prior to 2009 and subsequent to 2012, the
Hope Scholarship Credit is available only for an eligible student's first two
years of post-secondary education.212 The modified American Opportunity
203. I.R.C. § 25A(i)(3).
204. I.R.C. §§ 25A(f)(1)(B), (C).
205. I.R.C. § 25A(g)(2).
206. I.R.C. § 25A(g)(3).
207. I.R.C. § 25A(g)(6).
208. I.R.C. § 25A(b)(3)(B).
209. I.R.C. § 25A(b)(2)(B).
210. I.R.C. § 25A(b)(2)(D).
211. I.R.C. § 25A(c)(2)(B).
212. I.R.C. § 25A(b)(2)(C).
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Tax Credit is available for four years of post-secondary education. 213 The
Lifetime Learning Credit applies to qualified tuition and related expenses
for any course that is part of a post-secondary degree program-including
graduate level education-or is taken to acquire or improve job skills. 214
The benefits of the Education Tax Credits phase out ratably for tax-
payers with modified adjusted gross income in excess of certain thresholds.
As initially drafted, a taxpayer must reduce the amount of the credit (but not
below zero) by a fraction, the numerator of which is the excess (if any) of
the taxpayer's modified adjusted gross income over $40,000 and the deno-
minator of which is $10,000. For individuals filing a joint return, the nume-
rator and denominator are increased to $80,000 and $20,000, respectively.2 15
For tax years beginning after 2001, the $40,000/$80,000 phase-out thre-
sholds are adjusted for inflation.216 For 2008, both credits were phased out
for taxpayers with a modified adjusted gross income between $48,000 and
$58,000 (between $96,000 and $116,000 for taxpayers filing a joint return).
For 2009 and 2010, the Lifetime Learning Credit was phased out for tax-
payers with a modified gross income between $50,000 and $60,000 (be-
tween $100,000 and $120,000 for taxpayers filing a joint return).217 For
2011, the Lifetime Learning Credit phases out for taxpayers with a modified
gross income between $51,000 and $61,000 (between $102,000 and
$122,000 for taxpayers filing a joint return). 218 The American Opportunity
Tax Credit phases out at a higher income level (i.e., between $80,000 and
$90,000 for single taxpayers, and between $160,000 and $180,000 for tax-
payers filing a joint return).219
213. I.R.C. § 25A(i)(2). However, any year in which the taxpayer claimed the Hope
Scholarship Credit shall be counted as one of the four years for which the American Oppor-
tunity Tax Credit applies. Id.
214. I.R.C. § 25A(c)(2)(B).
215. I.R.C. § 25A(d). For these purposes, the term "modified adjusted gross income"
is defined in I.R.C. § 25A(d)(3).
216. I.R.C. § 25A(h)(2).
217. Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107; Rev. Proc. 2009-50, 2009 I.R.B. 617.
218. Rev. Proc. 2011-12, 2011-2 I.R.B. 297-99.
219. I.R.C. § 25A(i)(4). There is no inflation adjustment provided for the American
Opportunity Tax Credit's income limitations. Taxpayers that waive the application of the
American Opportunity Tax Credit in favor of taking the Hope Scholarship Credit are re-
quired to use the lower income limitations that also apply to the Lifetime Learning Credit for
those years. See supra note 197.
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2. Deduction for Higher Education Expenses
Code Provision: Section 222
Estimated Revenue Loss: 2009 - $700 million, 2010 - $200 mil-
lion220
Congress enacted Section 222 (the "Qualified Tuition Deduction") to
provide a degree of assistance for higher income families. 22' Section 222
was originally enacted as part of the EGTRRA as a temporary provision,
effective for tax years beginning in 2002 and ending with tax years begin-
ning on or after December 31, 2005.222 The history of the Qualified Tuition
Deduction shows that it has always been somewhat of an afterthought-the
provision was subsequently retroactively extended for two years (until De-
cember 31, 2007) by the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006,223 re-
extended retroactively (until December 31, 2009) by the Emergency Stabili-
zation Act of 2008,224 with a further retroactive re-extension (until Decem-
ber 31, 2011) by the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization
and Job Creation Act of 2010.225
Section 222 provides an above-the-line deduction-i.e., the deduction
is available to taxpayers regardless of whether those taxpayers itemize their
deductions or avail themselves of the standard deduction-for qualified
tuition and related expenses paid by the taxpayer during the taxable year.226
The Qualified Tuition Deduction provides a maximum deduction of
$4,000227 to a taxpayer with an adjusted gross income228 up to $65,000 (or, in
the case of a joint return, $130,000).229 A taxpayer whose adjusted gross
220. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 11 Ith CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013 38 (Comm. Print 2010).
221. Andrew D. Pike, No Wealthy Parent Left Behind: An Analysis of Tax Subsidies
for Higher Education, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1229, 1232 (1997).
222. EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 431, 115 Stat. 38, 66-69 (2001).
223. Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 101, 120 Stat. 2922, 2933 (2006).
224. Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-343, § 202, 122 Stat. 3765, 3864 (2008).
225. I.R.C. § 222(e) (2006), as amended by the Tax Relief Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-312, §724, 124 Stat. 3296, 3316 (2010). Although § 222 does not apply to tax years
beginning after December 31, 2011, expenses paid for by such date for a term beginning on
or prior to March 31, 2012 qualify for the Qualified Tuition Deduction in 2011. See I.R.C. §
222(d)(3)(B).
226. I.R.C. §§ 222(a), 62(a)(18).
227. I.R.C. § 222(b). For 2002 and 2003, the maximum deduction was limited to
$3,000.
228. The definition of "adjusted gross income" is slightly different than that of "mod-
ified adjusted gross income" found in Section 25A. Compare I.R.C. § 222(b)(2)(C) with
I.R.C. § 25A(d)(3).
229. I.R.C. § 222(b)(2)(B)(i).
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income exceeds $65,000 but not $80,000 (or, in the case of a joint return,
exceeds $130,000 but not $160,000) can deduct up to $2,000 for qualified
expenses.230 Taxpayers with an adjusted gross income in excess of those
limitations are not entitled to a Qualified Tuition Deduction. These income
limitations are not adjusted for inflation. The income limitations for the
Qualified Tuition Deduction are higher than the income limitations for the
Hope Scholarship Credit or Lifetime Learning Credit (but not the American
Opportunity Credit). Consequently, taxpayers whose incomes make them
ineligible for those tax credits could still the avail themselves of the Quali-
fied Tuition Deduction.
Section 222 operates in coordination with the Education Tax Credits.
Section 222 shares the definition for "qualified tuition and related expenses"
with those tax credit provisions.231 In addition, a Qualified Tuition Deduc-
tion may not be claimed for an individual if the taxpayer or any other person
elects to claim a Hope Scholarship Credit or a Lifetime Learning Credit
with respect to such individual for that year.232
In addition to coordinating with the Education Tax Credits, the Quali-
fied Tuition Deduction is coordinated with other Tax Incentive Provisions
to prevent a double benefit for the same expenditures. Section 222 provides
that the Qualified Tuition Deduction is not available for any expense for
which a deduction could be claimed under any other Code provision.233
Thus, for example, a taxpayer may not avail herself of the Qualified Tuition
Deduction for any expenses for which a Business Expense Deduction could
be claimed. In addition, the total amount of qualified tuition and related
expenses available for the deduction is reduced by the amount paid for with
amounts excluded under other Tax Incentive Provisions (i.e. Section 135,
Section 529 and Section 530).23
As with the Education Tax Credits, taxpayers may claim a deduction
for qualified tuition and related expenses for themselves, their spouses, or
their dependents.235 The Qualified Tuition Deduction is unavailable to indi-
viduals who might have been claimed as dependents on another taxpayer's
return,23 married persons filing separately,237 and nonresident aliens who do
not elect to be treated as resident aliens. 2 38
230. I.R.C. § 222(b)(2)(B)(ii).
231. I.R.C. § 222(d)(1).
232. I.R.C. § 222(c)(2)(A); see also S. REP. No. 107-30, at 41 (2001).
233. I.R.C. § 222(c)(1).
234. I.R.C. § 222(c)(2)(B); see also H.R. REP. No. 107-84, at 168 (2001) (Conf.
Rep.).
235. I.R.C. § 222(d)(1).
236. I.R.C. § 222(c)(3).
237. I.R.C. § 222(d)(4).
238. I.R.C. § 222(d)(5).
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3. Exclusion for Scholarships and Fellowship Grants
Code Provision: Section 117
Estimated Revenue Loss: 2009 - $2.0 billion, 2010 - $2.1 billion,
2011 - $2.2 billion, 2012 - $ 2.3 billion, 2013 - $2.4 billion 239
Prior to 1954, scholarships were not specifically addressed by any sec-
tion of the Internal Revenue Code, but were excludible under the general
provision exempting gifts. 24 In 1954, Congress enacted Section 117 to ex-
pand the scope of the exclusion for scholarships and in an attempt to avoid
the volume of case-by-case litigation that had resulted under prior law
where each grant was subjected to a "gift vs. compensation" test.241
Section 117 provides that gross income does not include any amounts
received as a qualified scholarship by an individual who is a candidate for a
degree at an educational institution .2  A qualified scholarship includes any
amounts received by an individual as a scholarship or fellowship grant to
239. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 11Ith CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCALYEARs 2009-2013 39 (Comm. Print 2010).
240. See Mimi Sharamitaro, Comment, The Federal Tax System and Treatment of
Scholarships for Graduate Students: Should Scholarships Be Taxed?, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J.
1501, 1502-03 (2004) (citing Richard C.E. Beck, Loan Repayment Assistance Programs for
Public-Interest Lawyers: Why Does Everyone Think They are Taxable?, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 251, 258 (1996); Robert W. Lee, The Taxation of Athletic Scholarships: An Uneasy
Tension Between Benevolence and Consistency, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 591, 592 (1985)). The
legislative history to this provision provides as follows: "The 1939 Code contained no provi-
sion regarding the treatment of scholarships and fellowship grants. The basic ruling of the
Internal Revenue Service stated that the amount of a grant or fellowship was includible in
gross income unless it could be established to be a gift." See JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N,
SUMMARY OF THE NEw PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, at 12 (1955);
See S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 109TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES, COMPENDIUM OF
BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISION 488 (Comm. Print 2006) ("Section 117
was enacted as part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 in order to clarify the tax status of
grants to students. . . ." Prior to such time, such scholarships were excludible from income
only "if it could be established that they were gifts.").
241. See H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at 4041-42 (1954) (to accompany H.R. 8300); S.
REP. No. 83-1622, at 4647-48 (1954) (also to accompany H.R. 8300); see also Sharamitaro,
supra note 240, at 1502.
242. I.R.C. § 117(a) (2006). For these purposes, the Code defines "educational or-
ganization" as "an educational organization which normally maintains a regular faculty and
curriculum and normally has a regularly enrolled body of pupils or student in attendance at
the place where its educational activities are regularly carried on." I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii).
Proposed regulations used the same definition of an educational organization, with the addi-
tional requirement that the educational organization must have as its primary function "the
presentation of formal instruction." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1 17-6(c)(5), 53 Fed. Reg. 21688-
01, 21692 (June 9, 1988). This definition is different than that of an "eligible educational
institution" used in most of the other Tax Incentive Provisions. See supra note 202.
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the extent that the individual establishes that the amount was used for quali-
fied tuition and related expenses.243 Section 117 is the exclusive provision
excluding such amounts from gross income.2'
For these purposes, the term "qualified tuition and related expenses"
includes tuition and fees required for the enrollment or attendance of a stu-
dent at a qualified educational organization and fees, books, supplies and
equipment required for courses of instruction at such an institution.245 Scho-
larship and fellowship grants that are used for other expenses, such as room
and board, are not excludable from gross income.2" Section 117 does not
require a tracing of funds.247 Rather, the amount of a qualified scholarship is
excludable up to the aggregate amount incurred for qualified tuition and
related expenses during the period covered by the grant, provided that the
terms of the grant or scholarship do not earmark or designate its use for
nonqualified expenses and do not specify that the funds cannot be used for
tuition and course-related expenses.24 8
In addition, Section 117 requires that the individual receiving the
scholarship or fellowship grant be a candidate for a degree at a qualified
educational organization.24 9 This requires the student to attend a primary or
243. I.R.C. § 117(b)(1).
244. See Treas. Reg. § 1.117-1(a) (2011); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1 17-6(b)(1).
245. I.R.C. §I 117(b)(2). In order to be treated as related expenses, any fees, books,
supplies or equipment must be required of all students in the particular course of instruction.
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(c)(2); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(c)(6), ex. 1.
246. I.R.C. § 117(b)(2). In 1986, Congress limited the exclusion to amounts for
qualified tuition and related expenses and made all grants for living expenses taxable. See
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §123, 100 Stat. 2085, 2112 (1986). The stated
reason for such change was that: "The Congress concluded that the exclusion for scholar-
ships should be targeted specifically for the purpose of educational benefits, and should not
encompass other items that would otherwise constitute nondeductible personal expenses."
See JoINT COMM. ON TAX'N, JCS-10-87, GEN. EXPLANATION OF TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at
40 (1987) [hereinafter 1986 JoINT COMM. ON TAX'N REPORT].
247. Under the proposed regulations, taxpayers are required to keep records to estab-
lish amounts used for qualified tuition and related expenses. The regulations do not require a
taxpayer to trace particular scholarship or fellowship grant amounts to particular expendi-
tures for tuition and related expenses. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(e).
248. H.R. REP. No 99-841, at II-16 (1986) (Conf. Rep.).
249. I.R.C. § 117(a). Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the exclusion was also
available to individuals who were not candidates for a degree. However, in that case, the
exclusion was limited to $300 a month with a lifetime limit of 36 months. See CONG.
RESEARCH SERv., S. PRT. 109-072, TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND
MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 488 (Comm. Print 2006) [hereinafter TAX
EXPENDITURES COMPENDIUM]. Congress determined that, in the case of grants to non-degree
candidates for travel, research, and similar expenses that would be deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses, exclusion for such expenses was not needed, and that exclusion
was not appropriate if the expenses would not be deductible. See 1986 JOINT COMM. ON
TAX'N REPORT, at 40. In addition, it was thought that this change to the law would lessen the
number of cases flooding the courts by medical interns and residents seeking to have their
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secondary school or to be an undergraduate or graduate student pursuing a
degree at a college or university.250 The term also includes a full or part-
time student at an educational institution that provides an educational pro-
gram that is acceptable for full credit toward a bachelor's or higher degree
(or offers a program of training to prepare students for gainful employment
in a recognized occupation) and is authorized under Federal and State law to
provide such a program and is accredited by a nationally recognized accre-
ditation agency.25'
Section 117 does not exclude any portion of the amount received to
the extent that such amount represents payment for teaching, research or
other services by the student required as a condition for receiving the scho-
larship.252 These payments are included in a recipient's gross income in an
amount determined by reference to the rate of compensation ordinarily paid
for similar services performed by an individual who is not the recipient of a
scholarship or a fellowship grant.253
In addition to the exclusion for qualified scholarships found in Section
117(a), Section 117(d) excludes from gross income any qualified tuition
reduction.254 A qualified tuition reduction is any reduction in tuition pro-
vided by an educational institution to an employee for the education of such
renumeration classified as a nontaxable fellowship grant. Id. at 41 (citing Zonkerman v.
Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 6, 9 (1977) (stating that "[w]hy the amounts received by a young
doctor just out of school should be treated differently from the amounts received by a young
lawyer, engineer, or business school graduate has never been made clear")).
250. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1 17-6(c)(4). A student could pursue studies or conduct
research at an educational organization other than the one conferring the degree if that study
or research met the requirements of the educational organization granting the degree. Id.
25 1. Id.
252. I.R.C. § 117(c)(1). As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress repealed
the exemption for amounts received for teaching, research or other services that are required
for all degree candidates whether or not on scholarship. Scholarships received in exchange
for such services are taxable to the extent of the value of all such services provided. Accord-
ing to the Joint Committee on Taxation,
The Congress concluded, consistently with the overall objectives of the Act, that
principles of fairness require that all compensation should be given the same tax
treatment; that is, some individuals (e.g., students who perform teaching services
for universities) should not receive more favorable tax treatment of their compen-
sation than all other individuals who earn wages.
See 1986 JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N REPORT, at 41. Beginning in 2002, amounts received under
the National Health Service Corps Scholarship Program and the Armed Forces Health Pro-
fessions Scholarship and Financial Assistance Program are exempt from this rule. See I.R.C.
§ 117(c)(2), as added by EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 413, 115 Stat. 38 (2001). This
exemption is inapplicable for payments made after December 31, 2012. See EGTRRA §
901; Tax Relief Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 101(a), 124 Stat. 3296 (2010).
253. Treas. Reg. § 1.1 17-2(a)(1) (2011); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1 17-6(d)(3).
254. See I.R.C. § 1 17(d)(1).
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employee or certain relatives of the employee at any qualified institution.255
The tuition reduction is exempt from gross income only if it is for education
below the graduate level, with an exception for graduate students engaged
in teaching or research at the institution providing the tuition reduction.256
The term does not include a reduction that represents payment for services,
such as teaching or research."'
4. Exclusion for Employer-Provided Educational Assistance Pro-
grams
Code Provision: Section 127
Estimated Revenue Loss: 2009 - $800 million, 2010 - $900 mil-
lion, 2011 - $900 million, 2012 - $ 900 million, 2013 - $900 mil-
lion 258
Prior to 1978, there was no provision excluding from gross income the
value of educational assistance provided by a taxpayer's employer.259 Under
prior law, the Service had ruled that where educational expenses paid on
255. See I.R.C. § 117(d)(2)(B). For these purposes, retired and disabled employees,
and surviving spouses of employees are treated as employees. In addition, tuition reductions
granted to a spouse or a dependent of an employee also qualifies for the exclusion. See
I.R.C. § 132(h).
256. See I.R.C. §§ 117(d)(2)(B), (d)(4).
257. See I.R.C. § 117(c); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.117-2(a)(1). Although, at first
glance, these statements (i.e., that a graduate student may qualify for a qualified tuition re-
duction only if he or she is engaged in teaching or research and that the amount paid for such
teaching or research is taxable as gross income) appear to be confusing and, perhaps, contra-
dictory, the following example illustrates the interplay between these concepts:
Thus, if a teaching assistant having to pay tuition of $10,000 is not required to pay
any graduate school tuition at all on the condition that she teach at the institution,
and the salary for similar teaching services paid to a nonstudent would be $6,000,
then $6,000 would be includable salary and $4,000 would be excludable as a quali-
fied scholarship.
See Joseph M. Dodge, Scholarships Under the Income Tax, 46 TAX L. 697, 724 (1993) (cit-
ing Prop. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.117-6(d)(3), (5), ex. 5, 53 Fed. Reg. 21688-01, 21692 (June 9,
1988).
258. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 11 Ith CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013 39 (Comm. Print 2010).
259. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 95th CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE REVENUE ACT OF 1978, at 124 (Comm. Print 1979) (Section 61 includes as gross income
"all income from whatever source derived including, but not limited to, compensation for
services") [hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATION REVENUE AcT OF 1978]. Although gross
income excluded amounts received as scholarships or fellowship grants, the Joint Committee
noted that such exclusion "is restricted to educational grants by relatively disinterested gran-
tors who do not require any significant consideration from the recipient." Id. (citing Bingler
v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969)).
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behalf of, or reimbursed to, an employee by an employer would have quali-
fied for the Business Expense Deduction (if paid by the employee), the
payment or reimbursement was excluded from income.2" Where the ex-
pense would not have qualified for the Business Expense Deduction, the
payment or reimbursement was includible in income.' In 1978, recogniz-
ing the confusion as to when the Business Expense Deduction applied,
Congress enacted Section 127.262
Section 127 excludes from an employee's gross amounts paid or in-
curred by an employer for educational assistance to such employee pursuant
to certain employer educational assistance programs ("Employer Assistance
Programs" or "EAPs"). 263 An employee may exclude a maximum of $5,250
of educational assistance furnished each year.2' Educational assistance
260. See id. at 125; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,235 (Dec. 5, 1969).
261. See GENERAL EXPLANATION REVENUE AcT OF 1978, at 125.
262. See I.R.C. § 127 (2006), as enacted by Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-600, §
164, 92 Stat. 2763, 2811 (Nov. 6, 1978). According to the Joint Committee on Taxation:
Because ambiguities exist in the "improve or maintain skills" test [of Treasury
Regulation Section 1.162-5], the taxability of educational assistance programs of
particular employers necessarily has depended on IRS agents' case-by-case analys-
es of the skills needed for the jobs held by each employee participating in such
programs.
The "job-related" distinction often seems both ambiguous and restrictive. For
example, if a person with little or no work experience is employed in an entry-level
position and receives training from his employer to advance to a job requiring
some greater skills or experience, the value of the training may be taxable. This
may discourage self-improvement. If a typist, for example, receives training to be
a secretary, or if a secretary receives training in a paralegal program, it might be
considered not job-related.
GENERAL EXPLANATION REVENUE ACT OF 1978, at 126.
263. I.R.C. § 127(a)(1). In order to qualify as an EAP, the educational assistance
program must meet certain requirements. First, the assistance must be provided pursuant to a
separate written plan of the employer for the exclusive benefit of its employees. See I.R.C. §
127(b)(1). Second, the EAP must not discriminate in favor of highly compensated em-
ployees. See I.R.C. § 127(b)(2). Third, no more than five percent of the amounts paid or
incurred by the employer during the year for educational assistance under such program may
be provided to individuals that own more than five percent of such employer and their spous-
es and dependents. See I.R.C. § 127(b)(3). Fourth, the program must not provide eligible
employees with a choice of receiving educational assistance or some other benefit that would
be includible in gross income. See I.R.C. § 127(b)(4). Finally, reasonable notification of the
availability and terms of the program must be available to eligible employees. See I.R.C. §
127(b)(6). There is no requirement that such program be funded. See I.R.C. § 127(b)(5).
264. I.R.C. § 127(a)(2). As originally enacted in 1978, Section 127 provided no
limitation on the amount of employer-provided educational assistance excludible from gross
income. See I.R.C. § 127, as enacted by the § 164 of the Revenue Act of 1978. In 1984,
Section 127 was amended to provide a maximum exclusion of $5,000 per employee per
calendar year. See Pub. L. 98-611, § 1, 98 Stat. 3176 (Oct. 31, 1984). The Tax Reform Act
of 1986 raised the maximum amount excludable from $5,000 to $5,250. See Pub. L. 99-514,
§ 1162, 100 Stat. 2085 (Oct. 22, 1986). The maximum amount excludable from gross in-
come is not adjusted annually for inflation, and today remains at the same level as in 1986.
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provided to an employee in excess of the $5,250 annual limitation is ex-
cludable from gross income only if the education expenses qualify as a
working condition fringe benefit.265 Accordingly, such amounts would have
to be deductible by the employee (if paid by the employee) pursuant to the
Business Expense Deduction.2
Educational assistance that qualifies for the exclusion is defined as the
payment by an employer of expenses incurred by or on behalf of the em-
ployee for education of the employee (including, but not limited to, tuition,
fees, and similar payments, books, supplies, and equipment).267 The term
also includes courses of instruction provided by the employer for the em-
ployee (including books, supplies, and equipment). 268 However, educational
assistance does not include: (1) tools or supplies (other than books) that may
be retained by the employee after completion of a course; (2) meals, lodg-
ing, or transportation; and (3) any education involving sports, games, or
hobbies. 269  The exclusion for employer-provided educational assistance
applies only to education provided to the employee.270 Unlike some of the
other Tax Incentive Provisions, the value of educational assistance provided
to an employee's spouse or dependents is treated as compensation income.
Educational assistance provided by Section 127 includes both graduate
and undergraduate courses.271 Courses do not have to be job related and can
265. See I.R.C. § 132(j)(8); see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, JCX-35-08,
PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIs RELATING TO TAx BENEFITS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 9 (Comm.
Print 2008).
266. I.R.C. § 132(d).
267. I.R.C. § 127(c)(1)(A).
268. I.R.C. § 127(c)(1)(B).
269. I.R.C. § 127(c)(1). The phrase "sports, games, or hobbies" does not include
education that instructs employees how to maintain and improve health so long as such edu-
cation does not involve the use of athletic facilities or equipment and is not recreational in
nature. See Treas. Reg. § 1.127-2(c)(3)(iii) (2011).
270. I.R.C. § 127(c)(1).
271. The exclusion has not always applied to graduate courses. The exclusion was
first made inapplicable to graduate-level courses by the Technical & Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1988. See Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 4001, 102 Stat. 3342, 3643 (1988). The exclusion
was reinstated with respect to graduate-level courses by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990, effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1990. See Pub. L. No.
101-508, § 11403, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-473 (1990). The exclusion was again made inap-
plicable to graduate-level courses by the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, effec-
tive for courses beginning after June 30, 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1202, 110 Stat.
1755, 1772 (1996). The exclusion for graduate-level courses was reinstated by EGTRRA,
although that change does not apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2012 as a
result of EGTRRA's sunset provision. See EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §§ 411(a), 411(b),
901, 115 Stat. 38, 63, 150 (2001) (as amended by the Tax Relief Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-312, § 101(a), 124 Stat. 3296 (2010)).
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help employees meet minimum requirements for current work or to prepare
for a new career.272
Section 127 was enacted as a temporary provision.273 It has been con-
sistently extended for the past twenty-two years and was made permanent in
2001.274 However, because the changes made by EGTRRA expire, and Sec-
tion 127 is not available for taxable years beginning after December 31,
2012.275
B. Tax Incentives for Future Educational Expenses-The Ghost of Christ-
mas Future
1. Exclusion for Earnings of Qualified Tuition Programs
Code Provision: Section 529
Estimated Revenue Loss from Prepaid Tuition Programs: 2009
- less than $50 million, 2010 - $100 million, 2011 - $100 mil-
lion, 2012 - $200 million, 2013 - $100 million 2 76
272. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. PRT. 109-072, TAx EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF
BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONs 491 (Comm. Print 2006).
273. See I.R.C. § 127, as enacted by Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 164,
92 Stat. 2763, 2811 (1978), which provided that the benefits of such section would be effec-
tive for tax years beginning after December 31, 1978 and prior to January 1, 1984.
274. In 1984, Section 127 was first extended to apply through December 31, 1985.
See Pub. L. No. 98-611, § 1, 98 Stat. 3176, 3176 (1984). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 re-
troactively extended Section 127 through December 31, 1987. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, §
1162, 100 Stat. 2085, 2510 (1986). The Technical & Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988
reauthorized the exclusion retroactively to January 1, 1988, and extended it through Decem-
ber 31, 1988. See § 4001, 102 Stat. at 3643. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1989 extended the benefits of Section 127 through September 30, 1990. See Pub. L. No.
101-239, § 7101, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989). The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990
then extended Section 127 through December 31, 1991. See § 11403, 104 Stat. at 1388. The
Tax Extension Act of 1991 extended the provision through June 30, 1992. See Pub. L. No.
102-227, § 103(a)(1), 105 Stat. 1686, 1687 (1991). The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993
reauthorized the provision retroactively and through December 31, 1994. See Pub. L. No.
103-66, § 13101(a)(1), 107 Stat. 312, 420 (1993). The Small Business Job Protection Act re-
enacted Section 127 to run through May 31, 1997. See § 1202, 110 Stat. at 1772. The 1997
TRA subsequently extended the exclusion with respect to courses beginning on or prior to
May 31, 2000. See Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 221, 111 Stat. 788, 818 (1997). The Ticket to
Work & Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 extended the exclusion through Decem-
ber 31, 2001. See Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 506, 113 Stat. 1860, 1922 (1999). With passage of
the EGTRRA, the exclusion was reauthorized (to include graduate education), and made
permanent. See §§ 411(a), (b), 115 Stat. at 63.
275. See EGTRRA § 901, 115 Stat. at 150, as amended by the Tax Relief Act of
2010, § 101(a).
276. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 11 Ith CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013 39 (Comm. Print 2010).
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Estimated Revenue Loss from College Savings Programs: 2009
- $300 million, 2010 - $400 million, 2011 - $500 million, 2012
- $700 million, 2013 - $1.0 billion2 7 7
Taxpayers who wish to save for higher education expenses may do so
by investing in a "Section 529" plan, aptly named for the section of the
Code that governs their tax treatment. Section 529 provides that qualified
tuition programs are exempt from tax.278 Participants in Section 529 plans
contribute after-tax dollars, and distributions are exempt from taxation to
the extent they are used for qualified higher education expenses.279
For these purposes, the term "qualified tuition program" encompasses
two different types of programs." Prepaid tuition programs allow an indi-
vidual to prepay a designated beneficiary's future tuition with today's dol-
lars by purchasing tuition credits or certificates on behalf of such beneft-
ciary. These credits or certificates entitle the beneficiary to the waiver or
payment of qualified higher educational expenses.281 College savings plans
allow individuals to contribute to an account established to pay a designated
beneficiary's qualified higher education expenses at an eligible educational
institution.282 Initially, Section 529 permitted only states to sponsor prepaid
tuition programs. Changes made to Section 529 in 2001 allow such pro-
277. See id.
278. I.R.C. § 529, added to the Code as part of the Small Business Job Protection Act
of 1996, § 1806(a), 110 Stat. at 1895.
Although prepaid tuition plans had been in existence for many years prior to 1996,
one author noted "they have become particularly noteworthy in light of three recent devel-
opments." See Eric A. Lustig, Taxation of Prepaid Tuition Plans and the 1997 Tax Provi-
sions-Middle Class Panacea or Placebo? Continuing Problems and Variations on a
Theme, 31 AKRON L. REv. 229, 232 (1997). First, in 1994, the Sixth Circuit issued a deci-
sion in Michigan v. U.S., 40 F.3d 817 (6th. Cir. 1994), holding that the annual investment
income of the Michigan Education trust was exempt from tax. Id. Second, the Treasury
Department issued final regulations providing that prepaid tuition plans are not debt subject
to the original issue discount rules. Id. The final development related to President Clinton's
education initiatives, including the enactment of the Hope Scholarship Credit, the Lifetime
Learning Credit and the educational savings account provisions of the Code. Id. at 232-33.
The Joint Committee on Taxation notes that Section 529 was enacted because "[t]he
Congress believed that it is appropriate to clarify the tax treatment of State-sponsored prepa-
id tuition and educational savings programs in order to encourage persons to save to meet
post-secondary educational expenses." See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, 104th CONG.,
JCS 12-96, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 104TH
CONGRESS 197 (Comm. Print 1996).
279. I.R.C. § 529(c)(3)(B).
280. I.R.C. § 529(b)(1).
281. I.R.C. § 529(b)(1)(A)(i).
282. I.R.C. § 529(b)(1)(A)(ii). An "eligible educational institution" is defined in the
same manner as such term is used for purposes of the Education Tax Credits. See supra note
202 and accompanying text.
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grams also to be offered by eligible educational institutions. 283 Only states
may sponsor college savings plans. 28
Qualified tuition programs must meet several statutory requirements.
First, the program must allow only cash purchases or contributions.285
Second, separate accounting must be provided for each designated benefi-
ciary. 286 Third, contributors and beneficiaries must be prohibited from di-
rectly or indirectly directing the investment of amounts in the program.287
Fourth, interests in the program (or any portion thereof) may not be used as
security for a loan.288 Finally, adequate safeguards must be provided to pre-
vent contributions in excess the amount necessary to provide for the benefi-
ciary's qualified higher education expenses.289
Other than as stated above, Section 529 imposes no limitations on con-
tributors or beneficiaries. For example, unlike some of the other Tax Incen-
tive Provisions, there are no income caps or contribution limits imposed on
contributors or beneficiaries. 29 A contributor may establish an unlimited
number of accounts for the same or for different beneficiaries. In addition,
283. I.R.C. § 529(b)(1), as amended by EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 402(a)(1),
115 Stat. 38, 60 (2001). Although the amendments made by the EGTRRA allowing eligible
educational institutions to provide prepaid tuition programs were set to expire after Decem-
ber 31, 2010, such changes were made permanent in 2006. See Pension Protection Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1304(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1109 (2006).
284. I.R.C. § 529(b)(1)(A)(ii) (as amended by EGTRRA, § 402(a)(2) 115 Stat. at 60).
285. I.R.C. § 529(b)(2).
286. I.R.C. § 529(b)(3).
287. I.R.C. § 529(b)(4). This prohibition is not violated if the participants in a quali-
fied tuition program are allowed to select among a variety of different investment strategies
at the time the initial contributions are made. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529-2(g) (2001). In
I.R.S. Notice 2001-55, 2001-2 C.B. 299, the Service provided that permitting a change in
investment options once per calendar year and upon a change in designated beneficiaries was
acceptable; provided, that the qualified tuition program must both allow participants to select
only from broad-based investment strategies designed exclusively by the qualified tuition
program and establish procedures and maintain appropriate records to prevent a change in
investment options from occurring on a more frequent basis. In I.R.S. Notice 2009-1, 2009-2
I.R.B. 250 (Jan. 12, 2009), the Service stated that, in order to address concerns caused by the
conditions in the financial markets, solely for 2009, a qualified tuition program may permit
changes in investment strategy for an account twice during the calendar year, in addition to
upon the change in the account's beneficiary.
288. I.R.C. § 529(b)(5).
289. I.R.C. § 529(b)(6). Pursuant to Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.529-2(i), the contribution
limit is the estimated future cost of qualified higher education expenses for five years of
undergraduate enrollment at the highest cost institution allowed by the program.
290. The absence of any income limitations makes a qualified tuition program the
ideal savings vehicle for higher-income taxpayers. See INv. Co. INST., PROFILE OF
HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS FOR COLLEGE 48 (2003) ("Responding households with state-sponsored
529 college savings plan accounts have a median income of $100,000 and median financial
assets of $150,000").
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there is no limit to the number of qualified tuition programs for which a
particular person may be a beneficiary.
Section 529 provides participants and beneficiaries with a number of
income, gift and estate tax benefits.29 ' With regard to income taxes, al-
though there is no deduction for contributions to a qualified tuition pro-
gram, 29 2 because such programs are exempt from federal income tax, the
earnings grow tax-free.293 In addition, the earnings and distributions gener-
ally are not includible in either the contributor's or beneficiary's gross in-
come. 2' Distributions are exempt to the extent of the amount spent by the
291. This Article generally discusses the federal income tax consequences of the Tax
Incentive Provisions. However, it is worth noting that, for estate and gift tax purposes, any
contribution to a qualified tuition program will be treated as a completed gift of a present
interest to the designated beneficiary. See I.R.C. § 529(c)(2)(A)(i). Contributions also do
not qualify as "qualified transfers" as defined in Section 2503(e). See I.R.C. §
529(c)(2)(A)(ii). Accordingly, contributions qualify for the annual gift exclusion of §
2503(b). In addition, donors have the ability to front-load their gifts by electing to take into
account a contribution that exceeds her Section 2503(b) limitation ratably over a 5-year
period beginning with the year of contribution. See I.R.C. § 529(c)(2)(B).
Section 529 also provides that distributions generally are not treated as taxable gifts.
See I.R.C. § 529(c)(5)(A). An exception to this rule arises where the contributor changes the
beneficiary or contributes the amount in a qualified tuition program to a new account for a
different beneficiary. In that case, the estate and gift tax rules shall apply unless the new
beneficiary is assigned to the same or a higher generation than the old beneficiary or is a
member of the family of the old beneficiary (as defined in § 529(e)(2)). See I.R.C. §
529(c)(5)(B).
With regard to the estate tax, Section 529(c)(4) provides that a qualified tuition pro-
gram generally is not included in the gross estate of any individual. See I.R.C. §
529(c)(4)(A). There are two exceptions to the general rule. First, amounts distributed on
account of the death of a beneficiary shall be includible in the gross estate of the beneficiary.
See I.R.C. § 529(c)(4)(B). Second, where a donor elects to spread a single contribution out
over a five-year period, and such donor dies before the close of such five-year period, the
gross estate of the donor shall be required to include in his or her gross estate the portion of
the contributions allocable to the periods ending after the date of death of the donor. See
I.R.C. § 529(c)(4)(C).
These provisions provide for unusual results since the contributor retains the right to
control the qualified tuition program (i.e., when the funds are distributed and to which bene-
ficiary). Because of the potential for abuse, Congress empowered the Treasury Department
to draft legislative regulations "necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this
section and to prevent abuse of such purposes." See I.R.C. § 529(f), (added by the Pension
Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-280, § 1304(b), 120 Stat. 780, 1110 (2006)).
292. This Article does not discuss the state income tax consequences of contributions
to, or distributions from, a qualified tuition program. However, some states allow taxpayers
that make contributions to the state's own qualified tuition program to take a tax deduction.
In addition, many states that piggyback their income tax calculations off of the federal in-
come tax do not tax income earned by qualified tuition programs.
293. I.R.C. § 529(a).
294. I.R.C. § 529(c)(1). Prior to 2002, beneficiaries included all amounts distributed
from a qualified tuition program in income. Beginning in 2002, distributions made to a
beneficiary from a qualified tuition program maintained by a State (or agency or instrumen-
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beneficiary on qualified higher education expenses.295 The portion of any
excess distribution representing the earnings of the qualified tuition program
is includible in the beneficiary's gross income.2 In addition, the Code gen-
erally imposes a ten percent tax penalty on the amount taxable pursuant to
the preceding sentence.29
Section 529 defines "qualified higher education expenses" to include
tuition, fees, books, supplies and equipment required for the enrollment or
attendance of a designated beneficiary at an eligible education institution.298
tality thereof) were excluded from gross income to the extent used to pay qualified higher
education expenses. See EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 402, 115 Stat. 38, 61 (2001).
Earnings withdrawn from qualified tuition programs sponsored by higher education institu-
tions became exempt from tax to the extent used to pay qualified higher education expenses
beginning in 2004. See I.R.C. § 529(c)(3)(B)(iii), as amended by EGTRRA, 115 Stat. at 61.
Originally, these amendments to Section 529 were due to expire after December 31, 2010.
See EGTRRA § 901. However, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 made such amendments
permanent. See Pension Protection Act, Pub. L. 109-280, § 1304(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1110
(2006).
295. I.R.C. § 529(c)(3)(B).
296. I.R.C. §§ 529(c)(3)(A), (B). Section 529(c)(3) uses the annuity rules of Section
72 to determine the amount of the distribution includible in income. These rules divide the
distribution into two components representing the contributions to and the earnings of the
qualified tuition program. Only the earnings are potentially subject to tax, and then only
proportionately based on the ratio that the amount not spent on qualified higher education
expenses bears to the amount of the distribution. The following example illustrates this
point:
Assume that A is the beneficiary of a qualified tuition plan. The plan has a total
balance of $50,000 (consisting of $20,000 of contributions and $30,000 of earnings). During
the year, A withdraws $15,000 from the account.
In this example, 40 percent of the distribution represents a return of capital (i.e.,
$20,000/$50,000 * $15,000 = $6,000) that will never be includible in beneficiary's gross
income and 60 percent of the distribution ($30,000/$50,000 * $15,000 = $9,000) represents
accumulated earnings (which may be included or excluded from income depending on the
beneficiary's qualified education expenses for the year).
If the beneficiary's qualified education expenses equal or exceed $15,000, no por-
tion of the distribution will be includible in gross income. If, however, the beneficiary incurs
less than $15,000 of qualified education expenses, only the portion of the $9,000 of accumu-
lated earnings that bears the same ratio as the qualified education expenses incurred bears to
the aggregate distributions is excluded from income. Thus, if the beneficiary's qualified
education expenses for the year totaled $12,000, since $12,000 is 80 percent of the amount of
the total distribution, only 80 percent of the amount of the distribution that constitutes accu-
mulated earnings (i.e., 80 percent of $9,000 = $7,200) is excluded from gross income. Ac-
cordingly, $1,800 ($9,000 - $7,200) is included in the beneficiary's income.
297. See I.R.C. § 529(c)(6), which incorporates the provisions of Section 530(d)(4).
Thus, in addition to paying income tax on $1,800 of gross income, the beneficiary in the
example in the preceding footnote would be subject to an additional tax of $180.
298. I.R.C. § 529(e)(3)(A)(i). Solely for 2009 and 2010, such term included expenses
for the purchase of any computer technology or equipment, or internet access or related
services, if such technology, equipment or services are to be used by the beneficiary and the
beneficiary's family for any of the years that the beneficiary is enrolled at an eligible educa-
tion institution. See I.R.C. § 529(e)(3)(A)(iii).
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Such term also includes reasonable costs incurred by the designated benefi-
ciary for room and board for students who are generally carrying at least
one-half of the normal full-time workload for the course of study that such
student is pursuing.2" Finally, the term also includes expenses for special
needs services (in the case of a special needs beneficiary) that are incurred
in connection with such enrollment or attendance."
In order to prevent a Double Benefit, the amount of qualified higher
education expenses is reduced by the tax-free amount of any scholarship
received by the beneficiary, any other payments received by such benefi-
ciary that are excluded from gross income (other than gifts, bequests and
inheritances), as well as by the amount of such expenses claimed by any
taxpayer (with respect to the beneficiary) in determining the amount of the
Hope Scholarship Credit or the Lifetime Learning Credit.30 ' Finally, since
2002, an individual can be a beneficiary of both a qualified tuition program
and a Coverdell Education Savings Account.302 To the extent that the distri-
butions received by a beneficiary under both provisions exceeds the benefi-
ciary's qualified higher education expenses, such expenses must be allo-
cated among the distributions to determine the amount of income includible
under each provision. 30 3
2. Exclusion for Earnings from Education Savings Accounts
Code Provision: Section 530
Estimated Revenue Loss from Prepaid Tuition Programs:
2009 - $100 million, 2010 - $100 million, 2011 - $100 mil-
lion, 2012 - $200 million, 2013 - $200 million30
Enacted in 1997,305 and liberalized in 2001,'0 Section 530 provides
taxpayers with another tax-favored savings plan. These plans, originally
299. I.R.C. § 529(c)(3)(B)(i), which incorporates the definition of an "eligible stu-
dent" from Section 25A(b)(3). The amount of room and board treated as a qualified higher
education expense is limited to the greater of (i) the allowance (applicable to the student) for
room and board included in the cost of attendance as determined by the eligible educational
institution for such period, and (ii) the actual invoice amount the student residing in housing
owned or operated by the eligible educational institution is charged by the institution for
room and board costs during such period. See I.R.C. § 529(c)(3)(B)(i).
300. I.R.C. § 529(e)(3)(A)(ii).
301. I.R.C. § 529(c)(3)(v).
302. EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38, 59-60; see infra Section I1l.B.2.
303. I.R.C. § 529(c)(3)(vi).
304. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ONTAX'N, 11 Ith CONG., ESTIMATES OFFEDERALTAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARs 2009-2013 39 (Comm. Print 2010).
305. I.R.C. § 530, as enacted by the 1997 TRA, Pub. L. 105-34, § 213(a), Ill Stat.
788, 813 (1997).
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referred to as Education Individual Retirement Accounts, were renamed in
2001, and are now known as Coverdell Education Savings Accounts (he-
reafter "Coverdell ESAs")."
A Coverdell ESA is a trust created or organized in the United States
exclusively for the purpose of paying qualified education expenses of des-
ignated beneficiaries (who must be individuals) that is so designated at the
time of its creation or organization.308 In addition, the written governing
instrument creating the trust must provide that: (i) contributions must be
limited to cash, made before the beneficiary turns eighteen, and not result in
aggregate contributions for the year in excess of $2,000;" (ii) the trustee is
either a bank or another fiduciary that demonstrates to the satisfaction of the
Secretary that the trust will be administered consistent with the require-
ments of Section 530 (or who has so demonstrated with respect to any indi-
vidual retirement account);310 (iii) no part of the trust's assets will be in-
vested in life insurance contracts;31' (iv) the assets of the trust will not be
commingled with other property (except in a common trust fund or invest-
ment fund);312 and (iv) except in certain situations, any balance credited to a
designated beneficiary must be distributed to such beneficiary within 30
days after such beneficiary attains the age of thirty."'
Coverdell ESAs function similarly to Section 529 qualified tuition
plans. Contributions made to a Coverdell ESA are not deductible. Howev-
er, because a Coverdell ESA is exempt from tax, earnings on amounts in
Coverdell ESAs are not taxable prior to distribution.3 14 Distributions are not
includible in a beneficiary's gross income to the extent of the amount spent
by the beneficiary on qualified higher education expenses." The portion of
any excess distribution representing the Coverdell ESA's earnings is includ-
ible in the beneficiary's gross income.316 In addition, the Code imposes a
306. See EGTRRA § 401.
307. Education IRAs were renamed Coverdell Education Savings Accounts by Pub.
L. No. 107-22, 115 Stat. 296 (2001), effective July 26, 2001, in honor of the late Senator
Paul Coverdell who was a proponent of these savings plans.
308. I.R.C. § 530(b)(1).
309. I.R.C. § 530(b)(1)(A).
310. I.R.C. § 530(b)(1)(B).
311. I.R.C. § 530(b)(1)(C).
312. I.R.C. § 530(b)(1)(D).
313. I.R.C. § 530(b)(1)(E). To the extent that the beneficiary dies before turning
thirty, the balance shall be distributed to the beneficiary's heirs within thirty days of the date
of death. Id.
314. I.R.C. § 530(a); see also S. REP. No. 105-22 (1997).
315. I.R.C. § 530(d)(2)(A).
316. I.R.C. § 530(d)(2)(B). The Section 530 income inclusion provisions function in
the same manner as those of Section 529(c). For an example illustrating income inclusion,
see supra note 296.
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ten percent tax penalty on the amount taxable pursuant to the preceding
sentence.317
One difference between the two sections is that, while Section 529
provides tax-favored treatment to distributions only when the amounts dis-
tributed are used to pay for qualified higher education expenses, distribu-
tions from a Coverdell ESA can be used for qualified higher education ex-
penses and qualified elementary and secondary education expenses.318
However, with respect to higher education expenses, the two provisions
overlap in that both use the same definition for "qualified higher education
expenses.""' Where a beneficiary receives distributions from both a Cover-
dell ESA and a qualified tuition plan, the Code contains rules to coordinate
the amount, if any, includible in the beneficiary's income.320
The law initially allowed for a maximum contribution of $500.321 The
contribution limit was increased to $2,000, effective for tax years 2002
through 2012.322 Beginning on January 1, 2013, the maximum annual con-
tribution will revert back to $500.323 The contribution limit applies on an
aggregate basis both at the contributor and beneficiary level.324 The $2,000
contribution amount is reduced, but only if the contributor is an individual,
by $1 for each $15 (or $1 for each $30, in the case of a joint return) by
which the contributor's modified adjusted gross income exceeds $95,000
(or $190,000, in the case of a joint return).325 Accordingly, no contributions
317. I.R.C. § 530(d)(4).
318. I.R.C. § 530(b)(2). The amendments to Section 530(b)(2), which expanded the
definition of qualified education expenses to include qualified elementary and secondary
education expenses, expire after December 31, 2012. See EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §
901(a), 115 Stat. 38 (2001) (as amended by the Tax Relief Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312,
§ 101(a), 124 Stat. 3296 (2010)). Accordingly, after such date, the expenses covered by
Section 529 plans and Coverdell ESAs will be identical.
319. I.R.C. § 530(b)(2)(A)(i). Section 530 provides the same rules found in Section
529 to prevent a Double Benefit. See I.R.C. § 530(d)(2)(C)(i); I.R.C. § 529(c)(3)(v).
320. See I.R.C. § 530(d)(2)(C)(ii); I.R.C. § 529(c)(3)(vi).
321. See I.R.C. § 530, as enacted by the 1997 TRA, Pub. L. 105-34, § 213(a), Ill
Stat. 788, 813 (1997).
322. EGTRRA § 401(a).
323. EGTRRA § 901(a) (as amended by the Tax Relief Act of 2010 § 101(a)).
324. I.R.C. §§ 530(b)(1)(A)(iii), 4973(e)(1). Excess contributions generally are sub-
ject to a six percent excise tax. See I.R.C. § 4973(a)(4); I.R.S. Notice 97-60, 1997-2 C.B.
310, § 3, Q&As 5, 12 (although more than one Coverdell ESA may be created for the benefit
of a particular child, the $2,000 ceiling applies to all contributions by all contributors for
such child's benefit); see also I.R.S. Pub. 970, 41 (2011). The $2,000 maximum contribution
limitation does not apply to any rollover contributions. See I.R.C. §§ 530(b)(1)(A)(iii),
4973(e)(2).
325. I.R.C. § 530(c)(1). "Modified gross income" is defined in I.R.C. § 530(c)(2).
Interestingly, "corporations and other entities (including tax-exempt organizations) are per-
mitted to make contributions to [Coverdell ESAs], regardless of the income of the corpora-
tion or entity during the year of the contribution." See H.R. REP. No. 107-84, at 151 (Conf.
Rep. 2001). The exception to the income limitation rules for corporations and other entities
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may be made if the modified adjusted gross income of an individual contri-
butor exceeds $110,000 (or $220,000 in the case of a joint return). 326
3. Exclusion for Interest on United States Savings Bonds
Code Provision: Section 135
Estimated Revenue Loss: Less than $50 million each year from
2009 through 2013327
Section 135 was among the first Tax Incentive Provisions available to
assist in saving for postsecondary education.3 28 However, as a result of sta-
tutory limitations, this incentive is not as attractive an investment as some
other education savings vehicles.329
Section 135 excludes from income interest received by certain taxpay-
ers on the redemption of qualified United States savings bonds when the
taxpayer pays qualified higher education expenses during the year.330 If the
taxpayer's qualified higher education expenses exceed the amount of the
bonds redeemed, all of such interest is excluded.331 Where the redemption
proceeds exceed the amount of qualified higher education expenses, the
interest is includible in income in the same manner as excess distributions
from a qualified tuition plan or a Coverdell ESA.332
is eliminated after December 31, 2012. See EGTRRA § 901(a) (as amended by the Tax
Relief Act of 2010 § 101(a)).
326. Beginning in 2013, the $500 contribution amount will be reduced, regardless of
whether the contributor is an individual or an entity, by $1 for each $15 (or, $1 for each $10,
in the case of a joint return) by which the contributor's modified adjusted gross income ex-
ceeds $95,000 (or $150,000, in the case of a joint return). Accordingly, no contributions may
be made if the modified adjusted gross income of an individual or entity making the contri-
bution exceeds $110,000 (or $160,000, in the case of individuals filing a joint return). See
I.R.C. § 530(c)(1) (prior to amendment by 2001 EGTRRA § 401(b)).
327. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 111th CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013 39 (Comm. Print 2010).
328. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. PRT. 109-072, TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM
OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 476 (Comm. Print 2006).
329. Id. at 589.
330. I.R.C. § 135(a). I.R.C. § 135(a) was enacted by the Technical and Miscellane-
ous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub.L. 100-647, § 6009(a).
331. I.R.C. § 135(a).
332. I.R.C. § 135(b)(1); see also supra notes 296, 316. The following example illu-
strates this point:
In February 2009, Mark and Joan Washington, a married couple, cashed a
qualified series EE U.S. savings bond. They received proceeds of $9,000,
representing principal of $6,000 and interest of $3,000. In 2009, they paid $7,650
of their daughter's college tuition. They are not claiming the American opportuni-
ty, Hope, or lifetime learning credit for those expenses, and their daughter does not
have any tax-free educational assistance. Their MAGI for 2009 was $80,000.
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A "qualified United States savings bond" is defined as a United States
savings bond issued at a discount after December 31, 1989 to an individual
who was at least 24 years old as of the date of issuance.333 The United
States savings bonds that qualify for this exclusion are Series EE or Series I
Savings Bonds.3 ' The exclusion is not available to an individual who owns
bonds that such individual or his spouse did not purchase. 335
"Qualified higher education expenses" include only tuition and fees
required for enrollment or attendance of the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse,
or any dependent of the taxpayer at an eligible education institution.3 ' Ex-
penditures for courses in sports, games, or hobbies are not considered unless
they are part of a degree program.3 7 Amounts contributed to a qualified
tuition program or a Coverdell ESA for which the taxpayer, the taxpayer's
spouse or a dependent of the taxpayer is a designated beneficiary shall be
treated as a qualified higher education expense for these purposes.' Mar-
ried couples are required to file a joint return to utilize the exclusion.'
Section 135 denies a Double Benefit for education expenses by reduc-
ing the amount of qualified higher education expenses of an individual by
$3,000 interest * ($7,650 AQEE/$9,000 proceeds) = $2,550 tax-free interest
They can exclude $2,550 of interest in 2009. They must pay tax on the re-
maining $450 ($3,000 - $2,550) interest.
I.R.S. Pub. 970, 74 (2009).
333. I.R.C. § 135(c)(1).
334. See I.R.S. Pub. 970, at 73; see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. PRT. 109-072,
TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS
475 (Comm. Print 2006). "Series EE Bonds are accrued bonds which earn a variable interest
rate equal to 90 percent of the average yield on 5-year Treasury securities for the preceding
six months. Series I Bonds are accrued bonds that earn a fixed rate of return plus a variable
semi-annual inflation rate." Id.
335. See Technical Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-1104, at
141 (2d Sess. 1988) (Conf. Rep. to accompany H.R. 4333). This puts significant limitations
on the ability to use Section 135 to save for higher education. The Conference Report ac-
companying the law enacting Section 135 provides that:
The exclusion is not available to an individual who is the owner of a Series EE
bond which were purchased by another individual, other than a spouse. Under this
rule, interest on bonds purchased by an individual to be redeemed in (say) 10 years
when a dependent of the individual attends a college is eligible for the exclusion.
However, the exclusion will not be allowable if bonds are purchased by a parent
and put in the name of the child or another dependent of the taxpayer, or if bonds
are purchased by an individual who is under age 24 at the time of purchase.
Id.
336. I.R.C. § 135(c)(2)(A). For these purposes, the term "eligible education institu-
tion" has the same meaning as provided in §529(e)(5). See also I.R.C. § 135(c)(3).
337. I.R.C. § 135(c)(2)(B).
338. I.R.C. § 135(c)(2)(C). However, in order to prevent a Double Benefit, such
contribution shall not be treated as a contribution under Section 529 and Section 530 in de-
termining the portion of the distribution that represents a return of investment.
339. I.R.C. § 135(c)(2)(C).
1098 [Vol. 2010:1047
Tax Treatment of Higher Education Expenses
any scholarships, veterans' education assistance, employer education assis-
tance or similar assistance received by such individual.' The amount of
qualified higher education expenses is further reduced by excluding ex-
penses that are used in the computation of the Education Tax Credits or to
compute the amount excluded from a distribution from a qualified tuition
program or a Coverdell ESA. '
The benefit provided by Section 135 is phased out for middle- and up-
per-income taxpayers. 42 As introduced in 1988, the interest exclusion was
reduced proportionately based on the ratio that the taxpayer's modified ad-
justed gross income in excess of $40,000 (or $60,000, in the case of a joint
return) bore to $15,000 (or $30,000, in the case of a joint return)." How-
ever, for taxable years beginning after 1990, the $40,000 and $60,000
amount have been indexed for inflation.? For 2010, the exclusion under
Section 135 begins to phase out for a taxpayer having a modified adjusted
gross income above $70,100 ($105,100 for joint returns), and is completely
phased out for a taxpayer having a modified adjusted gross income at or
above $85,100 ($135,100 for joint returns)."
For 2011, the exclusion under Section 135 begins to phase out for a
taxpayer having a modified adjusted gross income above $71,100 ($106,650
for joint returns) and is completely phased out for a taxpayer having a mod-
ified adjusted gross income at or above $86,100 ($136,650 for joint re-
turns)." These income limitations, unlike those limitations applicable to
Coverdell ESAs (which apply to contributions rather than distributions),
apply at the time the bonds are redeemed (rather than at the time of pur-
chase). Accordingly, families intending to purchase savings bonds as a
means to save for college expenses must predict their income eligibility far
in advance.
4. Relieffrom Penalties for Withdrawals from IRAs
Code Provisions: Section 408 and Section 408A"
340. I.R.C. § 135(d)(1).
341. I.R.C. § 135(d)(2).
342. I.R.C. § 135(b)(2); see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. PRT. 109-072, TAX
EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 476
(Comm. Print 2006).
343. See I.R.C. § 135(b)(2)(A) (as enacted by Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1988, Pub.L. 100-647, § 6009(a)).
344. See I.R.C. § 135(b)(2)(B) (as enacted by the 1988 TAMRA § 6009(a)).
345. Rev. Proc. 2009-50, 2009-45 I.R.B. 617.
346. Rev. Proc. 2010-40, 2010-46 I.R.B. 663.
347. Because these relief provisions are not considered tax expenditures, the federal
government does not provide revenue loss estimates.
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As a general rule, if a taxpayer makes a withdrawal from his individu-
al retirement account ("IRA") before reaching the age of 59 1/2, in addition
to paying federal income taxes on the amount withdrawn (except to the ex-
tent the withdrawal is a return of nondeductible contributions), the taxpayer
also must pay a ten percent penalty tax on all or part of the amount with-
drawn." However, since January 1, 1998, a taxpayer making a withdrawal
from an IRA to pay his "qualified higher education expenses" will be re-
quired to pay the federal income tax on the withdrawal, but will not be sub-
ject to the additional tax of ten percent."' The exception to this additional
tax applies only to the extent that the amount of the distribution does not
exceed the qualified higher education expenses during the taxable year for
the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, or any child or grandchild of the tax-
payer or the taxpayer's spouse at an eligible educational institution."'o
Qualified distributions from a Roth IRA generally are not includible in
gross income.3 s' A qualified distribution is any distribution that is made
after the five-taxable year period beginning with the first taxable year for
which the individual made a contribution to the Roth IRA, and after either
348. See I.R.C. § 408(d) (regarding the taxability of distributions from an IRA.); see
also I.R.C. § 72(t)(1) (regarding the general rules providing for a 10 percent penalty on early
withdrawals).
349. See I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(E) (added by 1997 TRA, Pub. L. 105-34, § 203, 111 Stat.
788, 809 (1997)); see also I.R.S. Notice 97-60, 1997-2 C.B. 310.
The Congress believed that it is both appropriate and important to allow indi-
viduals to withdraw amounts from their IRAs for purposes of paying higher educa-
tion expenses without incurring an additional 10-percent early withdrawal tax.
The Act provides that the 10-percent early withdrawal tax does not apply to
distributions from IRAs (including new Roth IRAs created by the Act) if the tax-
payer uses the amounts to pay qualified higher education expenses (including those
related to graduate-level courses) of the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, or any
child, or grandchild of the taxpayer or the taxpayer's spouse.
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 107TH CONG., JCS-23-97, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1997 23 (Comm. Print 1997).
350. See I.R.C. §§ 72(t)(2)(E), 72(t)(7)(A); see also I.R.S. Notice 97-60, 1997-2 C.B.
310 (Nov. 17, 1997). For these purposes, the Code defers to Section 529 for purposes of
defining "qualified higher education expenses." See I.R.C. § 72(t)(7)(A). Qualified higher
education expenses paid with an individual's earnings, the proceeds of a loan, a gift, an inhe-
ritance given to the student or the individual making the withdrawal, or personal savings
(including savings from a Section 529 qualified tuition program) are included in determining
the amount of the IRA withdrawal which is not subject to the 10 percent early withdrawal
tax. See I.R.S. Pub. 970, 71 (2009). However, qualified higher education expenses paid with
a Pell Grant, a scholarship excluded from income under Section 117, a distribution from a
Coverdell ESA not includible in income under Section 530, employer-provided educational
assistance excluded from gross income under Section 127, or any other nontaxable payment
(other than gifts and inheritances) are excluded in computing the amount of a taxpayer's
qualified higher educational expenses for these purposes. Id. at 72.
351. I.R.C. § 408A(d)(1).
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(i) attainment of age 59-1/2; (ii) on account of death or disability; or (iii)
which is a "qualified special purpose distribution" (within the meaning of
Section 408A(d)(5)).352 Distributions from a Roth IRA that are not qualified
distributions are includible in income to the extent attributable to earnings
(i.e., distributions are not taxable to the extent such amount represent a re-
turn of contributions).3 53 In addition, distributions other than qualified dis-
tributions are subject to the same ten percent penalty as traditional IRAs on
amounts that are includible in income.3 5 The rules that exempt traditional
IRA distributions from the ten percent early withdrawal penalty similarly
apply to nonqualified distributions from a Roth IRA.I
C. Tax Incentives for Prior Educational Expenses-The Ghost of Christmas
Past
1. Deduction for Interest on Qualified Education Loans
Code Provision: Section 221
Estimated Revenue Loss: 2009 - $800 million, 2010 -
$900 million, 2011 - $500 million, 2012 - $400 million,
2013 - $400 million356
The Code generally provides no deduction for personal interest paid or
incurred by individuals."' Personal interest is defined as all interest other
than six specifically enumerated types of interest, including interest on in-
debtedness properly allocable to the taxpayer's trade or business and inter-
est on a qualified education loan.358 Where an individual's debt was in-
curred to pay for higher education expenses, three possible outcomes may
occur. First, the interest may qualify for a Business Expense Deduction.
Second, the interest may be deductible under Section 221, if the loan is a
qualified education loan. Finally, the interest may be treated as nondeducti-
ble personal interest.
Whether interest qualifies for a Business Expense Deduction depends
on whether the cost of the underlying education would qualify for a Busi-
ness Expense Deduction under Section 162 and Treasury Regulation Sec-
352. I.R.C. § 408A(d)(2).
353. I.R.C. §§ 408A(a); 408(d)(1).
354. I.R.C. §§ 408A(a); 72(t)(1).
355. I.R.C. §§ 408A(a); 72(t)(2)(E); see supra note 349.
356. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 11 Ith CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAx
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013 38 (Comm. Print 2010).
357. I.R.C. § 163(h)(1) (2006).
358. I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(2)(A), (F); 221(a).
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tion 1.162-5."' In Holmes v. Commissioner, the Tax Court concluded that,
where a taxpayer incurred loans "to further education in order to obtain a
new trade or business," the interest on such loans was not deductible.36
Interest that does not qualify for a Business Expense Deduction may
still be deductible under Section 221.361 Designed to ease the financial bur-
den imposed on taxpayers as a result of considerable borrowings to finance
their undergraduate and graduate educations,362 Section 221 allows a deduc-
tion for up to $2,50061 of interest paid on a qualified education loan.3  The
amount of the deduction is not indexed for inflation. The deduction is an
above-the-line deduction, meaning that it is available to taxpayers who both
itemize and take the standard deduction." The student loan interest deduc-
tion is available only for interest paid by the taxpayer."* The deduction is
not available to married taxpayers who file separate returns3 67 or to persons
that may be claimed as a dependent on another's tax return.
359. See supra Part H.
360. 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 516 (1993); see also Mullin v. Comm'r, 81 T.C.M. (CCH)
1655, 1656 (2001) (concluding that "[t]he deductibility as a business expense of interest on a
loan obtained for educational expenses depends, at least in part, upon whether the education-
al expenses themselves are deductible business expenses").
361. For purposes of Section 221, interest includes both qualified stated interest and
original issue discount (including capitalized interest, loan origination fees, and late fees).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.221-1(f)(1) (2011).
362. See S. REP. No. 105-33 (1997).
363. See I.R.C. § 221(b)(1). The maximum deduction allowed in 1998 was $1,000.
I.R.C. § 221(b)(1). This amount was increased to $1,500 in 1999, $2,000 in 2000 and $2,500
in taxable years beginning in 2001 or thereafter. I.R.C. § 221(b)(1).
364. See I.R.C. §§ 221(a), 221(b)(1). As initially enacted, Section 221(d) provided
that a deduction was allowed "only with respect to interest paid on any qualified education
loan during the first 60 months (whether or not consecutive) in which interest payments are
required." 1997 TRA, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 202(a), Ill Stat. 788, 806-07 (1997). Regula-
tions promulgated under Section 221 set forth rules determining when such 60-month period
begins and ends, as well as when such period could be suspended. See Treas. Reg. § 1.221-
2(e)(3) (2011).
Section 221(d) was eliminated in 2001, providing for interest on a qualified educa-
tion loan to be deductible throughout the entire life of the loan. See EGTRRA, Pub. L. No.
107-16, §§ 402(b)(2)(B), 412(a)(1), 412(b)(1), 412(2), 431(c)(2), 115 Stat. 38, 61, 63, 64, 68.
(2001). The amendments made to Section 221 by EGTRRA are set to sunset after December
31, 2012 and, absent Congressional action, the 60-month rule will be effective for taxable
years beginning after December 31, 2012. See EGTRRA § 901(a) (as amended by the Tax
Relief Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 101(a), 124 Stat. 3296, 3298 (2010)).
365. I.R.C. § 62(a)(17).
366. I.R.C. § 221(a). The regulations provide that the taxpayer must be legally obli-
gated to make interest payments under the terms of the loan. See Treas. Reg. § 1.221-
1(b)(1).
367. Treas. Reg. § 1.221-l(b)(3).
368. Treas. Reg. § 221-1(b)(2). Although a dependent student cannot deduct the loan
interest, his or her parents can qualify for the deduction by taking out the loan in their own
names (and thus becoming legally liable on the debt) since a qualified education loan in-
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As initially enacted, the maximum annual deduction was phased out
ratably for single taxpayers with a modified adjusted gross income between
$40,000 and $55,000, and married taxpayers filing a joint return with a
modified gross income between $60,000 and $75,000."69 Inflation adjust-
ments were created to take effect after 2001."0 In 2001, Section 221 was
amended both to raise the income limitation and to repeal the effects of the
marriage penalty.37 ' Thus, effective for the 2002 tax year, the maximum
annual deduction was phased out ratably for single taxpayers having a mod-
ified adjusted gross income between $50,000 and $65,000, and for married
taxpayers filing a joint return with modified adjusted gross income between
$100,000 and $130,000.372 For both 2010 and 2011, the maximum annual
deduction is phased out ratably for single taxpayers with modified adjusted
gross income between $60,000 and $75,000, and for married taxpayers fil-
ing a joint return with modified adjusted gross income between $120,000
and $150,000.373
For purposes of Section 221, a "qualified education loan" is defined as
any indebtedness incurred by the taxpayer solely to pay qualified higher
education expenses incurred on behalf of the taxpayer, the taxpayer's
spouse or any dependent of the taxpayer as of the time the debt was in-
curred.374 Such expenses must be paid or incurred within a reasonable time
cludes indebtedness incurred to pay for higher education expenses of a dependent of the
taxpayer at the time the indebtedness was incurred. See I.R.C. § 221(d)(1)(A).
369. See I.R.C. § 221(b)(1) (as enacted by the 1997 TRA, § 202(a)). For these pur-
poses, "modified adjusted gross income" is defined in I.R.C. § 221(b)(2)(C).
370. See I.R.C. § 221(g) (as enacted by the 1997 TRA, § 202(a)). For the current
phaseout limitation, see I.R.C. § 221(f) (as amended by EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §
412(b)(2), 115 Stat. 38, 64 (2010)).
371. See I.R.C. § 221(b)(2) (as amended by the EGTRRA § 412(b)(2)). The marriage
penalty refers to the fact that prior to 2002 the benefits for both single and married taxpayers
were eliminated ratably over a $15,000 income range. The elimination of the marriage pe-
nalty results from the fact that, while single taxpayers see the maximum interest deduction
phase out over a $15,000 income range, for married taxpayers the deduction is currently
eliminated over a $30,000 income range. I.R.C. § 221(b)(2).
372. I.R.C. § 221(b)(2).
373. Rev. Proc. 2009-50, 2009-45 I.R.B. 617; I.R.C. § 221(b)(2); Rev. Proc. 2011-12,
2011-2 I.R.B. 1. With the expiration of certain tax provisions enacted as part of the
EGTRRA, beginning January 1, 2013, the marriage penalty will be reinstated and the phase
out of this interest deduction will occur for single taxpayers with modified adjusted gross
income between $40,000 and $55,000, and for married taxpayers filing a joint return with
modified adjusted gross income between $60,000 and $75,000, in each case as adjusted for
inflation since 2001. See I.R.C. § 221(g), (prior to amendment by EGTRRA, § 412(b)(2));
EGTRRA, § 901(a) (as amended by the Tax Relief Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, §
101(a), 124 Stat. 3296, 3298 (2010)).
374. I.R.C. § 221(d)(1)(A). The loan is not required to be issued or guaranteed under
a Federal postsecondary education loan program. See Treas. Reg. § 1.221-l(e)(3) (2011).
However, a qualified education loan does not include any indebtedness owed to certain re-
lated parties or under certain qualified employer plans. See Treas. Reg. § 1.221-1(e)(3)(iii).
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before or after the indebtedness was incurred?7 ' Finally, the expenses must
be ones that are attributable to education furnished during a period in which
the recipient was an eligible student.76 Interest paid on mixed-use loans is
not deductible. Indebtedness used solely to refinance a qualified educa-
tion loan also constitutes a qualified education loan.m If, however, a tax-
payer refinances a qualified education loan for more than the balance of the
original loan, any excess must be solely used to pay qualified education
expenses (and the loan must satisfy the other requirements of a qualified
education loan) or none of the interest paid on the loan is deductible.379
Section 221 defines "qualified higher education expenses" to mean the
cost of attendance at an eligible education institution380 as defined in Section
472 of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as in effect on August 4, 1997
(the date of enactment of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997).381 Such ex-
penses include "tuition and fees normally assessed [to] a student carrying
the same . .. workload as the student, an allowance for room and board, and
an allowance for books, supplies, transportation, and miscellaneous ex-
penses of the student."38 2 To prevent a Double Benefit, the amount of quali-
fied higher education expenses does not include the amount of any such
expenses paid with the proceeds of: (i) tax-free scholarships; (ii) education-
al assistance provided to present or past members of the armed forces; (iii)
tax-free amounts received under an EAP; (iv) any other non-taxable pay-
ment for the student's education expenses (other than gifts, bequests, devis-
375. I.R.C. § 221(d)(1)(B). The regulations provide that what constitutes a "reasona-
ble period of time" is based on all of the relevant facts and circumstances. See Treas. Reg. §
1.221-1(e)(3)(ii). The regulations contain a safe harbor which provides that the "reasonable
period of time" standard will be satisfied if either (i) the expenses are paid with the proceeds
of education loans that are part of a Federal postsecondary education loan program, or (ii) the
expenses relate to a particular academic period and the loan proceeds used to pay the ex-
penses are disbursed within a period that begins 90 days before the start of the academic
period and ends 90 days after the end of that academic period. Treas. Reg. § 1.221-
1(e)(3)(ii).
376. I.R.C. § 221(d)(1)(C).
377. I.R.C. § 221(d)(1) (as amended by IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 6004(b)(1), 112 Stat. 658 (1998)); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.221-
1(e)(4), ex.6.
378. Treas. Reg. § 1.221-1(e)(3)(v).
379. Preamble to Treas. Reg. § 1.221-1 (2004), T.D. 9125, 2004-23 I.R.B. 1012. The
regulations reserve a place for a more detailed treatment of refinanced and consolidated
indebtedness.
380. The definition of an "eligible education institution" for purposes of Section 221
is the same as that which is used for purposes of determining qualification for the Education
Tax Credits. See I.R.C. § 221(d)(2). However, for these purposes, an eligible education
institution also includes an institution that conducts an internship or residency program lead-
ing to a degree or certificate awarded by an institution of higher education, a hospital, or a
healthcare facility that offers postgraduate training. I.R.C. § 221(d)(2).
381. I.R.C. § 221(d)(2).
382. Treas. Reg. § 1.221-1(e)(2)(i).
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es or inheritances); (v) amounts constituting interest received tax-free upon
the redemption of United States savings bonds; and (vi) tax-free distribu-
tions received from a qualified tuition plan or Coverdell ESA.83 No Double
Benefit rule prevents a taxpayer who borrows money for expenses, and
takes an Education Tax Credit with respect to such expenses, from deduct-
ing the interest paid on the loan.
Section 221(e)(1) also denies a deduction to the extent that another
Code provision allows a deduction. 3" Thus, a taxpayer that incurs a home
equity loan that qualifies as deductible home mortgage interest under Sec-
tion 163(h)(3), and uses the proceeds to pay for qualified education ex-
penses, cannot deduct the interest under Section 221 even though the above-
the-line deduction for student loan interest may provide a greater benefit
than the itemized deduction for home equity interest.
2. Exclusion for Student Loan Forgiveness
Code Provision: Section 108(f)
Estimated Revenue Loss: $100 million for each tax year
from 2009 through 2013385
Taxpayers generally include any discharge of indebtedness in gross
income.386 However, to encourage students to work in underrepresented
professions and areas, student loans are sometimes granted under programs
that forgive all or a portion of the loans when borrowers agree to and actual-
ly perform services in those designated professions and areas.8
Congress enacted Section 108(f).. to encourage certain trained profes-
sionals to serve in rural and low-income neighborhoods.389 Since recipients
383. I.R.C. § 221(d)(2); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.221-1(e)(2)(ii).
384. See Treas. Reg. § 1.221-1(g)(2).
385. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 111th CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARs 2009-2013 39 (Comm. Print 2010).
386. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12).
387. While not part of his tax proposals, President Obama showed support for loan
forgiveness programs as part of his 2010 State of the Union address when he stated that:
To make college more affordable . . . let's tell another one million students that
when they graduate, they will be required to pay only 10 percent of their income on
student loans, and all of their debt will be forgiven after 20 years-and forgiven af-
ter 10 years if they choose a career in public service, because in the United States
of America, no one should go broke because they chose to go to college.
Press Release, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address, Jan. 27, 2010, avail-
able at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address.
388. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1076(a), 98 Stat. 494,
1053-54 (1984). Section 108(f) applies to discharges occurring on or after January 1, 1983,
but similar treatment for earlier periods was provided by §2117 of the Tax Reform Act of
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of this benefit will generally be employed in professions that pay lower sal-
aries than can otherwise be earned in the public market, the value of the
loan forgiveness benefit is intended to partially replace the amount of fore-
gone revenue.
If the discharge is pursuant to a loan provision providing for complete
or partial debt forgiveness if the individual worked for a certain period of
time in certain professions for any of a broad class of employers, the
amount discharged is excluded from gross income." Student loans repaid
under the National Health Service Corps Loan Repayment Program or simi-
lar state programs similarly qualify.39 ' In addition, amounts received by
individuals under any other State loan repayment or loan forgiveness pro-
gram intended to provide for the increased availability of health care servic-
es in underserved or health professional shortage areas (as determined by
such State) are similarly excluded from gross income.3 92
For these purposes, a "student loan" means a loan made to an individ-
ual to assist the individual in attending an educational institution."' For
these purposes, an "educational institution" is defined in the same manner
as for scholarships, but differently than for purposes of the student loan in-
terest deduction. Accordingly, the interest on a loan that qualifies for tax-
free loan forgiveness might not be deductible. In addition, the loan must be
made by (1) the United States, or an instrumentality or agency thereof; (2) a
state, territory or possession of the United States, or the District of Colum-
bia, or any political subdivision thereof; (3) certain tax-exempt public bene-
fit corporations; or (4) an educational organization if such loan is made (i)
1976 and §162 of the Revenue Act of 1978. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 95th
CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1978, at 125 (Comm. Print 1979);
see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 98TH CONG., JCS-41-84, GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 1199-1200 (Comm.
Print 1984) [hereinafter DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT].
389. See DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT at 1200. The professions to which this section was
originally intended to apply were medicine, nursing and teaching. Id.; see also Porten v.
Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1994 (1993); Moloney v. Comm'r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2006-53,
2006 WL 995393 (U.S. Tax Ct. 2006). But see Rev. Rul. 2008-34, 2008-28 I.R.B. 76 (apply-
ing this provision to a law school loan repayment assistance program).
390. I.R.C. § 108(f)(1).
391. I.R.C. § 108(f)(4), as added by American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-357, § 320, 118 Stat. 1418, 1473 (2004), which applies for taxable years beginning after
2003. The National Health Service Corps Loan Repayment Program provides repayments of
as much as $35,000 per year of service for recipients who agree to provide medical services
in geographic areas identified by the Public Health Service as having shortages of health-care
professionals. See H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 485-86 (2004) (Conf. Rep.).
392. See I.R.C. § 108(f)(4) (as amended by The Patient Protection & Affordable Care
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10908(a), 124 Stat. 119, 1021 (2010)).
393. I.R.C. § 108(f)(2), which uses the definition of an educational organization
defined in Section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii). Section 108(f) is silent on what expenses the loan may
be used to finance.
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pursuant to an agreement with any entity described in (1), (2) or (3) under
which the funds from which the loan was made were provided to such edu-
cational organization, or (ii) pursuant to a program of such educational or-
ganization to encourage students to serve in occupations with unmet needs
or areas with unmet needs." The term "student loan" also includes certain
loans made to refinance an eligible student loan, but only if the refinanced
loan is made by an educational institution or a tax-exempt entity pursuant to
a program to encourage students to serve in occupations with unmet needs
or areas with unmet needs.395
D. Critiquing the Tax Incentive Provisions.
Prior to 1997, federal financial assistance for higher education was
provided primarily through student grant and loan programs authorized un-
der Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended.39 These
programs include Pell Grants for low-income students, Parent Loan for Un-
dergraduate Students (PLUS) loans to parents and graduate students, and
Stafford loans." In fiscal year 2007, the Department of Education made
available approximately $15 billion in grants and another $65 billion in
Title IV loan assistance.398 Today, the Tax Incentive Provisions provide
additional financial resources. In fiscal year 2007, such provisions cost the
government an additional $8.7 billion."'
While Title IV aid is larger in size, the Tax Incentive Provisions are
wider in scope. In 2002, approximately 8.4 million students received either
394. I.R.C. § 108(f)(2). Income exclusion does not apply to the discharge of loans
made by educational organizations or tax-exempt entities described in Section 108(f)(2)(D) if
the discharge is on account of services performed for such organizations. See I.R.C. §
108(f)(3).
395. I.R.C. § 108(f)(2) (as amended by the 1997 TRA, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 225(a),
111 Stat. 788, 820 (1997)).
396. See Higher Education: Multiple Higher Education Tax Incentives Create Op-
portunities for Taxpayers to Make Costly Mistakes: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Select
Revenue Measures, H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. 3 (2008) (testimony of
Michael Brostok, Director, Tax Issues, Government Accountability Office), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08717t.pdf [hereinafter TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL BROSTOK].
397. Id. Title IV also authorizes programs funded by the federal government and
administered by participating higher education institutions, including the Supplemental Edu-
cational Opportunity Grant, Perkins loans, and federal work-study aid. Id. at 3-4.
398. Id. at 3.
399. See supra note 396. The Office of Management and Budget estimate takes into
account revenue loss only from the Hope Scholarship Credit, the Lifetime Learning Credit,
the Qualified Tuition Deduction, the student loan interest deduction, Section 529 plans and
Coverdell ESAs. Estimates of revenue loss from all of the Tax Incentive Provisions for
fiscal years 2009 through 2013 can be found, supra Part m.
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a grant and/or a loan under a Title IV program.' In the same year, approx-
imately 9.6 million tax returns claimed a Hope Scholarship Credit, a Life-
time Learning Credit, or a Qualified Tuition Deduction.4 1 This does not
reflect the magnitude of tax preferences in three respects. First, the 9.6 mil-
lion figure reflects only three of the Tax Incentive Provisions discussed in
this Article. Second, while the 8.4 million number is an unduplicated count
of students (i.e., each student is counted only once regardless of the number
of forms of Title IV aid received), the 9.6 million tax returns claiming one
or more Tax Incentive Provisions reflects the number of tax returns-not
the number of students-aided by these provisions. A single tax return may
reflect tax incentives utilized by more than a single individual.42 Presuma-
bly, some returns encompass more than one student, meaning that the 9.6
million figure is only a starting point for the number of students helped by
the Tax Incentive Provisions. Finally, incentives that provide an income
exclusion (e.g., qualified scholarships) will never be reported on a tax re-
turn.
There are three major differences between Title IV assistance and the
Tax Incentive Provisions: timing, demographic coverage, and individual
responsibility." With respect to timing, Title IV aid generally is provided
contemporaneously with the education, while the benefit of the Tax Incen-
tive Provisions occurs before, during, and/or after the time the education
takes place.' With respect to demographic coverage, some Title IV pro-
grams provide much of their financial assistance to students and families
whose incomes are lower, on average, than students and families who utilize
the Tax Incentive Provisions." Finally, whereas federal government and
educational institutions have significant responsibilities in assisting students
400. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-684, STUDENT AID AND
POSTSECONDARY TAX PREFERENCES: LIMITED RESEARCH ExisTs ON EFFECTIVENESS OF TOOLS
To ASSIST STUDENTS AND FAMILIES THROUGH TITLE IV STUDENT AID AND TAX PREFERENCES
12-13 (2005).
401. Id.
402. Id. at 13 n.l1.
403. Id. at 14.
404. Id. In addition, Title IV grant and loan programs generally provide money to
students when it is needed-at the time tuition and other expenses are due. Id. However,
even the Tax Incentive Provisions that provide current benefit (i.e., the Education Tax Cre-
dits) have a delayed effect-that is, students are required to pay the expenses and seek
"reimbursement" from the government when they file their tax returns claiming the incen-
tive. A student that pays qualified educational expenses in January 2011 would not benefit
from many of the Tax Incentive Provisions until filing her 2011 tax return in April 2012.
405. See TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL BROSTEK, supra note 396, at 7-9. Director Brostek
also stated that "92 percent of Pell financial support in 2003-2004 was provided to dependent
students whose family incomes were $40,000 or below." In contrast, in 2005, 60 percent of
the benefit of the tuition deduction went to families with incomes exceeding $80,000. Id. at
8-10; see also supra note 290.
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and families in obtaining aid under Title IV programs, students and families
generally bear the burden of navigating the complexities of the Code.'
This complexity has prevented maximum utilization of the Tax Incentive
Provisions.'
Professor Halperin states that judging the appropriateness of the Tax
Incentive Provisions is "an enormously complex subject, involving not only
the effort to perfect the definition of income . . . but also matters as to the
extent to which education should be subsidized, the effects of a tax allow-
ance on the allocation of educational resources, and the redistribution of
income or educational opportunity."" Professor Chirelstein notes that the
Tax Incentive Provisions have "nothing to do with 'tax policy' as such. As
in so many other areas, it simply represents a willingness to use the tax law
as a means of carrying out a national program that Congress deems worthy
of support."' When scrutinized from a tax policy perspective, the Tax
Incentive Provisions have been evaluated in terms of their efficiency, equi-
ty, and complexity.410 Using these yardsticks, it is unclear that these provi-
sions accomplish their stated goals.
406. See TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL BROSTEK, supra note 396, at 10-11.
407. Id. at 11. This is not a new concern. See Note, Federal Tax Incentives for
Higher Education, 76 HARV. L. REV. 369, 374 (1962) (quoting Blum, How the Growth of
Favored Tax Treatment Affects Taxpayers and Practitioners, 4 J. TAX'N 28 (1956) (stating
"the Internal Revenue Code already is complicated, and retention or addition of any tax
benefit breeds added complexity and increases opportunities for error and abuse"));
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF TAXATION, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS TAX DIVISION, AND TAX EXECUTIVES INSTITUTE, TAX SIMPLIFICATION
RECOMMENDATIONS 6-7 (2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/tax/pubpolicy
/2001/0102simpl.pdf (noting that "[flor many taxpayers, analysis and application of the
intended incentives are too cumbersome to deal with compared with the benefits received,"
and "there are so many individual tests that must be satisfied for each benefit, taxpayers may
inadvertently lose the benefits of a particular incentive because they either do not understand
the provision or because they pay tuition or other qualifying expenses during the wrong tax
year"); see also TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL BROSTEK, supra note 396, at 11-12 (stating that "in
total, including both those who failed to claim a tax credit or tuition deduction and those who
chose a credit or a deduction that did not maximize their benefit, we found that in 2005, 28
percent, or nearly 601,000 tax filers did not maximize their potential tax benefit").
408. See Halperin, supra note 169, at 903.
409. See Chirelstein supra note 146, at 202. One of the dangers of using tax laws to
carry out such policies is stated as follows:
Perhaps even more important, the indirectness of this method tends to remove the
existence and amount of benefit from public scrutiny. This same indirectness may
conceal the fact that within the economic activity being benefited, the aid may be
irrationally allocated or insufficient; this possibility is heightened by the fact that
Congress seldom reevaluates special tax benefits.
Note, supra note 2, at 374.
410. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, JCX-35-08, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS
RELATING TO TAX BENEFITS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 38 (Comm. Print 2008). See also
PAMELA J. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32507, HIGHER EDUCATION TAX CREDITS:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 7 (2008) [hereinafter HIGHER EDUCATION TAX CREDITS], available
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"Policymakers currently attempt to enhance economic efficiency
through tax provisions that promote a wide variety of behavior that they
deem socially beneficial."41 1 Government subsidies promote higher educa-
tion because market forces are inefficient to price in the positive externali-
ties generated from such education.412 Higher levels of education corres-
pond to lower rates of unemployment,413 poverty,414 use of public assistance
programs,415 smoking,4 16 and crime.4 17 Higher levels of education also cor-
respond favorably with higher tax revenues, 418 higher participation rates in
pension plans,1  higher levels of health insurance,4 20 better perceptions of
individual health,421 higher levels of exercise,4 22 and greater civic participa-
tion.4 23 Furthermore, higher levels of education lead to greater productivity
and national wealth. "[1]t is estimated that education and the innovation that
arose from it accounted for two-thirds of the increase in U.S. economic
growth." 424 According to one report "[t]he economic benefits from contin-
at http://opencrs.com/document/RL32507/2008-04-29; Kerry A. Ryan, Access Assured:
Restoring Progressivity in the Tax and Spending Programs for Higher Education, 38 SETON
HALL L. REv. 1, 30 (2008).
411. Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax
Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REv. 23, 42 (2006).
412. HIGHER EDUCATION TAX CREDITS, at 1.
413. See EDUCATION PAYS 2007, supra note 6, at 18.
414. Id. at 19.
415. Id. at 20.
416. Id. at 22.
417. See SANDY BAUM & KATHLEEN PAYEA, EDUCATION PAYS 2004, THE BENEFITS OF
HIGHER EDUCATION FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY 20 (2004), available at
http://www.collegeboard.com/prod downloads/press/cost04/EducationPays2004.pdf.
418. See EDUCATION PAYS 2007, supra note 6, at 9.
419. Id. at 15.
420. Id. at 16.
421. Id. at 21.
422. Id. at 23.
423. Including higher levels of participation in volunteer activities, blood donation,
and voting. Id. at 25-27.
424. DONNA DESROCHERS, COMM. FOR ECON. DEv., HIGHER EDUCATION'S
CONTRIBUTION TO THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY, available at http://www.jcu.edu/academic/
planassess/planning/files/Planning%20articles/Knowledge%20Economy.pdf (authored for
the Solutions for Our Future Project).
In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama noted that:
Maintaining our leadership in research and technology is crucial to America's suc-
cess. But if we want to win the future-if we want innovation to produce jobs in
America and not overseas-then we also have to win the race to educate our kids.
Think about it. Over the next 10 years, nearly half of all new jobs will require
education that goes beyond a high school education. And yet, as many as a quarter
of our students aren't even finishing high school. The quality of our math and
science education lags behind many other nations. America has fallen to ninth in
the proportion of young people with a college degree. And so the question is
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ued expansion in access to higher education could be substantial. Increas-
ing the country's average level of schooling by one year could increase eco-
nomic growth by 6% to 15%-adding between $600 billion and $1.5 trillion
to U.S. economic output."425 The Tax Incentive Provisions are designed, in
part, to encourage more investment in education than would occur in their
absence. These incentives are efficient only if they increase investment in
education. However, not much is known since many of these programs
have not been properly studied or, where studied, the research reaches vary-
ing conclusions.426 Some studies find no measurable effects on college at-
tendance and persistence, while others find positive effects.427
Most commentators are also skeptical that the Tax Incentive Provi-
sions promote equity. One such dissenting voice states:
A component of fairness in taxation is vertical equity, a concept which requires
that tax burdens be distributed fairly among people with different abilities to pay.
Tax credits benefit those who have sufficient income to pay tax. Those individuals
without sufficient income to pay tax do not have the opportunity to benefit from
education tax credits. The disproportionate benefit of tax expenditures to individu-
als with higher incomes reduces the progressivity of the tax system, which is often
viewed as a reduction in equity.
The tax credits are regressive in that the more income taxpayers have, the more
benefits they receive (up to the maximum phase out limits of the tax provision).
As a result of their nonrefundable nature and the fact that the tax credits are not
based on need, the tax credits move the distributional balance of federal aid away
from low-income students towards middle-income students.428
whether all of us-citizens, and as parents-are willing to do what's necessary to
give every child a chance to succeed.
See Press Release, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address, supra, note 197.
425. See DESCROCHERS, supra note 424.
426. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-690, TAX EXPENDITURES
REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL COMMITMENT AND NEED TO BE REEXAMINED 55-56
(2005) (finding "[iun the higher education area, the Department of Education ... is unable to
analyze the use of higher education tax credits or their effects because it lacks access to
individual taxpayer data needed to identify users of the credits. Treasury has access to tax-
payer data but has not used these data for evaluating the education tax credits since their
implementation in 1998").
427. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-684, STUDENT AID AND
POSTSECONDARY TAX PREFERENCES: LIMITED RESEARCH EXISTS ON EFFECTIVENESS OF TOOLS
To ASSIST STUDENTS AND FAMILIES THROUGH TITLE IV STUDENT AID AND TAX PREFERENCES
27-31 (2005); Bridget Terry Long, The Impact of Federal Tax Credits for Higher Education
Expenses (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9553, 2003); Schenk &
Grossman, supra note 26; Ryan, supra note 410, at 36-41 (arguing the Tax Incentive Provi-
sions are not designed to promote efficiency).
428. See JACKSON, supra note 410, at 16.
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Other commentators also believe that the Tax Incentive Provisions are
regressive in how the benefits of the provisions are distributed.429 Since, the
value of the subsidy increases as the taxpayer's marginal tax rate bracket
increases, taxpayers in higher income brackets receive a greater share of the
tax benefits.43 0 In low-income families, where the taxpayer pays no income
tax, the Tax Incentive Provisions generally provide no benefit.431 Only the
American Opportunity Tax Credit (which expires at the end of 2012) is re-
fundable.432 The Tax Incentive Provisions can be made less regressive by
imposing lower income limitations for eligibility (which will decrease the
size and scope of the benefits) and by designing incentives as refundable
credits rather than deductions.
Finally, the Tax Incentive Provisions do not promote simplicity.
These provisions add complexity to the Code, raising administrative costs
for which individuals, the federal government and educational institutions
all bear the burden.433 The absence of uniform definitions,4 3 different in-
come limitations for different incentives, 433 and the Double Benefit provi-
sions all add to complexity.436 None of the legislative history underlying
these provisions explains the rationale for such poor integration of these
provisions, and any explanation for the differences among these provisions
is far outweighed by the resulting complexity. Taxpayers also must address
429. See generally Ryan, supra note 410, at 30-36; Oliver, supra note 201, at 137
(stating that "the TRA 1997 fails to meet the Congressional goal and the ideal of providing
assistance to low-income families").
430. See Oliver, supra note 146, at 137 (stating that "the distributional effects of the
TRA 1997 are exactly the opposite of the intended goals. Families in the highest income
bracket, $200,000 and over, have the greatest reduction in tax liability as a result of the TRA
1997. Families in the lowest income bracket receive no tax relief at all."); Schenk, supra
note 26, at 299 (concluding that "the incentives operate as a rebate of consumption other than
education in ways that have disturbing distributional consequences"). See supra note 405.
431. See Ryan, supra note 410, at 30 (stating that "non-taxpayers are completely
foreclosed from realizing any higher education subsidy from the education-related deduction
and exclusions. In 2004, 35% of taxpayers had no positive income tax liability, and these
same taxpayers housed almost half of all America's children"); Thomas J. Kane, Savings
Incentives for Higher Education, 51 NAT'L TAX J. 609, 618 (1998) (stating that "[b]ecause
the tax credits are nonrefundable, the program is likely to have only modest effects on col-
lege enrollment rates, since the low-income families who are most sensitive to tuition costs
and who are most likely to be on the margin of entering college are likely to benefit little").
432. See supra Section Ill.A.I.
433. See JACKSON, supra note 410, at 17-20.
434. As discussed throughout this Article, taxpayers confronting the Tax Incentive
Provisions have to deal with different definitions for which expenses qualify for the benefits
of a particular provision, who constitutes an eligible student, and what institutions qualify as
an eligible educational institution.
435. See generally Part M.
436. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, JCX-35-08, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS
RELATING TO TAX BENEFITS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 40 (Comm. Print 2008); see also discus-
sion supra note 193.
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uncertainties regarding the temporary nature of certain incentive provisions,
and the fact that other provisions-since many of these provisions expire or
are substantially modified after December 31, 2012 absent further congres-
sional action.437 This complexity leads to inefficiency in that taxpayers
often do not claim the maximum benefits to which they are entitled.438 Sim-
plification of the Tax Incentive Provisions has been recommended numer-
ous times.439 However, to date, no such effort has garnered enough support.
437. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, JCX-35-08, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS
RELATING TO TAX BENEFITS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 40 (Comm. Print 2008). As discussed
throughout this Article, a number of amendments were made to the Tax Incentive Provisions
as part of the enactment of EGTRRA. The amendments, however, were initially drafted so
that such provisions terminated after December 31, 2010. See EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-
16, § 901, 115 Stat. 38, 150 (2010). "[Tlhe Bush administration made extensive use of sun-
set provisions [i.e., provisions that expire after a period of time] while drafting [EGTRRA]."
Manoj Viswanathan, Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code: A Critical Evaluation and Prescrip-
tions for the Future, 82 NY L. Rev. 656, 660 (2007).
While some of those provisions were permanently extended by the Pension Protec-
tion Act of 2006, most of these amendment remained effected, including (i) the ability of a
taxpayer to claim an Education Tax Credit and an exclusion for qualified distributions from a
Coverdell ESA in the same taxable year; (ii) the increase in the contribution limit for Cover-
dell ESAs from $500 to $2,000; (iii) the expansion of the definition of a "qualified education
expense" with respect to distributions from Coverdell ESAs to include elementary and sec-
ondary school expenses; (iv) certain rules regarding coordination of distributions from Co-
verdell ESAs with distributions from qualified tuition programs; (v) rules extending deducti-
bility of interest on student loans beyond the first 60 months of required interest payments;
(vi) extension for the exclusion of employer-provided educational assistance, including assis-
tance for graduate school tuition; (vii) inclusion of amounts received pursuant to the National
Health Service Corps Scholarship Program and the Armed Forces Scholarship Program as
qualified scholarships; and (viii) expanded income limitation levels provided in several of the
Tax Incentive Provisions. See generally Part III. In addition, the ARRA, which expanded
the Hope Scholarship Credit into the American Opportunity Tax Credit, was set to expire
after December 31, 2010. See discussion supra, note 197.
The expiration of these provisions was delayed for a period of two years-until after
December 31, 2012-by the enactment of the Tax Relief Act of 2010. See Tax Relief Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, §§ 101(a), 103(a), 124 Stat. 3296, 3298, 3299 (2010). However,
such legislation was not enacted until just 17 days prior to the time that these provisions were
set to expire. Such last-minute legislation creates a great deal of uncertainty for taxpayers,
which prevents proper tax planning.
In addition, with respect to a provision such as the Qualified Tuition Deduction,
which was retroactively extended almost one year after its expiration, taxpayers receive the
benefit of a tax deduction for which their spending was not incentivized. See Tax Relief Act
of 2010, § 724 (which, on December 17, 2010, extended Section 222 which had expired for
periods after December 31, 2009 for an additional two years).
438. See supra text accompanying note 407.
439. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, 107TH CONG., JCS-3-01, STUDY OF
THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAx SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986
122-31 (Comm. Print 2001) (recommending a single definition of qualified higher education
expenses, combining the Education Tax Credits, and modifying the Double Benefit Rules);
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 108TH CONG., JCS-3-04, DESCRIPTION OF THE REVENUE
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In theory, the Tax Incentive Provisions can increase efficiency. In
practice, gains in efficiency have not been realized, as demonstrated by the
research, while equity and simplicity in the Code have decreased. Although
this Article recommends a simplification or elimination of the Tax Incentive
Provisions," the presence or absence of these provisions in the Code nei-
ther enhances nor detracts from the proposal for a more significant reform
of the tax treatment of higher education expenses.
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM
A. Introduction
The current regulations and the courts apply a different standard, for
purposes of Section 162, with respect to education expenses as compared to
other business expenses. As discussed previously, this prevents a proper
matching of income-providing an over-reporting of income in some cases,
and an underreporting of income in other cases. The long history dealing
with such expenses, beginning with the Service's pronouncements that such
amounts were nondeductible personal expenses,"' to the Supreme Court's
dicta in Welch that education will allow a taxpayer to "practice his vocation
with greater ease and profit if he has an opportunity to enrich his culture,"" 2
to the court's statement in Carroll that the education in question was a "per-
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET PROPOSAL 193-96
(Comm. Print 2004) (noting that, in 2004, President Bush recommended providing uniform
definitions for qualified higher education expenses and qualified higher education institu-
tions, eliminating the student loan interest deduction and the Qualified Tuition Deduction,
and proposed treating student loan interest as a qualified expense for purposes of a per-
student Lifetime Learning Credit); Education Tax Care Credit Simplification Act, H.R. 4136,
108th Cong. (2004) (proposing a single education credit of up to $3,000 and a uniform defi-
nition of qualifying higher education expenses); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 109TH
CONG., JCS-02-05, OPTIONs TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES
42 (Comm. Print 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf (recommending
combining the Education Tax Credits and the Qualified Tuition Deduction into a single cre-
dit that would be computed on a per-student rather than a per tax return basis in order to
promote simplicity and fairness); Middle Class Opportunity Act of 2007, S. 614, 110th
Cong. (2007) (proposing, among other things, to combine the Education Tax Credits into a
single credit, allow a deduction for some books, use a standard definition of eligible student,
increase the income limitations, and eliminate the Qualified Tuition Deduction); Bipartisan
Tax Fairness and Simplification Act of 2010, S. 3018, 11Ith Cong. (2010) (proposing to
combine the Education Tax Credits and to eliminate the separate deduction for student loan
interest by folding such deduction into the new education tax credit). In addition to the rec-
ommendations cited in this paragraph, see the recommendations proposed by the American
Bar Association Section of Taxation, supra note 407, at 7.
440. See infra Section IV.D.
441. See supra notes 61-62.
442. Welch v. Comm'r, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
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sonal responsibility, and it provided extensive personal rewards,"" has led
to regulations that categorize education as either a deductible business ex-
pense or a nondeductible expenditure that is either personal or an insepara-
ble aggregate of personal and capital expenditures."
Professor Schoenfeld concluded that the current regulations are an un-
reasonable interpretation of Section 162(a)." While this statement is true,
this Article proposes a legislative fix as a result of the long history of dispa-
rate treatment for education expenses by the courts and the Service.
The recommendation proposed in this Article attempts to treat educa-
tion expenses similarly to other expenses, providing for categories of non-
deductible personal expenses, deductible business expenses, and amortiza-
ble business capital expenditures."6 Although an attempt was made to craft
443. Carroll v. Comm'r, 51 T.C. 213, 216 (1968), affd, 418 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1969).
444. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (2011).
445. See Schoenfeld, supra note 20, at 311.
446. There are few court cases addressing the amortization of education expenses.
Such case law is irrelevant in analyzing the proposal since it is based on the history in this
area and the current regulations treating such expenditures as being inherently personal.
There is no legal prohibition to Congress amending the law to allow for an amortization
deduction for certain education expenses as proposed herein.
In Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515, 525-27 (1976), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th
Cir. 1978), the taxpayer, a New York attorney, accepted a job with the IRS in California.
Although not required by his employer, the taxpayer decided to become a member of the
California bar. The taxpayer incurred expenses relating to a California bar review course, the
bar examination, and fees to be admitted to practice law before the California courts. The
taxpayer deducted both the costs of obtaining his law license in New York (including the
cost of college and law school, a New York bar review course, and a New York state bar
examination fee), as well as the costs incurred in obtaining admission to the California bar
and courts. The Tax Court held that the New York educational expenses were neither de-
ductible nor amortizable; rather such expenses were part of an "inseparable aggregate" that
included personal expenditures because they satisfied the minimum educational require-
ments. Id. at 526 (citing Fausner v. Comm'r, 413 U.S. 838, 839 (1973). In addition, the
court concluded that Section 262 took precedence over Section 167 in denying an amortiza-
tion deduction. Id. at 526, (citing Comm'r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 17 (1974); Bod-
zin v. Comm'r, 509 F.2d 679, 681 (4th Cir. 1975)). However, the taxpayer could amortize
the license fee as a capital expenditure.
A similar result was reached concerning the expenses incurred in California. With
respect to the California expenses, the Tax Court held that the cost of the bar review course
was not deductible because it qualified the taxpayer for a new trade or business. However,
the costs of acquiring his California law license, including bar examination and court admis-
sion fees, were capital expenditures that could be amortized over his life expectancy. Al-
though the taxpayer argued that the useful life of such assets ended when he turned sixty-
five, the court found insufficient evidence to establish such shorter useful life. See also
Huene v. Comm'r, 247 F. Supp. 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (where the taxpayer argued that
he should be able to either deduct his law school and business school expenses, or amortize
them over his working life. The court rejected these arguments, concluding "plaintiff cited
no authority for this claim of amortization[,] ... [and] I find none"); Denman v. Comm'r, 48
T.C. 439, 444-47 (1967) (where the Tax Court disallowed an amortization deduction for an
engineering degree over a thirty-seven year useful life (beginning with graduation and ending
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a proposal that was pure-in the sense that the expenses would be matched
accurately with the income that it produces-three factors have led to cer-
tain arbitrary lines being drawn. First, even those expenses with a direct
and proximate relationship to a current or future business of the taxpayer
contain both a business and personal element." Second, the useful life of
education expenses may be difficult to determine. Finally, changing the tax
treatment of education expenses would result in significant cost to the fed-
eral government." The remainder of this Article focuses on a legislative
fix."9
when the taxpayer turned sixty-five because of a lack of authority for such deduction)); Hall
v. Comm'r, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1363, 1364 (1970) (same with respect to college and law
school expenses); Bodley v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 1357, 1362 (1971) (same result where the
taxpayer attempted to amortize his law school education over five years).
In Hyde v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 954, 963-64 (1981), the taxpayer
claimed a depreciation deduction on his employment contract arguing that the cost of his
college education should be used as the contract's basis. The court denied the deduction,
stating that the costs of a general college education were not deductible.
In Duecaster v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 917 (1990), the taxpayer at-
tempted to amortize his law school education over five years under Section 195 as "start-up"
costs of investigating and creating a trade or business in the practice of law. The Tax Court
rejected this argument noting that if the taxpayer had been engaged in a trade or business,
such expenses would have been nondeductible under Section 162 since they prepared him for
a new trade or business. Since Section 195 only applies to expenses that would have been
deductible had the taxpayer been carrying on a trade or business, a deduction was denied.
447. Professor Davenport notes the problem of drawing arbitrary lines, stating that:
Commentators generally agree that the courts have gotten the cost recovery issue
wrong as to some types of education expenditures, for example, professional, voca-
tional, and graduate education costs that seem clearly career-related and not to in-
volve substantial personal consumption by almost any definition. There has been
substantial disagreement, however, as to where to draw the line between those edu-
cation expenditures that should be treated entirely as business-related and those
that should be treated as involving some personal consumption.
David S. Davenport, Education and Human Capital: Pursuing an Ideal Income Tax and a
Sensible Tax Policy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 793, 812 (1992).
448. Recognition of fiscal concerns in creating tax legislation is not a new concept-
even in the area of education tax policy. For example, in reenacting Section 127 in 1996, the
House Report for the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 notes that:
The need to balance the Federal budget necessitates some modification [ofl the ex-
clusion. . .. [T]he exclusion for employer-provided education should be targeted to
those most in need of educational assistance-low- and middle-income employees
who seek to obtain education which improves their skills and qualifies them for
better jobs. Accordingly, the Committee believes it appropriate to reinstate the re-
striction on graduate-level education.
H.R. REP. No. 104-586, at 80 (1996); see also supra note 271.
449. Legal scholars have considered the proper tax treatment of higher education
expenses, with the general consensus that cost recovery for some of these expenses is appro-
priate. See, e.g., Richard Goode, Tax Treatment of Individual Expenditures for Education
and Research, 56 Am. EcoN. REV. 208 (1966); Bernard Wolfman, The Cost of Education and
the Federal Income Tax, 42 F.R.D. 535 (1966); John K. McNulty, Tax Policy and Tuition
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B. A Legislative Fix
1. Creating Categories of Education Expenses
Creating symmetry for education expenses under the Business Ex-
pense Deduction requires addressing two questions. First, which education-
al expenditures should be treated as personal expenses and which qualify as
business expenses? Second, which business expenses are currently deducti-
ble and which qualify for capitalization?
With respect to the first question, only business expenses that are di-
rectly connected with or pertaining to a current or future trade or business of
the taxpayer should qualify as a business expense.4 50 Where an expense
contains both business and personal characteristics, such amounts should be
categorized based upon their primary purpose.45 1 The courts have consis-
tently resolved this issue by citing case law for the proposition that Section
262 takes precedence over Sections 162 and 167 and that no deduction is
allowable because education expenses are an inseparable aggregate of per-
sonal and capital expenses.452 However, these courts interpret Fausner too
narrowly. In Fausner, the Supreme Court concluded that, in some cases, an
allocation of an expense between business and personal might be appropri-
ate and a deduction for the portion allocated to the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness would be allowable.453 A statutory solution for determining how to
make such allocation would be no different than the line drawing that oc-
454curs in other areas.
Credit Legislation: Federal Income Tax Allowances for Personal Costs of Higher Education,
61 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1973); David C. Tarshes, Comment, The Cost of Education as a De-
ductible Business Expense: A Reassessment, 1980 DUKE L.J. 997, 1021 (1980) (stating that
"[tihe major flaw in section 1.162-5 is not its inconsistency, its broad definition of 'new
trade,' or its susceptibility to subjective considerations, but rather its failure to comport with
a theoretically sound treatment of educational expenses as capital expenditures"); Loretta
Collins Argrett, Tax Treatment of Higher Education Expenditures: An Unfair Investment
Disincentive, 41 SYRACUSE L. REv. 621 (1990); Charlotte Crane, Scholarships and the Fed-
eral Income Tax Base, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 63 (1991); Davenport, supra note 447; Louis
Kaplow, Human Capital Under an Ideal Income Tax, 80 VA. L. REv. 1477 (1994); Hamish
P.M. Hume, The Business of Learning: When and How the Cost of Education Should Be
Recognized, 81 VA. L. REV. 887 (1995). But see Dodge, supra note 23 (arguing against
amortization of such expenses).
450. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (2011).
451. This suggestion is borrowed from Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b), which treats travel-
ing expenses as deductible business expenses if "the trip is related primarily to the taxpayer's
trade or business."
452. See Sharon, 66 T.C. at 526 (citing Fausner, 413 U.S. at 839 (1973)).
453. Fausner, 413 U.S. at 839.
454. A number of commentators have noted that business travel is deductible al-
though there may be a personal component to such expenditures. See, e.g., Halperin, supra
note 169, at 862 (stating that "[i]f a deduction for entertainment expenditures reasonably
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Since this Article is limited to post-secondary higher education, no
discussion will be made regarding courses that are not part of a program
leading to a degree. Regarding post-secondary higher education, most
commentators have noted that the expenditures for most graduate, profes-
sional, technical and vocational education should be considered a business
expense eligible for amortization.455 A more difficult problem is whether
the expenditures for an undergraduate education also should so qualify. 456
Here, commentators have taken different positions.457  Recognizing that
some personal gains are derived from the education process, this Article
takes the position that "on the whole, education remains an important
designed to produce income must be allowed, regardless of the accompanying personal bene-
fit, do not similar considerations require a deduction for the less obviously personal costs of
education in medicine or law, or even an undergraduate degree in such fields as business or
engineering?"); McNulty, supra note 449, at 20; Davenport, supra note 447, at 813 (noting
that Section 274(n) makes an arbitrary allocation between the business and personal compo-
nent for business meals and entertainment); Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Problem of High-
Cost Education and the Potential Cure in Federal Tax Policy: "One Riot, One Ranger", 20
J.L. & EDUC. 1, 6 n. 24 (1991) (also referring to the home office and moving expense deduc-
tions as similar hybrid expenses).
455. See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 447, at 215 (stating that "[p]rofessional, voca-
tional, and graduate education, for example, are typically so closely related to career plans
and involve so little "general cultural enrichment" or other personal components that their
costs should be generally recoverable in full against one's future income, over some appro-
priate period and under some appropriate method"); Goode, supra note 449, at 210; McNul-
ty, supra note 449, at 18; Argrett, supra note 449, at 653-54.
456. Professor Hume states:
Undergraduate degrees would create a battleground: an undergraduate liberal arts
degree is such a general preparation for any number of professions as to be a clear
case of a nondeductible outlay, but what about the student who gets an undergra-
duate degree in engineering or business? What about students who major in ac-
counting or economics rather than history or philosophy? The Service would have
to formulate a definition of 'vocational' or 'professional' to avoid continued litiga-
tion over such questions. The easiest definition to administer would probably ex-
clude all degrees that offered more than a minimal mixing of disciplines, thereby
excluding most undergraduate courses.
Hume, supra note 449, at 902.
457. Some commentators have supported treating undergraduate education entirely as
a business expenditure. See, e.g., Goode, supra note 449, at 211 ("This rule would admitted-
ly err on the side of liberality."); Wolfman, supra note 449, at 547; Paul B. Stephan m, Fed-
eral Income Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1369 (1984); Argrett, supra,
note 449, at 654; Pace, supra note 454, at 18. Other commentators would treat such educa-
tion as a personal expense. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 169, at 904 ("[E]ven the assump-
tion of a large return on investment does not justify the deduction"); Alan Gunn, The Re-
quirement That a Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM.
L. REV. 443, 479 (1974) (stating that an undergraduate education provides personal satisfac-
tions so great that it should be treated as a nondeductible personal expense). Professor
Schultz offers a compromise: proposing to treat half of the cost of such education as a per-
sonal expense. See Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AM. ECON. REv.
1, 13 (1961).
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means of increasing future earnings."4 58 As a result, legislation should
draw the line by providing that, absent a showing that education was under-
taken primarily for personal purposes,459 all education in a program leading
to an undergraduate, graduate, professional or vocational degree should be
considered a business expenditure.
With respect to the second question, business expenses will be consi-
dered currently deductible when such expenses do not provide significant
benefits beyond the taxable year in which they are paid or incurred. When
business expenses provide significant future benefits, capitalization is re-
quired. With respect to any course offered in a program leading to a degree,
legislation should provide for capitalization based on the fact that a taxpayer
who has earned a degree earns significantly more over her entire lifetime
than a taxpayer with less education.o While this bright-line rule might
capture some courses that would otherwise entitle a taxpayer to a current
deduction,"' there is a concern that a taxpayer may attempt to deduct the
cost of a degree by taking courses piecemeal over a period of years.42
2. What Expenses Qualify for Capitalization?
Qualifying expenses should include only tuition and fees required for
the enrollment or attendance at eligible educational institutions, and any
fees, books, supplies, and equipment required for courses of instruction."
458. Stephan, supra note 457, at 1369 (noting that "[p]arties, athletic events, and
creative writing courses, for example, may be largely consumption rather than investment").
459. An example of this might include a tax lawyer that takes classes to earn a mas-
ters degree in English literature. Like Professor Goode, this rule would err on the side of
liberality. Goode, supra note 449, at 211.
460. See supra notes 6-15.
461. For example, a practicing accountant would be required to capitalize the cost of
a single accounting course offered by a local university as part of masters in accounting
program regardless of whether such taxpayer intends to complete the program and receive a
degree.
462. The example in the previous footnote raises a concern that a taxpayer could
attempt to deduct the cost of a masters degree in accounting by taking one course a semester
and deducting such courses under the Business Expense Deduction.
463. A proposal to expand the scope of education expenses that qualify as business
expenses (whether currently deductible or amortizable) also increases the amount of student
loan interest that would constitute business interest. This raises the question of how such
interest should be treated. To remain true to form, a deduction should be allowed for all
student loan interest relating to currently deductible education expenses. With respect to
deferred education interest, Section 263A would require capitalization of such interest until
such time as the asset is placed in service (i.e., until the student begins working). Thereafter,
the interest would be entitled to the Business Expense Deduction. See I.R.C. § 263A (2006);
see also Comm'r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 17 (1974). With approximately $830
billion of student loan debt outstanding, allowing a current deduction for all interest paid
would be cost prohibitive. See Mary Pilon, Student-Loan Debt Surpasses Credit Cards,
REAL TIME EcONOMICS WALL ST. J. BLOG, Aug. 9, 2010, http://blogs.wsj.com/economics
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This definition tracks the one currently used for qualified scholarships."'
Such definition excludes expenditures for room and board and other living
expenses, as such amounts are clearly consumption expenses."
In order to prevent taxpayers from receiving a Double Benefit, the
amount of qualified expenses must be reduced by the amount of such ex-
penses that are deductible or used in computing any tax credit available
under the Code. Similarly, qualifying expenses should be reduced to the
extent that a taxpayer received any amount not includible in her gross in-
come (such as amounts received as part of a qualified scholarship or as part
of an employer-provided educational assistance program).
3. Method of Amortization
Qualifying education expenses should be amortizable on a straight-
line basis over the taxpayer's useful life with no recovery for unamortized
costs that remain upon the taxpayer's death or retirement from the work-
force. Professor Argrett has noted that "[c]ourts generally have accepted
the actuarial life span of the taxpayer as the appropriate period for the re-
covery of capital expenditures when the benefit from the expenditures will
extend throughout the person's lifetime."' Although some commentators
have argued that a shorter amortization period of time should be used,'
/2010/08/09/student-loan-debt-surpasses-credit-cards/ (last accessed June 4, 2011). As a
result, the author would suggest keeping caps on the amount of student loan interest deducti-
ble similar to those currently found in Section 221. See Subsection III.C.I.
464. See supra note 245. However, in defining which schools constitute eligible
education institutions, the author favors using the definition used for the Education Tax
Credits. This is a broader definition than that used with respect to the qualified scholarship
rules. Compare supra note 202, with supra note 242.
465. See Argrett, supra note 449, at 654; Goode, supra note 449, at 211; see also
supra note 246 (discussing the amendment made to Section 117 excluding room and board
from the definition of qualified tuition and related expenses).
466. See Argrett, supra note 449, at 649 (citing Sharon v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 515, 527,
530 (1976) (allowing amortization of state law license fees over the taxpayer's expected life
expectancy); Rev. Rul. 70-171, 1970-1 C.B. 55 (same for doctor's fees for staff privileges at
a hospital); Snell v. Comm'r, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 635, 636 (1979) (same with respect to en-
trance fees and other costs incurred by a taxpayer to become a member of Lloyd's of Lon-
don); Hampton Pontiac, Inc. v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 1073, 1079 (D.S.C. 1969) (same
for franchise fees to acquire an automobile dealership). For these purposes, taxpayers should
be required to use the actuarial tables computing a taxpayer's life expectancy for purposes of
the annuity rules. See Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 (2011).
467. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 169, at 905 (suggesting amortization over the
taxpayer's working career); McNulty, supra note 449, at 32 (suggesting an amortization
period equal to the lesser of twenty years or when the taxpayer reaches age sixty-five);
Goode, supra note 449, at 212 ("Administrative expediency and convenience in compliance
strongly suggest that the usual amortization period for educational capital might be arbitrarily
set at ten to twenty years rather than the student's entire working life. This would also be in
accord with the recent tendency to accelerate depreciation allowances for physical capital
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amortization over the taxpayer's entire life is appropriate for two reasons.
First, today many people work past the standard retirement age. Since a
particular individual's retirement age is uncertain, there is no benefit to us-
ing the retirement age as a substitute. Second, amortization of higher edu-
cation expenses will result in a significant revenue loss to the federal gov-
ernment." Requiring taxpayers to recover their education costs over a
longer period will reduce the financial burden associated therewith.'
Legislation would provide for amortization on a straight-line basis.
Arguments could be made that education depreciates more during its early
years, or that a greater portion of education should be allocated to a taxpay-
er's later years since "most taxpayers earn more in the years closest to re-
tirement."470 However, since the Code amortizes most intangibles ratably
over their useful life, a similar rule should be applicable to education ex-
penses.47' Moreover, as Professor Argrett notes, "[b]ecause it would be
difficult, or nearly impossible, to measure the decline in utility of this initial
capital investment in education, the simplest approach would be to allow a
straight-line cost recovery method."472
Proposed legislation should disallow a deduction for unrecovered
costs remaining upon a taxpayer's death or retirement prior to the time such
costs are fully amortized. In this way, the proposal provides a treatment
different than that for other capital expenditures.473 Three rationales exist
and the liberal treatment of research and development costs."); Pace, supra note 454, at 29
(arguing to treat education expenses similar to other start-up expenditures eligible for amorti-
zation under Sections 195, 248 and 709 over 60 months (now 180 months)).
468. See infra Section IV.C.
469. For example, assume taxpayer who graduates college at age twenty-five with
$100,000 in education expenses. Assume further that the taxpayer has a constant marginal
tax rate of thirty percent. Amortizing such expenses over a forty-year useful life (i.e., until
age sixty-five) would cost the Treasury $9,999 in present value terms (assuming a seven
percent discount rate). Requiring such taxpayer to amortize these costs over his 57-year
actuarial life expectancy would reduce the revenue loss by more than twenty-six percent
($7,355). In addition, using an actuarial life expectancy would prevent a sixty-six year old
taxpayer who decides to seek an additional degree from deducting the costs in full as in-
curred.
470. For the latter proposition, see Clifford Gross, Tax Treatment of Education Ex-
penses: Perspectives from Normative Theory, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 916, 936 (1988). But see
Goode, supra note 449, at 212.
471. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 195, 197, 248, 708 (2006); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-
3(b)(3) (2011).
472. See Argrett, supra note 449, at 655.
473. For a different view, see McNulty, supra note 449, at 32 ("All amortized ex-
penses remaining at death could then be deducted in the last taxable year, much as the differ-
ence between depreciated costs and salvage value of a useless piece of depreciable property
can be deducted from income in the year it is discarded. If a net loss resulted, a carry-back to
prior taxable years could even be allowed. Similar treatment would be justified for a person
who becomes unemployably disabled."); Goode, supra note 449, at 212 ("Provision would
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for this disparate treatment. First, prohibiting accelerated cost recovery
would limit the revenue loss resulting from this proposal.474 Second, educa-
tion provides taxpayers with personal benefits that are retained following
retirement. Finally, a bright-line prohibition would eliminate certain prac-
tical issues. For example, what would be the proper tax treatment for a tax-
payer that had previously retired, taken a write-off for unrecovered educa-
tion expenses, and later decides to return to work? Conversely, how should
the law treat a taxpayer that takes a temporary hiatus from the labor force?
At what point, does a temporary hiatus become permanent?
4. Who? When? Against What?
Legislation should provide that the student is the party entitled to de-
duct or amortize the costs of any education expenses, regardless of whether
the student or another person pays such expenses. This is necessary to en-
sure that the deduction is matched with the income associated with the edu-
cation. Education expenses paid by another party on the student's behalf
should be treated as a gift.475
Any legislative proposal should provide that amortization of education
expenses should begin upon the later of receiving the degree relating to such
expenses and entering into a trade or business to which the education has a
direct and proximate relationship. It is recognized that this might result in a
factual inquiry in certain cases. For example, when does a taxpayer en-
gaged as an accountant who attends law school in order to practice law be-
gin amortizing the cost of her legal education: during the period she works
as an accountant or only upon entering the legal profession?' 76 In those cas-
es, if the education is directly and proximately related to the current trade or
business, amortization should begin upon receiving the degree. If not,
amortization would begin when the taxpayer enters the new trade or busi-
ness. It is admitted that this rule might allow certain taxpayers to begin
amortizing their education earlier than under an ideal income tax. However,
the long amortization period required under this proposal would mitigate
any significant distortion resulting from accelerating the recovery period.
Finally, the question arises as to what income should be offset with the
amortized education expense deduction? Commentators that have consi-
dered this issue have concluded that the amortized deductions should only
have to be made for late adjustment of the original estimate if earnings were prematurely
ended by death, disability, or obsolescence.").
474. See supra note 469; see infra Section IV.C.
475. See Goode, supra note 449, at 211; McNulty, supra note 449, at 26-27; Argrett,
supra note 449, at 655.
476. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 781 (1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 1406 (7th
Cir. 1975).
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offset income related to such education.' The difficulty here is that "pro-
fessional education may contribute to the earning of income outside the
field for which the taxpayer was most directly trained."478 The solution is to
allow taxpayers to amortize their educational expenses against their earned
income.479 Under a pure tax system, taxpayers who do not have enough
earned income to absorb the amortization deduction in any given year
should be entitled to carry the net loss forward or back to offset income in
other years. However, it is proposed that any excess amortization deduc-
tions for a tax year should be lost. Two benefits arise from this strict rule.
First, limiting an amortization deduction to a single year might reduce the
costs of this proposal. Second, such limitation would prevent taxpayers
from being rewarded for education expenses that significantly exceed their
earned income.480
C. Costs of Amortizing Higher Education Expenses
Probably the most difficult issue in implementing this legislative pro-
posal is determining and compensating for the revenue loss arising from a
significant expansion of cost recovery for education expenses. Although
this proposal is attempting to do no more than correctly account for the
costs of higher education, it is unlikely that such proposal will be seriously
considered if it causes a significant loss of revenue. As the figures indicate,
allowing an amortization of education expenses need not cost as much as
one would initially imagine.
Tuition and fees for all public degree-granting institutions for the
2007-2008 academic year were approximately $48 billion. 48 1 This figure
should be reduced by (i) the amount of scholarships and fellowships granted
477. See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 447, at 914 (stating that "we could-and we
should-appropriately limit use of accelerated depreciation deductions for human capital by
providing that they may only reduce reasonably-related earned income"); McNulty, supra
note 449, at 30.
478. McNulty, supra note 449, at 30 (noting that "[1]aw school training, for example,
may benefit a taxpayer who later enjoys earnings in politics, business, government and other
fields").
479. But see McNulty, supra note 449, at 30 (who notes that education may make a
taxpayer a better investor, thereby increasing unearned income).
480. Because of the mixed business/personal nature of education expenses, an analo-
gy can be made here to other provisions of the Code. See, e.g., I.R.C. § -183 (2006) (limiting
deductions for hobby expenses to hobby income with no carryover provisions); I.R.C. §
165(d) (limiting gambling losses to current year's gambling income).
481. See Education Statistics, supra note 24, at tbl.352. The term "degree-granting
institutions" means those institutions that grant associates or higher degrees and participate in
Title IV federal financial aid programs. This figure does not take into account such poten-
tially amortizable expenses as books, supplies and equipment.
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by such institutions (approximately $10 billion)482 and (ii) any awards
granted to students under the Pell Grant Program (approximately $15 bil-
lion).483 The net amount of $23 billion would give rise to a net revenue loss
of approximately $7 billion (assuming a weighted average marginal tax rate
of 30 percent).4 4
However, such estimate must be considered speculative for a number
of reasons. First, it is unclear that a thirty percent weighted average mar-
ginal rate is the correct number to use. One economist states that such rate
might be closer to twenty-four percent.485 Reducing the weighted average
marginal tax rate from thirty percent to twenty-four percent would result in
a twenty percent reduction of costs.
Second, the net figure of $23 billion does not take into account those
expenses that would not qualify under the legislative proposal due to being
personal expenses. Nor is the $7 billion cost reflective of the fact that cer-
tain of these expenses are deductible under current law. In addition, al-
though the $23 billion of net tuition and fees is reduced by scholarships
received from the school and amounts received from Pell Grants, such
amount should be further reduced by any private scholarships or amount
received by students under employer educational assistance programs. Si-
milarly, to the extent that such expenses are used in computing another tax
benefit (for example, an Education Tax Credit), the $23 billion will be fur-
ther reduced.
In addition, to the extent that taxpayers are unable to take full advan-
tage of the amortization allowance, the revenue loss resulting from this pro-
482. Id. at tbl.362.
483. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC., 2007-2008 FEDERAL.
PELL GRANT PROGRAM, END-OF-YEAR REPORT 1, available at http://www.pellinstitute.org/
federalgrantprogram.html.
484. This figure should be compared with the approximately $12 billion revenue loss
estimate for fiscal year 2010 for the Education Tax Credits. See supra notes 188-189.
485. See Average Effective Marginal Tax Rates, GREG MANKIW'S BLOG: RANDOM
OBSERVATIONS FOR STUDENTS OF ECONOMICS (Oct. 1, 2008), http://gregmankiw.blog
spot.com/2008/10/average-effective-marginal-tax-rates.html (last visited June 4, 2011). In
discussing the tax proposals of the 2008 Presidential candidates, Mankiw states that
"[o]verall, the Obama plan would leave average effective marginal tax rates virtually un-
changed at 24 percent whereas the McCain plan would lower the average EMTR to 23 per-
cent."); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAx RATES ON LABOR INCOME
1 (2005), available at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/68xx/doc6854/1 1-10-LaborTaxation.pdf, (stat-
ing that: "In terms of federal individual income taxes, most taxpayers face effective marginal
rates of 15 percent or less. Less than one-fifth face rates of more than 25 percent, and about
7 percent of taxpayers face rates in excess of 30 percent . . .. If tax provisions enacted in
2001, 2003, and 2004 expire as scheduled [after 2010], marginal rates will increase across
most of the income distribution. Compared with a fully phased-in version of existing law,
expiration would raise effective marginal tax rates by an average of almost 3 percentage
points.").
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posal will be decreased.486 In other words, amortization deductions lost as a
result of taxpayers who die prior to their actuarial expected life or retire
from the workforce will reduce the total cost of this proposal. Changes in
enrollment, tuition prices and tax rates will also have an effect on the cost of
providing a legislative fix. Finally, any loss of revenue resulting from
amortization will be reduced by any increase in taxable income attributable
to education undertaken as a result of increased tax subsidization.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the revenue losses associated with re-
vising the tax treatment for education expenses are significant. However,
certain limitations could be implemented to mitigate these revenue losses.
First, the $7 billion revenue loss estimate assumes full implementation of
the program. If amortization of higher education expenses were prospec-
tive, the first year's revenue loss would be limited to a ratable share of $7
billion. Assuming a fifty-year useful life for such expenses, the first year's
revenue loss would be approximately $140 million.487 In such case, revenue
losses will continue to compound until full implementation, as additional
years become eligible for cost recovery.
Second, the expenses for which amortization is allowable could be li-
mited to tuition and fees, as these costs are more easily determinable and
can be verified from educational institutions. Alternatively, Professor Ar-
grett notes, "[fliscal effects can be further limited by placing a cap on al-
lowable expenses eligible for cost recovery at the various levels of higher
education."488 An example of this would be to set the limit on deductible
law school expenses for which amortization is allowed equal to the median
costs incurred by all students at law schools for a given year. Not only
would this reduce the revenue lost from this legislative proposal, but such a
limit would also prevent students at expensive private schools from receiv-
ing a greater benefit than students at less expensive publicly supported
ones.489 Furthermore, a cap on the amounts eligible for cost recovery would
486. See McNulty, supra note 449, at 33, (citing Goode, supra note 449, at 293-95.).
487. A fifty-year useful life assumes that the average age at which amortization be-
gins for taxpayers is thirty-three. See Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9, tbl.5 (2011). Using a thirty-year
amortization (assuming an average age of fifty-four) would increase the first year's revenue
loss to approximately $230 million.
Present value was computed using a seven percent discount rate. The U.S. Office of
Management and Budget uses a seven percent discount rate in evaluating Federal programs
whose benefits and costs are distributed over time. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR No. A-94, REVISED (2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars-a094#8.
The present value of amortizing $100,000 of education expenses for a 22-year old
college graduate would be $7,020-assuming a thirty percent marginal tax rate, a 60-year
useful life, and a seven percent discount rate. The present value for the same expenses for a
35-year old college graduate would be $8,582.
488. Argrett, supra note 449, at 657.
489. Id. However, Professor Argrett notes that:
Winter] 1125
Michigan State Law Review
make it less likely that institutions would raise their tuition and fees as a
direct result of the legislation.4 90
D. Coordination with the Tax Incentive Provisions
The Tax Incentive Provisions are inequitable, complicated, and, possi-
bly, inefficient.49' One solution would be to eliminate most of these incen-
tives. Provisions such as the qualified scholarship exclusion, the exclusion
for employer-provided educational assistance plans and the exclusion for
student loan forgiveness could be retained solely out of a desire to achieve
political palatability for a change to a long-standing policy of providing tax
incentives for higher education. Additionally, the current rules providing
for limited deductibility of student loan interest should be retained for fiscal
reasons.492 Repealing the remaining Tax Incentive Provisions would result
in approximately $8.5 billion in savings for fiscal year 2011.493 These sav-
ings would offset the cost of the legislative proposal discussed in this Ar-
ticle and could allow for additional direct aid for students that would be
more efficient, equitable, and less confusing than the Tax Incentives Provi-
sions such aid replaces.
This proposal attempts to be realistic, recognizing that widespread use
of the Tax Incentive Provisions makes it politically challenging to effectuate
their elimination.494 If any such provisions are to be retained, it is suggested
that all current tax incentives (other than those suggested to be retained pur-
suant to the preceding paragraph) be combined into a single deduction or
credit using a single set of definitions. Thus, for example, a single $3,000
tax credit could be provided to taxpayers in lower- and middle-income tax
brackets to be used for any tuition, fees, books, and supplies at qualified
educational institutions.
A counter-argument to placing a cap on these expenditures is that students attend-
ing expensive private schools would be truly disfavored-as they would not be
able to recover fully the costs of their education, which may in fact lead to higher
earnings than if they had not attended these private schools-while students at pub-
licly-supported schools would be able to recover their costs fully in many cases, as
well as receiving a substantial tax-free subsidy through lower tuition and fees.
Others may argue, however, that it is not unfair to place a cap on recoverable
amounts because the excess amount paid by students who attend expensive private
institutions ought to be viewed as consumption.
Id. at 657 n.208.
490. Id.
491. See generally discussion supra Section II.D.
492. See supra note 463.
493. See supra notes 188-89, 220, 276-277, 304, & 327.
494. See supra notes 400-402.
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V. CONCLUSION
Under current law, there are two ways that a taxpayer who has in-
curred education expenses can receive a tax benefit with respect to such
expenses. First, where the taxpayer has incurred ordinary and necessary
expenses in connection with her trade or business, such expenses are de-
ductible in full in the year paid or incurred. Second, expenses not qualify-
ing for such a deduction might be eligible for a tax benefit as a result of
certain Tax Incentive Provisions. The first route is inequitable, with com-
plicated provisions that often result in taxpayers receiving a deduction that
is either too large or too small. The second route is comprised of tax provi-
sions that are inefficient, inequitable, and complicated.
The legislative solution proposed in this Article does not provide a
perfect fix for the problems created by the current law. However, such a
solution attempts to accomplish good tax policy by allowing taxpayers to
offset the income they earn with the costs of the education that allowed for
such earnings. This solution, however, is costly. But, by tinkering with the
proposed legislative fix, the author believes that Congress could draft legis-
lation that would allow for good tax policy at a sensible cost.
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